The American Neptune

Maritime History & Arts

Volume Sixty-One, Number One

Winter 2001

THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

A Quarterly Journal of Maritime History and Arts

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Shorter Notices

by Briton C. Busch

On the Cover

The schooner yacht *America* painted in oil by Fitz Hugh Lane in 1851. This was done after a sketch by Oswald W. Brierly depicting *America* winning the Royal Yacht Club Cup at Cowes in 1851. M4696. Photograph by Mark Sexton of the Peabody Essex Museum, Salem, Mass.

The *American Neptune* (ISSN 0003-0155) is published quarterly by the Peabody Essex Museum, Incorporated, of Salem, Massachusetts, d/b/a the Peabody Essex Museum. Officers of the corporation are: John O. Parker, president; Carter H. Harrison and Robert N. Shapiro, vice presidents; C. Richard Carlson, treasurer; Lea B. Pendleton, secretary; and Richard Wheatland II, chairman of the Overseers.

Subscription rates are $39 for U.S. individuals and $45 for U.S. institutions. Non-U.S. subscription rates are $42 for individuals and $48 for institutions. Postage is paid at Lawrence, Kansas. Postmaster: send address changes to the *American Neptune,* Peabody Essex Museum, East India Square, Salem, Massachusetts 01970. You may telephone (978) 745-9500, ext. 3042, or e-mail will_lamoy@pem.org.

Information on the *American Neptune* is available at our website and can be accessed at www.pem.org/neptune.

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The reproductions are high-resolution digital prints of archival quality that are printed and matted on acid-free materials. The selection includes a truly extraordinary range of art, architecture, and culture from internationally renowned holdings of the museum's maritime art and history; American decorative art, folk art, portraits, costumes, and furniture; Native American art; as well as art from Africa, China, Japan, Korea, India, and Oceania.

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IN THE HEART OF THE SEA

The Tragedy of the Whaleship Essex

Nathaniel Philbrick

"A book that gets in your bones...Philbrick has created an eerie thriller from a centuries old tale....Scrupulously researched and eloquently written....It would have earned Melville's admiration."—*The New York Times Book Review.* "Spellbinding."—*Time.* Winner of the National Book Award.

Penguin 320 pp. 0-14-100182-8 $14.00

THE LOSS OF THE SHIP ESSEX, SUNK BY A WHALE

First-Person Accounts



Thomas Nickerson, Owen Chase, and Others

Edited by Thomas Philbrick. Introduction by Nathaniel Philbrick. Combines the newly discovered account of the wreck of the Essex by its fifteen-year-old cabin boy Nickerson with the long-definitive account by its first mate Chase. Also includes more than a dozen other contemporary accounts from articles and newspapers.

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

William Bligh and Edward Christian

Edited with an Introduction by R.D. Madison. For the first time in one volume—all the relevant texts and documents related to a drama that has fascinated generations. Here is the full text of Bligh's *Narrative of the Mutiny*, the minutes of the court proceedings gathered by Edward Christian in an effort to clear his brother's name, and the highly polemic correspondence between Bligh and Christian—all amplified by Robert Madison's illuminating Introduction and rich selection of subsequent *Bounty* narratives.

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MR. MIDSHIPMAN EASY



Frederick Marryat

New Introduction by Tim Fulford. Based on the author's own experiences, this is the tale of a young man who finds his destiny at sea during the Napoleanic Wars. "Frederick Marryat's greatness is undeniable."—Joseph Conrad.

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Thomas Helm

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

Donald A. Petrie

"This is an extraordinary book. All the romance and adventure from the age of piracy and privateers told from a hitherto unexplored perspective—that of the law of the time so constructed and interpreted that it fostered and protected what otherwise would have been an era of lawlessness at sea."—Walter Cronkite.

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Editor-in-Chief's Note

This journal is proud of its esteemed history. With this issue, we begin our sixty-first volume, which by any normal measure of longevity indicates an outstanding publication run. We are also proud to say that we continue to attract the very best quality of manuscripts. These potential articles are subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny and examination by internal and external readers, some of whom are on our editorial board. Other readers are specialists in the various disciplines—history, anthropology, marine archaeology, marine biology, maritime and international law, and politics—and may be called upon by the editor as needed.

As editor in chief, I have always focused on what our readers would wish to see in our pages. Not only do our lead articles need to be previously unpublished works, but they must also be well-informed, well-researched contributions. Our world is jammed with material of a printed nature that is often recycled. In such circumstances, we have to make sure that the *American Neptune* publishes only excellent and original work. Our reviewers have from time to time spotted manuscripts that are not entirely original or convincingly researched, and we have had to reject such works. We would not want to suffer the embarrassment of having published something cribbed from another source. Plagiarism is a plague on all our houses, and one of my biggest jobs as editor is to seek out any violators. In this case, vigilance is the price of originality. At the same time, we insist that our articles be examples of authenticity. Although the subject may be original, its treatment might be less than what is required. I have had to send back a number of potentially good manuscripts because the work was incompletely researched.

Many of those who have submitted their texts for consideration have a hard time reining in their enthusiasm, and they carry their details and discourse to excessive lengths. A well-formulated argument, one buttressed by superbly documented research, nicely fabricated into a solid and sensible whole, is what we are looking for. In other words, many prospective articles would have a higher rate of acceptance if the authors took adequate time and care in the submission of their work. The assumption still exists that it is the obligation of the editor and his/her copyeditor to perfect the submitted manuscript, but I assure you that this is certainly not the case.

To our parent organization, the Peabody Essex Museum, I want to express my appreciation. As editor, I have always had the most complete support and assurance that this special publication, one of the museum's flagships, will have a long, continuing, and exalted life. The Peabody Essex Museum has never faltered in its support of the *American Neptune;* indeed, at every turn, it has assisted us and made our progress an exciting and enduring one. The journal exhibits true Yankee zeal and has seen steady progress in its advertising and subscriptions.

As to our themes and areas of focus and interest, this current issue rather nicely exemplifies the concentrations we have long held dear. We begin with a story of a Continental Navy brig of the era

of the American Revolution. We then move to a story about the language of sail, more specifically to one of those Norse terms that we still use today ashore and afloat. Another field of interest, yachting (in this case the America's Cup), is covered in a discussion about the suitable sailing rig for a famous vessel. Next follows an account of navy wives and WAVES, and what they left behind in the way of documentary records. We conclude our articles with a study of a vessel that would now be forgotten had not the author thought the record of this vessel well worth preserving. Maritime history is more often than not about a ship or a boat. As editor, I have constantly kept in mind that our readers want to know about vessels, be they merchant or military.

We once again offer a strong segment of book reviews and book notices. We only review books suitable for the interests of our readers, and our requirements are very selective. To Professor Briton C. Busch and Geraldine Ayers, we extend our thanks for conscientious work that is invariably superbly executed.

To Dori Phillips, the assistant publisher, I extend our appreciation for making this the splendidly printed and beautifully formatted work that it is. Credit must also be given to our many volunteers. I am also reassured by the fact that I may rely upon William T. La Moy, the director of publications for the museum, for technical and moral support.

Please encourage your friends and associates to become subscribers. In that way, you can do your part to see that our great journal continues into the future. As always, it is my personal pleasure to see another issue in print, and I am confident that this preliminary issue for volume sixty-one continues the high standards of those of the six decades (and some two hundred and forty issues) that have gone before.

Barry Gough
Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, Ontario

The Continental Naval Brig *Andrew (Andrea) Doria*

by Louis Arthur Norton

The Continental brig *Andrew Doria* tacked into the harbor channel of the Dutch West Indies island of St. Eustatius on 16 November 1776. Her captain, Isaiah Robinson, ordered the new flag of the United States of America raised on her ensign staff. As the ship passed the fort that guarded the port, the *Andrew Doria* fired an eleven-gun salute to honor the flag of the Netherlands. Minutes passed, and then puffs of gun smoke arose from the shore followed by the muffled thumps in the cadence of a returned salute. The American naval ensign had been recognized by a European power.

Louis Arthur Norton, a native of Gloucester, Massachusetts, is a professor emeritus at the University of Connecticut Health Center in Farmington. He is a frequent contributor to maritime history journals, and most recently published *Joshua Barney: Hero of the Revolutionary War and 1812* from the Naval Institute Press.

He would like to thank Professor Emeritus Christopher Collier (Connecticut State Historian) for his constructive criticism, Dirk Tang of Amsterdam for obtaining Dutch source material on de Graaff, Professor Cornelius Palmeijer for his translation of the documents, and his wife, Elinor, for her patience and proofreading.

The tale of the *Andrew Doria* touches upon several areas in late eighteenth-century American maritime history. Paramount are the reasons why the Continental Congress opted to form a Continental Navy. America's pre-Revolutionary economy, particularly in its agricultural domain, was damaged by British control of colonial mercantile centers. One crucial key to a successful revolution was the development of an American naval force to diminish the effect of Britain's naval presence. The strategic necessity for this navy was the protection of commerce and supply of troops with food and arms in the far-flung fields of the rebelling colonists.

The *Andrew Doria* was the first American naval vessel to receive a cannon salute by a sovereign foreign nation, and that cannon salute at St. Eustatius was the focus of a well-known book by Barbara Tuchman.[1] Tuchman argued that the significance of the incident was that it precipitated a diplomatic quarrel among Britain, Holland, and the United States. There is evidence that it was also a symptom of the desperate need the Americans had for arms and munitions during the early part of the Revolutionary War and the duplicity that was used to obtain them. The

Dutch government signed a treaty to placate the British, then carried on business as usual, so that the Dutch governor Johannes de Graaff could personally profit. From analysis of the testimony of various witnesses to the event, the salute appeared to be a mere courtesy—two guns less than the normal recognition of a sovereign, and the same number used to acknowledge a merchant ship. Regardless of the number of shots fired, the British use of this minor "insult" as a pretext for raising an international issue was not bizarre. Such a quiet note of diplomatic protest would likely have been ignored in America and perhaps Holland. A similar salute went unnoticed at Denmark's St. Croix a few weeks before this incident with no political repercussions. Apparently, the reason for the high profile protest was not the salute, but to call attention to the Dutch government that they were continuing to ignore the embargo order. It was more diplomatically correct to raise a lesser issue related to the central matter rather than cause a naval confrontation leading to the breaking of Dutch neutrality or a widening of the war.

The 1777 battle of the Delaware River marked the end of the first vessels of the Continental Navy. The long-term consequence of the defeat on the Delaware and the scuttling of the *Andrew Doria* may have been more far reaching than its heralded cannon salute episode. The brig's demise displayed both America's vulnerability and portended a path toward an ultimate Revolutionary War military triumph.

A painting of Captain Nicholas Biddle by Orlando Lagman after a painting by James Peale. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

The Continental Congress decided that the American ports and waterways had to be opened and America's harbors fortified in order to dislodge the British from the colonies. This expensive and risky venture was contemplated in order to maintain not only the independent economic status, but also the strategic viability of the nascent states. The inland waterways and coastal sea lanes were highways for the movement of heavy trading goods for the colonies. The key to the control of colonial North America was a naval presence in its port cities and along its water routes. In spite of rampant smuggling, a naval command of harbors and watersheds allowed the British colonial government to tax and control waterborne commerce and, in turn, control the American interior. In addition, command of the harbors also performed a strategic military need, protection of Britain's sovereign land holdings.

The principal needs of the rebelling colonists were the establishment of a military presence and the continuance of profitable trade. The way to assure both objectives was through the formation of its own navy. The creation of a Continental Navy was not universally popular among those of

influence. Samuel Chase of Maryland called it "the Maddest idea in the World."[2] However, it was an idea that made sense because the population of trade centers of the North American colonies grew around seaports and brought burgeoning prosperity to both sides of the Atlantic.

Economic factors surrounding the American Revolution suggest that Britain's solvency was partially dependent upon commercial connections with the American colonies. War meant supporting an increasing military establishment thousands of miles away without benefit of the colonies' trade. Britain had to subdue the colonies quickly or not at all. A prolonged conflict would likely attract opportunistic European powers to the aid of the colonists. In addition, a lengthy war could cause an upheaval in Britain's economic and political system with the need to sustain an army and navy to fight on a distant shore.

The colonists apparently felt that because of the vast American coast and thinly dispersed navy, the British could not significantly affect the American economy. The Continental Congress was committed to having open American ports, politically neutral commerce, and the active pursuit of free trade. The Americans could not successfully challenge the British in establishing their own independence in trade, however, without an effective protective naval presence of their own.[3] "The very bond that had held the empire together . . . now became the primary medium through which each side [England and America] attacked each other."[4]

The Americans had an advantage in feeding and supplying their forces, namely, the vast potential manpower readily at hand and the diffuse and large agricultural society that was not yet terribly disrupted by the war. To keep the sea lanes open was the primary task of the individual state navies, not that of the Continental Navy. Vessels in state navies rarely sailed off soundings, remaining close to home in order to defend local interests. Thus, the defense of several thousand miles of coastline; the protection of merchantmen; and the ferrying of cargo, diplomats, and the mail became the primary mission of the Continental Navy.

On 30 October 1775, Congress passed the specific resolution for the purchase of naval vessels. The *Journal of the Continental Congress* stated that a "committee [that had been] appointed to prepare an estimate &c and to fit out the vessels, brought in their report" and included notes that there was difficulty in finding "Seamen to man 4 Vessells."[5] Congress ordered the formation of the first naval fleet: the *Andrew Doria, Cabot, Columbus,* and *Alfred.* On 6 December, John Adams made this note in his autobiography:

> This committee . . . purchased and filled five Vessells. The first We named *Alfred* in honor of the founder of the greatest navy that ever existed. The second *Columbus* after the Discover[er] of this quarter of the globe. The third *Cabot,* for the Discoverer of this northern Part of the Continent. The fourth *Andrew Doria* (also known as the *Andrea Doria* as well as the *Andy Doria* to its crew) in memory of the Great Genoese Admiral who never saw North America and the fifth *Providence,* for the town where she was purchased, the Residence of Governor Hopkins and his Brother Eseck whom We appointed first Captain.[6]

On 19 December 1775, Dunlap's *Maryland Gazette* noted that the new naval ships had been known by previous names. The ship *Black Prince* became the *Alfred,* the ship *Sally* became the *Columbus,* the brig *Sally* became the *Cabot* and the brig *Defiance* was renamed the *Andrew Doria.*[7] The ship *Alfred* was armed with twenty-four guns, *Columbus* with eighteen or twenty (accounts differ), the brig *Andrew Doria* with fourteen or sixteen (accounts differ), the brig *Cabot* with fourteen, and the sloop *Providence* with twelve. The schooner *Wasp* and the sloop *Fly,* both with eight guns, were also added.

On 22 December 1775, the Continental Congress announced that Esek Hopkins would be the commander in chief of the fleet. Nicholas Biddle was named captain of the *Andrew Doria* with James Josiah serving as his first lieutenant.[8] Another young first lieutenant, John Paul Jones, was assigned to the *Alfred,* Hopkins's flagship of the fledgling fleet. On 4 January 1776, the vessels left Philadelphia as a unit but were icebound in the river until 17 January. The *Andrew Doria* tried to make for the sea again, this time in the company of the sloops *Providence* and *Fly,* only to be icebound once more on 11 February. On the fifteenth of February, Nicholas Biddle wrote to his brother James:

> I now muster 109 Men in the Whole, am in every respect well equipt. Have by great odds the fastest Vessel in the fleet except a Small sloop call[e]d *Fly* and the Schooner from Maryland with which I have not had a fair tryal. . . . all the Officers and Men of the Fleet have Signd an agreement to share Prizes that may be taken in case of separation.[9]

The 75-foot, 190-ton *Andrew Doria,* Nicholas Biddle in command, was a small, nimble vessel. During her cruises, she carried a crew of up to 130 and was, by most accounts, armed with fourteen four-pound guns and a number of swivel guns mounted on deck. Although there are detailed physical descriptions for the *Cabot* and *Alfred,* including the ships' colors and aspects of rigging, none have been found for the *Andrew Doria.* The converted merchant brigs *Andrew Doria* and *Cabot* were about the same size and tonnage; it is assumed that they resembled each other.

The Continental Navy now had a full complement of vessels but a shortage of guns and powder. Because of the overwhelming British presence prowling American waters, a naval expedition to a foreign port became necessary. On 1 March 1776, John Paul Jones raised the Grand Union flag to a flagstaff mounted on the stern of the *Alfred* as a signal for *Andrew Doria, Cabot, Columbus, Providence, Fly,* and *Hornet* to set sail from Baltimore in the company of a sister ship-of-war, the schooner *Wasp.*[10] Assembled by Commodore Hopkins, this humble armada of eight small vessels sailed to New Providence (Nassau) in the Bahamas. During the voyage south, the *Hornet* collided with the *Fly.* Neither vessel could reach the destination and support this mission.

There was a small fort protecting the Bahamian port, but the town was deemed by the American commanders to be easy prey, and a source of much-needed arms and munitions. Nassau was a small village sprawled along the water's edge behind Hog Island. Two forts guarded it, Montagu on the eastern shore and Nassau to the west. Most of the gunpowder was stored in Fort Nassau, but a civilian militia protected both forts. The British had withdrawn their naval forces except for one schooner, *St. John,* at that moment careened down at the docks for repairs. The American fleet, now six vessels with 813 sailors and marines, made sail for the eastern channel. A landing party consisting of 250 sailors and a small contingent of marines marched to the bulwark of Fort Montagu. The number of marines used in this raid is not known, but 226 marines were available.[11] The British fired a few eighteen-pound shots without inflicting casualties. An officer of the fort came to the gate under a flag of truce to ask the commander of the marines their identity and intentions. The British militia officer decided that shedding of blood served no purpose and surrendered, thereby allowing the Americans to spend the night ashore within the fort.

Meanwhile, the British governor, Montfort Browne, aware of the American threat, ordered the captain of the merchant sloop *Mississippi Packet* to jettison his cargo of lumber and, undercover of darkness, to load 162 barrels of Fort Nassau's gunpowder on board for shipment to St. Augustine. The British sloop crossed a treacher-

The *Andrew Doria* (1775–77) from a painting by W. Nowland Van Powell. Courtesy of the Memphis Council Navy League through the U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

ous sandbar, thus eluding capture by the American fleet. Accordingly, when Commodore Hopkins and the rest of the captains came ashore on 4 March, they learned that the main purpose of their expedition was only partially successful. According to the log of the *Andrew Doria,* this expedition captured these items:

> Large Quantitys of Shel & Shott, 16 Morters of different Sizes: 30 Cask of powder & some Provisions fifty two cannon Eighteens twenty fore & Thirty two pounders loaded with

> Foynd Shott Double headed & Grape & several other Articles.[12]

This raid was the first coordinated venture of the Continental Navy on foreign soil and the first time that American marines, although perhaps small in number, went ashore in an amphibious landing. The element of surprise and attacking from a superior position made the excursion a rudimentary success, but the voyage would prove costly in an unexpected manner.

The Americans set sail for home on 16 March 1776 with their prizes and three prisoners, Governor Browne and two local officials. Shortly before the ships left the Delaware on their excursion, smallpox had been reported among the seamen. Because of inexperience among the American officers in dealing with such a matter, the spread of the infectious disease reached epidemic proportions and raced from ship to ship. Captain Biddle, who had been trained in the Royal Navy, ran a very clean vessel, and some of his men apparently had been variolated. (Variolation was a subcutaneous inoculation with fluid from smallpox-infected blisters, used as a preventative measure against the disease from the first quarter to the end of the eighteenth century. Dr. Edward Jenner discovered the more effective smallpox vaccination process using extracted bovine virus in 1796.)

Because of Captain Biddle's attention to cleanliness and the possibility of some immunity to smallpox, Hopkins decided to make the *Andrew Doria* into a transportation vessel for the gravely ill. Technically, she became the first hospital ship of the American navy. Every available space was given over to accommodating the sick. During the trip north, the surgeon and his mate were taken sick with smallpox, causing additional suffering among the patients. The routine of sail changes was punctuated by sad commands of "heave to" so the crew could have periodic funeral services and burials at sea.[13] The exact number is not recorded.

The next naval ventures involving the *Andrew Doria* were captures of eight British vessels (*Betsey, Crawford, Elizabeth, Lawrence, Molly, Nathaniel and Elizabeth, Oxford,* and *Peggy*) and one recapture of an American sloop *(John and Joseph)* that appear as log entries of the ship.[14] The most unusual captures were those of the Scottish transport *Oxford* carrying a company of the Black Watch 42nd Regiment and the English transport *Crawford* that carried a company of the 71st Regiment. Biddle jested with an old naval term, stating that he captured them largely "with the speaking trumpet."[15] These captures were the beginning of the distinguished American naval career of Captain Nicholas Biddle.

Because of her many successes, the *Andrew Doria* was mentioned in dispatches to and from many prominent patriots in the American government, including George Washington, John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, and Silas Deane.[16] These notations lauded the brig's successful seizure of British vessels or the missions in which she participated.

Other Continental naval officers figured prominently in the history of the *Andrew Doria:* Captain Isaiah Robinson and his executive officer Lieutenant Joshua Barney, both of the Continental Navy sloop *Sachem.* On 7 September 1776, Robinson and Barney were rewarded for their valor with transfers to a larger naval warship, *Andrew Doria.* Minutes of the Continental Marine Committee for 20 September 1776 read as follows: "Resolved: That Captain Eseiah [Isaiah] Robinson be appointed Commander of the Brigantine *Andrew Doria* in the Room of Cap Biddle, signed John Brown."[17] No reason is given for the replacement of Biddle with Robinson other than the implication of a reward of a larger ship for both distinguished captains. This is the first document mentioning that the ship was brigantine-rigged.[18] On 21 September, Robert Morris wrote to Captain Robinson asking him to take

command and to get the ship provisioned and ready for sea within two months.[19] The Marine Committee wrote a letter to Silas Deane on 23 October 1776 ordering the *Andrew Doria* to St. Eustatius with a dispatch to William Bingham at Martinico.[20] The *Andrew Doria* started upon a voyage that would bring her a measure of both fame and controversy.

At the start of the Revolution, Holland, along with Portugal, Denmark, and Austria, generally forbade their subjects to supply contraband to the British revolt in the colonies. The Stadhouder, or States-General, was monarchical and generally pro-British. The States-General publicly condemned the Declaration of Independence and sympathized with the British efforts to extinguish the insurrection. On the other hand, the Dutch were opportunists and astute businessmen. The general population of Holland interpreted the law as a bureaucratic hurdle rather than an absolute roadblock.

St. Eustatius, or "Statia" as it was more commonly known, was a Dutch Island at the northern end of the gently curving chain of the Leeward Caribbean Islands.[21] A center of legal and quasilegal trade, the island became an important source of arms that were difficult to obtain in the early part of the Revolution. The local merchants and bureaucracy were sympathetic to the American cause and liked turning a tidy profit. Several firms from the Netherlands quietly engaged in a clandestine traffic through French harbors, shipping sizable quantities of military supplies to Statia. This Caribbean port became a well-stocked and cheap source of European goods, as well as an economic and strategic threat to Britain. Johannes de Graaff was appointed governor of St. Eustatius on 26 April 1776, but the islanders considered the appointment disastrous, assuming that their profitable illicit trade would be curtailed. De Graaff, however, was a businessman and very aware of the mercantile possibilities from allowing this illegal commerce to continue to thrive.

In late October 1776, the *Andrew Doria* sailed for the Dutch Island of St. Eustatius, entering its harbor on 16 November flying the flag of the Grand Union on her ensign staff. (The Grand Union banner had thirteen alternating red and white strips, signifying the united thirteen colonies. In the corner was a canton of the combined red St. George and white St. Andrew crosses on a blue field from England and Scotland respectively. It was the British maritime merchant ensign with six horizontal white stripes oversewn on it making thirteen stripes; the white stripes indicated a separation or independence from the mother country.) As the *Andrew Doria* backed her topsails to slow her headway in preparation to drop anchor, Captain Robinson made a ceremonial entry into port and ordered an eleven-gun salute to be fired. Abraham Ravené, the commander of the fort protecting the harbor, surmised that the unfamiliar flag was that of an American warship and that returning a salute might be offensive to the British. He sent a message to Governor de Graaff, whose home was near the fort, asking for specific instructions. Ravené was then directed to answer the salute with cannon volleys.[22]

This token of international maritime courtesy, the firing of eleven shots from the small four-pounders of the *Andrew Doria* and its return from the larger fort-based cannons of unknown size turned out to be a diplomatic indiscretion. Until then, the newly self-declared independent nation of the United States had not received formal recognition from any European power. Such recognition was contrary to the stated foreign policy of the Dutch States-General. When news of this incident reached neighboring St. Christopher (now St. Kitts), its British governor, Craister Greathead, sent a vehement protest to Governor de Graaff. De Graaff responded by saying that Statia had a policy of making a distinction between merchant or private vessels and war-

The first official foreign salute of the American flag. The *Andrew Doria* carried the flag, and the fort on St. Eustatius issued the courtesy. Painting by Phillips Melville. Courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

ships of foreign nations. When a warship fired a salute, by custom, his fortress fired a return salute gun for gun.

Greathead was furious about the support and protection that the rebels received at the Dutch island with good reason. Statia served a perfidious function. It also was the Caribbean center for equipping and outfitting the American privateers. On 1 December 1776, a British merchantman left St. Kitts and was soon attacked by an American sloop, the *Baltimore Hero,* also flying the Grand Union flag. This ship had just left Statia and, after directing its prize crew to Baltimore, sailed the *Baltimore Hero* back to the safety of the neutral Dutch port. This incident further enraged Greathead. On 17 December 1776, the British governor wrote a complaint about the salute incident to the British Foreign Office. He protested that, after *Andrea Doria* anchored in the harbor of St. Eustatius following the salute incident, it was allowed to load gunpowder and war provisions for the use of the American rebel army. The exact number of shots fired in the salute ceremony became a point of heated dispute. In his report of the incident to the Foreign Office, Greathead wrote that he was convinced that a salute was deliberately returned by a Dutch fort to the *Andrew Doria* under rebel colors, a flagrant indignity to His Majesty's flag. He was, however, uncertain if the rebels saluted with thirteen or eleven guns, or if the salute was returned with a like number or an inferior number of guns.

In his defense, de Graaff claimed that he did not know the American colors. Because they resembled those of Great Britain, he ordered the salute out of normal courtesy. In a letter to Vice-Admiral James Young, British commander of the Leeward station in Antigua, the Dutch governor said that "the only thing that an active Commander can do . . . [is] redress the Respective Grievances of the Subject nations in Amity by every legal method within the limits of his power and instructions . . . during the Great disturbance between Great Britain & her North American Colonies."[23] De Graaff went on to explain that he could only enforce the treaty laws on the island between Britain and the Dutch nation as he understood them.

Other depositions of the event were given before British magistrates. John Trottman, a seventeen-year-old Princeton student from Barbados, had been impressed into service on the *Andrew Doria* from the docks of Philadelphia. When the *Andrew Doria* anchored in Statia, Trottman jumped ship and later made his way to St. Kitts. On 14 December, the young deserter made a deposition about the incident and added to the confusion when he stated that the *Andrew Doria* "saluted the Orange Fort with Thirteen Gun, and that, after some interval, the Salute was returned by s[ai]d Fort with nine or eleven Guns . . . [he] doth not recollect," but "during the time of the Salute and the return thereof, having the Colours called the Continental Congress Colours then flying."[24] Another deposee, James Fraser, identified only as a gentleman, also testified that the Dutch fort saluted with nine guns in response to the eleven fired by the American brig.[25]

Captain John Colpoys of the warship *Seaford* was sent to Statia by Admiral Young on 14 December to present the formal protest of the British. Colpoys sent a letter to Young dated 31 December 1776 stating that when he entered the harbor, de Graaff had hoped that "I would Salute the Fort, and that an equal number of Guns shou'd be returned. . . . I found an evasive answer was given on the subject of the Forts returning Salutes to Vessels, wearing the Colours, of the American Rebels. . . . His answer was, that Statia was a free port . . . all Vessels under whatsoever Colours, were at liberty to come in there, and if the Fort was saluted, 2 Guns less was returned to all Mercht Vessels, to Kings ships an equal number." Colpoys went on to say that "I cou'd never think of degrading the Flag of the King [when a governor] salutes, from the Fort, of a State . . . made no distinction between the flag, of a Lawful sovereign, or that of Pirates, & Rebels." He stated in his conclusion that "Governor de Graaf is well known to have given more Aid, and Assistance, to the American Rebels than any other man in his Government, being by far, the most wealthy, & considerable Merchant in St. Eustatia, he of course, has been the best able to carry on the most extensive Illicit Trade with the Rebellious Colonists."[26]

This was a devastating indictment and carried weight with the Admiralty. The charge of favoritism was probably the result of the work of an American representative to Statia, Abraham van Bibber, agent of Maryland and part owner of the *Baltimore Hero*. Van Bibber actively encouraged American trade with St. Eustatius and made sure that all Americans were treated with great hospitality.[27] Since *Andrew Doria* was a Continental Navy warship, van Bibber may have arranged for the hospitality afforded Robinson to be at the highest level.

Britain made an issue of the salute based upon the violations of the Dutch munitions embargo. The British parliament sent a formal complaint to den Haag on 21 February 1777 to disavow the salute, dismiss and punish Governor de Graaff, and extend and enforce the West Indies munitions embargo. If satisfaction were not received within three weeks, Britain would recall its ambassador to the Netherlands. Already, a

week before, an order had gone out to British naval commanders to search all Dutch ships entering or leaving Statia for munitions or military goods. The Dutch government called de Graaff home to answer to these charges at a formal enquiry.

Ultimately, de Graaff was neither dismissed nor punished. However, the government did reaffirm the earlier embargo order in the West Indies against the export of military stores to the Americans. They went even further to disclaim acts of their officials that might be interpreted as recognition of American independence. This was a strange twist of practical commerce. During the early part of the Revolutionary War, the British merchants ended up helping the American cause because of maritime insurance policies. Fearing French attacks on merchant ships, the ship owners opted for lower insurance rates from Britain to St. Kitts, and a second trip from St. Kitts at higher rates to St. Eustatius. It was believed that the goods were safer there, but now, under the neutral Dutch flag, they were fair trading game for the Americans.

De Graaff returned to den Haag eighteen months later to write a large multivolume defense of his action. He was completely exonerated by the Dutch government and returned to Statia in 1779, where he became a favorite of the revolutionaries. An American privateer was named for de Graaff, and his portrait was hung in the New Hampshire State House (a copy of an original portrait in Surinam) in gratitude for the "first salute" and to honor the Dutch armed neutrality that gave one belligerent such satisfaction and the other total discontent.[28] There is irony in this honor from one of the most libertarian American states. De Graaff was an arms merchant, an opportunist, a slave trader, and a high government official who deliberately turned his back on the treaty for personal gain. His respected place in American history was perhaps achieved because his profit agenda helped the revolutionary cause.

Captain Robinson now had to contend with the new challenges of naval warfare. The *Andrew Doria* encountered the sloop *Racehorse* that was part of the British fleet assigned to protect the British commerce in the Caribbean on 6 December 1776. The two vessels, evenly matched in firepower and manpower, swapped broadsides. The gun crews on the American vessel were faster reloading. Their shots damaged both the hull and rigging of the *Racehorse,* splintering her spars and breaching her hull. The British were forced to strike their colors, giving Robinson a prize to take to Philadelphia. The American ship's carpenter and crew went to work patching the *Racehorse*'s hull, fabricating new spars and braces and mending sails, turning her into a Continental Navy brig, Benjamin Dunn serving as prize master.

A few days later, the two brigs engaged and captured a well-armed snow, the *Thomas,* under the command of Thomas Nicolson. She surrendered with little resistance and no loss of life, and Barney was given command of this second prize. With two prizes plus the mother ship *Andrew Doria,* the rebel crew was too small to handle the ships alone. They would have to coax at least part of the captured British crew to change their allegiance with a bribe of a share in the prize money. This was not as difficult a task as one might imagine since many British seamen were poor and had been pressed into naval service.

With an offer of money, the persuasive Barney managed to recruit a large number of British sailors to join his prize crew on the commodious snow. The three ships sailed north, but as they reached the Virginia coast, a December winter squall blew the vessels out of sight of one another. On Christmas night, the keel of the *Thomas* struck the sandy shoals off Chincoteague Island. Barney got the hapless snow off the sandbar and back out to sea, but when the weather cleared, the watch of the *Thomas* sighted the sails of a British sloop-of-war. The twenty-four-gun *Perseus,* George Keith Elphinstone in command, recaptured the snow without a fight. Captain



Reconstruction of the fourteen-gun brig *Cabot.* It is believed that the *Andrew Doria* was similar in design. The image is from John F. Millar's *American Ships of the Colonial and Revolutionary Period* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 83.

Elphinstone granted Barney a parole on his word of honor that he would not bear arms against the king until an officer exchange of like rank could be arranged at some time in the future. By the terms of his parole, the *Andrew Doria*'s second-in-command, Barney, was indefinitely tied to the shore, a prisoner fettered by his word as an officer.

From March through September 1777, the *Andrew Doria* was ordered to patrol the coast and carry dispatches and cargo, mundane duty for the naval vessel. On 5 August 1777, the Continental Navy Board appointed Captain Robinson of the *Andrew Doria* to command a squadron of vessels, including the *Repulse, Champion, Surprise, Fly, Convention,* and schooner *Delaware,* to protect the Cape May channel. This order appeared to be given more to maintain morale and discipline in the squadron than to gather intelligence about enemy ship movements. It is not clear whether this was a pervasive fleet problem at the time or preparation for the battle that was to come. In late September, the fleet was ordered to move up the Delaware River off Chester, Pennsylvania, to start to reinforce the forts along the river. This strategy would place the fleet near Philadelphia as the prelude for a defensive naval engagement.

On 26 September, Philadelphia, the home port of the *Andrew Doria,* was captured by the British army forces under General Sir William Howe. This was an unusual military event, analogous to the Dutch Navy sailing up the Thames River to bombard and capture London. The *Andrew Doria* would be a pawn in the complex land and sea chess match that was to follow.

The British held the mouth of the strategically vital Delaware Bay and obviously needed to complete their link between Philadelphia and the bay. They commenced a bombardment of the American defenses on 2 October 1777. First to come under attack was a small redoubt at Billingsport commanded by Colonel William Bradford. On 3 October, Bradford ordered his men evacuated into small boats and mentioned that "I stayed myself with Cap[t] Robeson [Robinson of the *Andrew Doria*] of the Continental Brig on shore for some more advice."[29] Initially, the American naval fleet was tightly packed along the Delaware River channel leading to Philadelphia. The armada consisted of four vessels of the Pennsylvania State Navy, the frigate *Montgomery,* two xebecs (lateen-rigged ships of Mediterranean or North African design), thirteen row galleys, twenty-six half galleys, two barge-like floating batteries, and eight vessels of the Continental Navy (the frigates *Delaware, Hornet, Wasp,* and *Andrew Doria,* the xebecs *Champion* and *Repulse,* and the sloops *Fly* and *Surprise,* the latter the renamed former British vessel *Racehorse*).

The Americans on shore prepared for battle, reinforcing their main defensive bases at Fort Mifflin on Mud Island at the mouth of the Schuylkill and Fort Mercer at Red Bank on the New Jersey shore, just southwest of the city. The commanders had set up *chevaux de frise,* cribs made from heavy timbers and filled with stones set into the riverbed. Protruding from these obstructions were very large timbers, the size of the mast of a small ship. At the top of each pole were immense iron spikes sharpened to impale unwary approaching vessels. These *chevaux* were set at narrow points in the river: the southern channel between the Billingsport redoubt and Billings Island and the channel south of Hog Island in front of Mud Island, stretching onto the shallows off Red Bank. If the British could successfully avoid the barricades, they might stray from the channel and run aground. There the guns of the two forts south of League Island at the bend of the Delaware southwest of Philadelphia and the American galleys, floating batteries, and vessels, including the *Andrew Doria,* were deployed to destroy them. The strategy was to use the American vessels as stationary gun platforms against the generally larger but less maneuverable British warships.

On 22 October, the defenders of Fort Mercer under Colonel Christopher Greene of Rhode Island repulsed a fierce assault from a Hessian unit under the command of Colonel Carl Emil Kurt von Donop. The battle now turned to the American floating batteries, the remnants of the Continental Navy, in a last-ditch attempt to keep the waterway from British domination. The *Andrew Doria* was short of experienced officers, but on 20 October 1777, a letter had reached Barney from Captain Elphinstone stating that Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia had arranged for his exchange for British Lieutenant Edmund Joshua Moriarty of the *Solebay.* An American scouting party had captured the Royal Navy lieutenant while he led a water party ashore.[30] Barney quickly rejoined Robinson and his shipmates on the *Andrew Doria* stationed off Mud Island.

On 8 November, Brigadier General James M. Varnum, commander of the defense of the *Delaware,* wrote to General George Washington:

> the continental vessells under Capt Robinson's command [of the *Andrew Doria*] will lay at the Mouth of the Schylkill and the Mouth of Timber Creek. I have placed the Continental and Militia Guards, upon Timber and Manto Creeks.[31]

The guns of the *Andrew Doria* were employed in harassing skirmishes and bombardments of fixed positions on shore. Effective American cannon fire held British naval forces in Delaware Bay below Philadelphia for forty days, but the inevitable conclusion played itself out. First, the Continental twenty-four-gun frigate *Delaware,* the large American vessel, ran aground on a sandbar on an outgoing tide. The British rolled in some field artillery pieces to buffet the immobile ship from shore and forced the *Delaware* to strike her colors. Next, the British deployed shallow-draft ships to match the Americans and added seven larger vessels, the sixty-four-gun *Somerset,* the smaller *Pearl,* and the *Isis,* plus two familiar foes to the Americans, the *Roebuck* and *Liverpool.* During the earliest attack, the Americans bombarded the sixty-four-gun *Augusta.* In an attempt to elude the rebel harassing fire, she ran aground, caught fire, and exploded. The *Augusta* was the largest British vessel lost in action with the Americans during either the Revolutionary War or the War of 1812. Continental Army Colonel Bradford described this event in the letter quoted above as follows: "the fire was so incessant that by all accounts the elements seemed to be in flames; about 12 o'clock the *Augusta* blew up . . . present[ing] a glorious sight before she blew . . . the flames issuing thro every port she had." Shortly after the dramatic loss of the *Augusta,* the British eighteen-gun sloop-of-war *Merlin* caught fire and was scuttled. In spite of these significant events, the persistent British cannon fire took a heavy toll at Fort Mifflin on Mud Island.

Fort Mifflin came under fire from three shore batteries at hastily prepared redoubts on Carpenter's and Province Islands, marshy land on the western shore by the mouth of the Schuylkill. The main assault started at 7:30 A.M. of 10 November. On 14 November, Howe sent a floating battery with two thirty-two-pounders to within five hundred yards of the fort to finish the siege. The next day, the fort was evacuated to the safety of Red Bank.

On 20 November 1777, the Continental Army commander ordered the burning of all the American vessels, including the *Andrew Doria,* to keep them out of the hands of the British. Bradford described the end of the *Andrew Doria* in a letter to Thomas Wharton Jr., president of the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council:

> there being no wind, the Continental Brig *Andora Doria, Xebec, Repulse* and *Champion,* sloops *Race horse* & *Fly,* with the Province ships and two Floating Batteries, were set on Fire and burnt, which made a most terrible conflagration, to the great joy of our cruel & wicked enemies, and much to the depression of my spirits.[32]

Most of the ships of the original Continental Navy, including the *Andrew Doria,* were destroyed at about the same time, in the same way, and in the same place. Those who could escaped in the galleys that rowed toward Bordentown on the New Jersey shore.

The British were able to concentrate their fire on Fort Mercer and, on 22 November, seized it with an overwhelming force. The next day a British man-of-war came up the Delaware to Philadelphia signaling the passage of control of the Delaware waterway to the British, from the cape to the capital.

The defeat on the Delaware and the burning of the *Andrew Doria* may have been more far reaching than the vessel's raid on Nassau or her better known cannon salute. Although the Continental Navy now had expanded beyond those eight original vessels from Philadelphia, the loss of those ships evinced the need for a naval force to protect commerce beyond what the united colonies could provide. The British defeat at Saratoga on 17 October 1777 gave the French confidence in the ability of the Continental army. With the loss of its navy in the defense of

Philadelphia, the Americans came to realize that prudence might lie in turning to the French Navy for help. The decision to do so was crucial and ultimately turned the war around with the victory at Yorktown, where the French Navy kept British troops from being reinforced and resupplied from the sea.

The actions in which the *Andrew Doria* had participated reflected the military, trade, and diplomatic struggles that accompanied the early days of the Revolution. Her passing, while a signal of America's vulnerability, led ultimately to new military strategies and successes.

Notes

1. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The First Salute* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988).
2. L. H. Butterfield, ed., *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams* (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 2:198.
3. William Bell Clark, "American Naval Policy, 1775–1776," *American Neptune* 1 (1941): 26–41.
4. Benjamin W. Labaree et al., *America and the Sea: A Maritime History* (Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum Press, 1998), 119.
5. *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy), 2:647 (henceforth NDAR).
6. Butterfield, *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams,* 3:350.
7. *Maryland Gazette,* Tuesday, 19 December 1775.
8. Paul L. Ford, ed., *Journal of the Continental Congress,* entry for 22 December 1775.
9. NDAR, 3:1307.
10. John Fitzhugh Millar, *American Ships of the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 9.
11. John S. McCusker Jr., "American Invasion of Nassau in the Bahamas," *American Neptune* 25 (1965): 193.
12. *Andrew Doria* journal, Public Record Office, London, Adm. 1/484.
13. Nathan Miller, *Sea of Glory* (New York: David McKay Company, 1974), 111–15.
14. Reference citations for each vessel respectively are as follows: NDAR, 6: 296, 125, 731, 731, 788, 1100, 166, (same vessel 788, 790, 946), 834.
15. NDAR, 6:125. The reference to the speaking trumpet is from Miller, *Sea of Glory,* 122.
16. D. Chase Philander, ed., *The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 4:182, 370; 5: 43–44, 142, 195, 331, 502–3, 630; 7:421–22, 440, 519. John C. Fitzpatrick, *Writings of George Washington* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 6:437; 9:427n.
17. NDAR, 6:915.
18. NDAR, 2:647 identifies the *Andrew Doria* as a fourteen-gun brigantine. Howard I. Chapelle describes her as a brig in *The History of the American Sailing Navy* (New York: Norton, 1949). She is called a brig-of-war on other official documents. The vessel was most probably what we might call a hermaphrodite brig. Robinson and Dow in *The Sailing Ships of New England, 1607–1907* (Salem, Mass.: Marine Research Society, 1922) define the brig as a generic vessel with three spars on two masts (fore and main) that were square-rigged. The brigantine also had two masts; the foremast carried two spars for square sails and the main with a fore-and-aft sail. The hermaphrodite version had two square foresails, a square top mainsail, and a fore-and-aft gaff mainsail.
19. NDAR, 2:936.
20. NDAR, 2:1387.
21. F. C. van Oosten, "Some Notes Concerning the Dutch West Indies during the American

Revolutionary War," *American Neptune* 36 (1976): 155–69.

22. In 1939, a plaque was presented to St. Eustatius bearing the signature of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was himself of Dutch descent. The plaque had this text upon it: "In commemoration of the salute of the flag of the United States fired at this fort November 16, 1776, by the order of Johannes de Graef, [American spelling variation] Governor of St. Eustatius, in reply to the national gun salute fired by the Brig-of-War *Andrew Doria.* Here the sovereignty of the United States of America was first formally acknowledged to a national vessel by a foreign official." J. F. Jameson presented evidence that the Grand Union Flag was first saluted in St. Croix by the Danes in mid-October three weeks earlier, a view that has gained wide acceptance ("St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," *American Historical Review* 8 [1903]: 691). The distinction was that the first salute given by the Danish fort was the common nine-gun salute given to a visiting merchantman. The Danes assumed that the Grand Union flag was a private variation of a British merchant pennant. The salute at St. Eustatius was to a foreign war ship, and the flag was recognized as that of the rebelling colonies.

23. NDAR, 7:564–65.

24. NDAR, 7:485–86.

25. Jameson, "St. Eustatius," 692.

26. NDAR, 7:586–8.

27. Jameson, "St. Eustatius," 695.

28. *Naval Records of the American Revolution* (Washington: Library of Congress, United States Printing Office, 1906), 319. The twenty-gun Philadelphia ship *de Graff* [another variation of the spelling, but the registered name of the warship] was commanded by Captain Hugh Lysle and commissioned 5 December 1780.

29. NDAR, 10:29.

30. NDAR, 10:379, 408.

31. NDAR, 10:435.

32. NDAR, 10:568.

A Norse Etymology for Luff, "Weather Edge of a Sail"

by William Sayers

In terms meaning "to windward," "weather side of the ship," "weather edge of the sail," and in related verbal phrases describing the sailing operation of tacking, Anglo-Norman French *lof* and Middle English *loof* have reflexes in most of the languages of the European Atlantic seaboard. These range from the Spanish *lof* and Portuguese *lô* to Danish *luv,* Swedish *loof, lof,* and *lov,* and Norwegian *lo* and *luv.* They also include the Low German *luuv* and *luv* and Dutch *loef an,* "to luff up." Once used in medieval northern Europe to designate the forward or weather edge of the single sail on the square-rigged ships (vessels on which the yard and sail were nominally at right angles to the axis of the hull but where they could be set at varying angles in response to wind conditions), the word later evolved in English as sailing technology itself advanced and triangular and nonrectangular sails aligned with the axis of the hull replaced the square sail. Now luff was no longer a relative term, depending on which leech or edge of the sail was into the wind, but also referred to the front edge of the forward sail.[1]

The earliest attested English usage is found in Layamon's *Brut* from the first decade of the thirteenth century. An example is found in the description of Julius Caesar's invasion of Britain: *heo scuuen ut heore lof, & læiden to þon londe* ("They thrust out their luff and made for the land").[2] The *Brut* is the adaptation of the Jerseyman Wace's rhymed chronicle in Anglo-Norman French from a half century earlier, and it is in his virtuoso description of the departure of King Arthur's fleet for Gaul that we find the first recorded use of *lof.* The scene of mass quayside activity in *Le roman de Brut* is reminiscent of Homer and Virgil, but its nautical detail is quite lacking in Wace's Latin source, Geoffrey of Monmouth's twelfth-century *Historia regum Britanniae* (as it is in Wace's successor, Layamon). The author seems to relish the exhibition of a specialist nautical lexicon, employing one or more terms per verse. A consideration of Wace's full deployment of the catalogue device will assist in evaluating *lof* in its narrower context when and where it appears.[3]

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Puis vint passer a Suthamtune;
La furent les nefs amenees
E les maisnees assemblees.
Mult veïssiez nés aturner,
Nés atachier, nés aancrer,
Nés assechier e nés floter,
Nés cheviller e nés cloer,
Funains estendre, maz drecier,
Punz mettre fors e nés chargier,
Helmes, escuz, halbercs porter,
Lances drecier, chevals tirer,
Chevaliers e servanz entrer,
E l'un ami l'altre apeler.
Mult se vunt entresaluant
Li remanant e li errant.
Quant as nés furent tuit entré
Et tide orent et bon oré,
Dunc veïssiez ancres lever,
Estrens traire, hobens fermer,
Mariniers saillir par cez nés,
Deshenechier veilles e trés;
Li un s'esforcent al windas,
Li altre al lof et al betas;
Detriés sunt li guverneür,
Li maistre esturman li meillur.
Chescuns de guverner se peinne
Al guvernal, ki la nef meine:
Avant le hel si curt senestre,
E sus le hel pur cure a destre.
Pur le vent es trés acuillir
Funt les lispruez avant tenir
Et bien fermer es raelinges.
Tels i ad traient les guidinges,
Et alquant abaissent le tref
Pur la nef curre plus suëf.
Estuïns ferment et escotes
Et funt tendre les cordes tutes,
Uitages laschent, trés avalent,
Boëlines sachent et halent,
Al vent guardent et as esteilles,
Sulunc l'uré portent lur veilles;
Les braiols funt lacier al mast
Que li venz par desuz ne past;
A dous ris curent u a treis.

Then [Arthur] advanced to Southampton;
There the ships were gathered
And the troops assembled.
You would have seen many ships being outfitted,
Ships moored, ships anchored,
Ships beached and ships launched,
Ships being pegged together and ships nailed,
Cordage spread out, masts raised,
Gangplanks put over the side and ships loaded,
Helmets, shields, hauberks carried,
Lances raised, horses led,
Knights and servants boarding,
And one friend calling out to another.
They exchange many greetings,
Those who are staying behind and those who are sailing.
When all had gone aboard the ships
And they had the tide and a fair wind,
Then you would have seen anchors raised,
Cables hauled, shrouds tied down,
Sailors clambering around on board,
Unfurling canvas and sails;
Some strain at the windlass,
Others with the luff and tacking spar;
Aft are the helmsmen,
The best of the master steersmen.
Each one is attentive to his navigation
At the rudder that steers the ship;
Tiller forward if running to port,
Tiller back to run to starboard.
In order to gather the wind into the sails
They brace the leech-spars forward
And fix them into the boltropes of the leeches.
There are some who pull the clewlines,
And lower the yard slightly,
So that the ship may run more smoothly.
They secure the fore-braces and the sheets,
And tauten all the ropes,
They release the halyards, bring down the yards,
Tighten the bowlines and haul,
They check the wind and the stars,
And trim their sails according to the breeze;
They lash the brails to the mast
So that the wind does escape past it;
They run under two reefs or three.

Mult fu hardiz, molt fu curteis
Cil qui fist nés premierement
Et en mer se mist aval vent,
Terre querant qu'il ne veeit,
Et rivage qu'il ne saveit.

Very bold, very gallant was he
Who first built a ship
And set sail down wind,
Seeking a country he didn't see
And a shore he didn't know.

The Norse stamp on medieval Norman seafaring terminology is apparent in the fact that these lines contain no fewer than sixteen terms for ship's parts and gear that are readily derived from Scandinavian—and *lof* is then a good candidate for the seventeenth.[4] With the exception of the specialized braiols or "brails," Wace employs no words of Gallo-Romance origin other than for such fundamentals as ship, mast, yard, sail, cordage, tiller, and anchor. The passage is particularly rich in the terminology associated with handling the yard and sail, and it is among such references that the medieval author employs three such words in this couplet: *Li un s'esforcent al windas, Li altre al lof et al betas* ("Some strain at the windlass, Others with the luff and tacking spar"). *Windas* is the Anglo-Norman reflex of Old Norse–Icelandic *vindáss,* literally, "winding beam," and the equipment is here being employed to raise the yard and sail to the masthead.[5] *Betas* reflects ON-Icel. *beitiáss.* This piece of gear was employed in the zig-zag sailing manoeuvre called tacking or beating to windward (ON-Icel. *beita,* "to cause to bite, to tack"). The tacking spar, also called the tacking boom or sailyard, was fitted into one of several sockets in a cleat on the inside of the hull and ran to the opposite, windward side of the ship, where it was inserted into or bent (tied) to the lower corner (tack) of the sail and was also lashed to the sheerstrake. The tacking spar both assured that the sail filled optimally with wind and transferred to the hull structure some of the dynamic forces to which the mast would otherwise have been subject when the wind was not squarely astern. With the square sail thus specifically angled into the wind and "boomed out," it is conjectured that the early northern mariners would have been able to sail closer to the wind than their southern European counterparts.[6]

What has puzzled naval historians and philologists in the pairing of *betas* and *lof* in a single verse is whether the *lof* was employed as a complement to the *betas,* as an alternative (since Wace is describing a number of ships), or whether the terms may be synonymous. The third option appears the least likely, given Wace's apparently discrete use of the remainder of his nautical vocabulary. A review of other near-contemporary references to the use of *lof* will assist us in a closer identification.

Another scene, although now only of a single ship and single set of sailing circumstances, also reveals an author interested in the catalogue device and in displaying a technical vocabulary. Here, too, *lof* figures prominently. The passage is from the twelfth-century *Vie de saint Gilles* by the Anglo-Norman author Guillaume de Berneville. With God's help, the future saint has saved a ship in distress and now, as a passenger, assures its advance over calm seas in a fair wind:[7]

Le jur fud bel, le solail cler,
La mer fud paisible e le vent
A la nef vunt ignelement;
Lez sunt del bel tens ke il unt.
Traient lur ancres, si s'en vunt.
A plein se astent d'eschiper,

The day was fine, the sun bright,
The sea was peaceful and the winds
Came briskly to the ship;
[The sailors] are happy at the fine weather they have.
They haul up their anchors, and depart.
They are in a great hurry to set sail,

Kar mult coveitent le passer.
Bons fud li venz e la mer quieie:
Ne lur estoet muver lur greie,
Ne n'i out la nuit lof cloé,
Estuinc trait ne tref gardé,
Ne n'i out halé bagordinge,
Ne escote ne scolaringe;
Ne fud mester de boesline;
Tute fud queie la marine:
Ne lur estut pas estricher,
Ne tendre tref ne helenger.
Fort ert l'estai e li hobent
Ki fermé furent devers lé vent,
E d'autre part devers le bort
Sunt li nodras e li bras fort;
Bones utanges out el tref,
Meillurs n'estot a nule nef;
Bons fud li tref e la nef fort,
E unt bon vent ki tost les port.
Tute noit current a la lune
Le tref windé trés k'a la hune:
Ne lur estut muver funain
Trestute nuit ne l'endemain.
Lur aire vunt od la mer pleine,
Kar issi veit cil ke Deus meine.

Because they are anxious to complete the passage.
The wind was fair and the sea calm;
They had no need to trim their gear,
Nor was there that night a luff pinned down,
Brace tightened nor yard (or sail) watched,
Nor were there brails hauled,
Nor sheet nor spilling line;
There was no need for a bowline;
The seascape was entirely calm:
They did not have to strike sail,
Nor tauten the sail nor adjust the tiller.
Strong were the stay and the shrouds
That were pulled tight in the face of the wind,
And elsewhere, deckside,
Are the strong replacement spars;
The ship had good halyards,
There were none better on any vessel;
The yard (or sail) was good and the ship strong,
And they have a fine wind that carries them quickly.
The whole night they ran under the moon,
The yard wound up to the masthead;
There was no need for them to trim their rigging
All that night or the next day.
They went their way with a full sea,
For thus goes he whom God leads.

Here, the *lof* is among shipboard equipment to which recourse is *not* needed, because sailing conditions are ideal and the ship is on a true course. This does not of itself provide an identification of *lof*, but the immediate context, which mentions such adjustable elements of the standing and running rigging as forebraces, brails, sheets, spilling lines, and bowlines, and the suggestion that the *lof* needed to be secured in place *(cloé)* agree well enough with our provisional understanding of the conjunction of *lof* and *betas* in Wace.[8]

La vie seint Edmund le rei, also an Anglo-Norman work from the twelfth century, recounts a voyage south from Saxony along the North Sea coast, then a crossing to East Anglia. Two separate sailing moments are described in the following passages, and both involve the *lof*.[9]

Li servant e li mariner
En vunt lur cordes adrescier.
Chescun mariner de l'esneke
Forment le sigle deshaneke,
Lur hobens estreinent vers destre
Hors lancent lur lof vers senestre,
La veile treient jesqu'a la hune
E al vent la firent commune.

The servants and the sailors
Go to attend to their ropes,
Each sailor on the ship
Smartly lets out the sail,
They tighten their shrouds on the starboard side,
And thrust out their luff to port,
They hoist the sail up to the masthead,
And get it spread evenly into the wind.



Artist's impression of a Scandinavian-style cargo ship *(knörr)* from about 1025. From a cleat on the forward lee side, the tacking spar *(beitiáss)* crosses the deck to the windward side, where it is secured to the tack (lower corner of the sail) and gunwale. Courtesy of the Viking Ship Museum, Roskilde.

La boëline halent al vent,
Ki l'oré recoilt e supprent.
...
Un vent surst devers miedi,
Bien aspre, ki les acoilli,
Ki en la veile e en lur tref
Fiert, si enpeint avant la nief.
Les mariners en sunt mult lié;
lof unt enz mult tost lancié,
E alaschent lur boëlines
E estreinent lur holgurdines.
Aspre est le vent, li sigle legier,
Unc ne les covint haneker.

They trim the bowline to the wind
To catch and hold the breeze.
...
A wind rose up from the south,
Very brisk, that caught them up
And struck the sail and the yard,
And drove the ship forward.
The sailors are very happy for it;
They cast in their luff very quickly
And release the bowlines
And tighten the brails.
The wind is brisk and the sail buoyant,
They have no need to take it in.

In the first scene, conditions are not ideal. The wind is coming from the port side, and several expedients are required. As the filled sail would cause the mast to bend to the starboard, the shrouds that ran from the masthead to the gunwale amidships are tightened up on this side to preclude play in these ropes and undue swaying of the mast.[10] The bowline from the central front face of the sail to the stempost is also tightened to increase the depth of the curve in the sail and fill its bunt (or central part) with wind. As a complementary measure, the *lof* is thrust out to port, that is, over the gunwale to the windward side. While we have no assurance in the matter of the technical phrase, *lancer hors* seems more appropriate as a verb phrase denoting the displacement of a solid object rather than a rope or portion of the sail. These observations are confirmed by the second passage, which describes fair sailing. The *lof* is brought in, and is again cast *(lancer enz)* rather than hauled; the bowline pulling the sail forward is released; and brails or ropes on the rearward face of the sail are tightened, pulling it in to the mast and thus reducing the curvature.

Yet another channel crossing, this one purportedly historical and not legendary, will further narrow our focus on *lof.* In his *Roman de Rou,* the history of the dukes of Normandy, Wace describes the crossing of William Rufus, son of William the Conqueror, from Southampton to Barfleur in Normandy. The sailors are reluctant to set out because of the poor weather and headwind: *"Nos n'avon mie boen oré, nos n'avon pas vent dreiturier, encontre vent fait mal nagier"* ("We do not have a fair wind at all, we do not have a wind for a straight course; running against the wind makes for hard sailing").[11] The king's reply reflects his assurance (unjustified, later historians might say) in divine favor: *"Onques . . . n'oï parler de rei qui fust neié en mer; faites voz nes al parfont traire e essaiez que porreiz faire"* ("I never heard of a king who was drowned at sea; have your ships towed out to deep water and then see what you can do"). The objective is to bring the ships to a point offshore where they can begin to tack against the wind and progress, albeit indirectly, toward the opposite coast. Against their better judgment, the mariners set to work:

Por faire al rei sa volenté	To do the king's will
li ont ço qu'il quist graanté;	They granted him what he had requested;
en l'esnege l'ont fait porter	They had him carried aboard the ship
e cil od lui qu'il volt mener,	And those with him that he wished to bring along,
batels e anchres ont enz traiz,	They brought in the ship's boats and anchors,
la gent firent seeir en paiz,	They seated the people securely,
atornee ont al vent la nef,	They turned the ship to the wind;
hobens ferment, windent le tref;	They tie down the shrouds, hoist the yard;
cil qui al governail s'assist	He who sat by the tiller
estreitement al vent se prist;	Set a course close by the wind;
le lof avant e le lispreu	With the luff and the leech-spar to the fore
siglant vindrent a Barbefleu. (ll. 9847–58)	They came sailing to Barfleur.

The *lof* is here used in conjunction with the *lispreu* (also mentioned in Wace's *Brut*), a slim horizontal spar, one end of which was hooked or fastened into the boltrope that ran along the leech or vertical side of the sail, we assume on the windward side, and complemented the *lof* by pushing the sail forward. On a zigzag course that modern naval historians, as well as the builders and sailers of replicas, believe may have been to within about sixty degrees of the wind, the sailors would have alternately brought the port and starboard edges of the sail into the wind, bracing the vertical edge of the sail well forward and out.

These literary but fully credible accounts exclude the possibility that in the Anglo-Norman French and Middle English of this early date, *lof* meant simply the windward or weather edge of the sail. Some concrete piece of ship's gear seems implied, and this conjecture is supported by a somewhat later term (French in origin but best attested in English shipyard inventories and account books), *porte-loof* (luff-mount) (Sandahl, II, 84ff.).

This review of narrative and descriptive evidence supports Sandahl (58) and others in their identification of the *lof* as a tack bumpkin of some kind.[12] This would have been a small boom that, unlike the *betas* or tacking spar, did not cross the deck, but was extended from the gunwale on the weather side to a cringle in the tack or lower corner of the sail on the same side. Like the tacking spar, its function would have been to push the corner of the sail out from the hull to catch the wind, enhance propulsive power, and facilitate navigation when the wind was not directly astern of the vessel. The circumstantial evidence of the Anglo-Norman texts that we have considered above supports this identification of a piece of gear that either complemented the tacking boom or, more likely, replaced it under somewhat different circumstances.

Sandahl goes on to trace the later evolution of the term *lof* as rope to the tack, spar, and ultimately weather edge of the sail. This note, however, will return to antecedents with a view to establishing a plausible etymology for *lof*, one that offers some degree of accord with the assumed makeup and use of the equipment.

Archaeological, iconographical, and textual evidence points to a close similarity between the northern ships of the Viking era and later vessels built and sailed by the descendants of Scandinavian settlers in Normandy and then, after the Conquest, in England. It is also reasonable to assume both direct influence on English ships from the shipbuilding practices of the Danelaw, and English imitation of Scandinavian and Norman naval architecture as a consequence of trade and the cross-channel movement of ships. Wace's account of such leaders as Arthur and William of Normandy and the scenes of the Bayeux Tapestry, which dates from some seventy

years earlier, may fairly be taken as among the earliest descriptions of medieval Scandinavian-style ships, earlier, in fact, than comparable references in medieval Scandinavian literature, in particular the written forms of the Icelandic sagas, the earliest of which is dated to about 1200.[13]

However rich this thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Norse literature may be in nautical scenes from mainland Scandinavia, Iceland, and even farther abroad, we have no unquestioned mention of a tack bumpkin nor any attested use of a word generally resembling *lof* in its phonological contours. The *beitiáss,* on the other hand, is well documented.[14]

The fullness of the northern vocabulary as concerns naval architecture is otherwise striking.[15] In *Skáldskaparmál,* a didactic work cataloguing the lexical resources on which poets might draw, Snorri Sturluson gives some thirty-seven names for ship types, another fourteen words that exemplify the qualities of ships and might be used as names for individual ships, eleven names of legendary sea kings and/or ships, and, in the last six stanzas of his roughly versified list, almost one hundred names for ships' parts. All of these could be used in metonymical references to an entire ship. The eighth stanza will serve as an example and will recall several of the Norman terms met in Wace, including that for the tacking spar:[16]

Rá, rakki, rif,
rengr ok hömlur,
vindáss, vengi,
vöndr, langnefjur,
völt, beitiáss,
varta, brandar,
bitar, bóglína,
búlkastokkar.

Yard, parrel, reef,
rib and thole straps,
windlass, cuddy,
wand (stripe?), thole pins,
capstan, tacking spar,
rudder boss, prow decorations,
lower crossbeams in the hull, bowline,
transverse beams in the cargo area.

Nowhere in the catalogue do we find a term suggestive of *lof* or its function. Despite this lack of evidence in Snorri, other areas of the Norse lexicon may be profitably explored in a consideration of the etymology of *lof.*

The superficially attractive association of *lof* with ON-Icel. *lopt* and *loft* (air, sky; loft) (cf. *á lopt* [aloft]) must be rejected, since the earliest attestations clearly deal with concrete matters, and not with the sail's edge into the wind. Moreover, the single sail of the early medieval Scandinavian ship was trimmed from the deck surface, and the crew seldom had cause to go "aloft." Several standard etymological works ascribe a Dutch origin to *loof* as a sea term, on the basis of the 1599 occurrence of *loef, loeve,* glossed as *scalmus* (thole-pin). This offers a link to other Germanic terms meaning "oar, steering paddle," e.g., Gothic *lōfa,* ON *lófi* (and Scottish *loof*), Norwegian *love,* OSw. *love,* and early Modern Danish *lov(e)* (palm of the hand) (cf. OE. *glōf* < **galōf* [glove]). Related terms are Gmc *laffa* (palm), *lappo* (rudder), and Sw. *labb* (paw).[17] Sandahl summarizes this opinion and proposed evolution as follows:

> In fact, it seems clear that *loof* is of Common Germ. origin and that (via the sense "palm of the hand") it was widely used for "oar, paddle." The latter sense then fell into disuse (perhaps as early as c. 1100), only surviving as ME. *loof* (> AN, OF. *lof*), and Du. *loef* "thole pin." The connecting link with *loof* "tack bumpkin" is, I think, that an oar was originally used for booming out the tack. It still is in small boats (62).

Sandahl sees what we might call the Middle English and other European reflexes of *lof* originating in Anglo-Norman French, and refers the first use of the gear it designated exclusively to the vessels of the Northmen (who seem to have been pioneers in the matter of tacking), the Normans, and the English. He is never explicit as to etymology, but the implicit derivation would seem to be from a presumed ON-Icel. *lófi* in the sense of "palm," metaphorically referring to the blade of an oar.

I find it difficult to believe that the advanced technology represented by Viking-era ships and the specialist vocabulary that we know described it would have employed such an image for a tack bumpkin. If I understand Sandahl correctly, the word for oar-blade is a metonym for the whole oar, even though the blade as such is not functional in the booming-out action with the tack, since the oar is simply being used as a spar of suitable length or weight. Even if an oar might serve as an expedient in roughly similar circumstances on smaller craft, I judge that on larger vessels a specialized piece of gear would have been used and would have borne a discrete, not borrowed, name. *Lófi* must then be rejected as a source for *lof* on a combination of grounds, although this should not dissuade us from continuing the search for a Norse etymology.

Without widespread literacy and the conservative influence of a written standard, word boundaries in spoken languages may become



Artist's impression of the *Hedeby 1* longship under sail. A tacking spar is again suggested. A tack bumpkin as proposed in this article would have been similarly positioned on the starboard side. Courtesy of the Viking Ship Museum, Roskilde.

The *Roar Ege,* a replica of the eleventh-century Skuldelev 3 coaster, on which a "sail pin" is thrust through the sheerstrake to secure the tack. Could the medieval Anglo-Norman *lof* (Middle English *luff)* have been a similar piece of gear? Courtesy of the Viking Ship Museum, Roskilde.

blurred. For example, a *nadder* becomes an *adder* in English. We may logically assume this also to be the case when a technical vocabulary is transferred orally from one language to another, as in this case from some form of Old Norse to the early Norman dialect of French.

The linguistic phenomenon that is called agglutination of the definite or indefinite article to a noun is clearly illustrated in the development of Latin *hedera* (ivy) into Old Fr. *l'(h)ierre,* the form with a definite article, and then into Mod. Fr. *le lierre,* when the earlier article was perceived as part of the noun. Another more convoluted instance is the development in French of Lat. *unicornus* (unicorn) whose first element was perceived as an indefinite article, yielding **un icorne,* which implies the definite form **l'icorne,* which then experienced agglutination and necessitated the creation of a fresh definite article, to give Mod. Fr. *la licorne.* The Anglo-Saxon name for the city of Lincoln suffered a similar transformation among Anglo-Norman speakers, who would have detached the supposed article and perhaps facilitated pronunciation by means of metathesis to conclude with the toponym *Nichole* (var. *Nincole*).[18]

I would then propose that Norman *lof* represents a Norse word with an initial vowel and agglutinated Romance article. My candidate for this hypothetical etymon is *úfr* (the masculine nominative singular ending *r* is lost in all loans from Old Norse into Norman). The evolution would roughly have been as follows: ON *úfr* > Old Norm. **of,* whence **l'of,* and ultimately **le lof.*[19] *Úfr* meant a rough edge or splinter still attached to its parent piece of wood or metal. In the legendary Icelandic romance *Egils saga einhanda ok Ásmundar berserkjabana* (ca. 1300) we find *úfr* in a nautical scene although not a strictly nautical application. One of the protagonists, Ásmundr, has been captured by berserkers and tied to the windlass on board ship: *Hann sá járnloku eina, er fram stóð ór vindásnum. Þar hafði komit í högg mikit, ok reis á röndinni úfr hvass* ("He noticed an iron-lock jutting out from it [the windlass]. This had been given a great blow which had left a rough edge on the iron").[20] The hero successfully saws the rope apart and escapes.

While *úfr* as "rough edge" might seem an apt metaphor for the vertical edge of the sail facing into the wind, we must recall that "weather edge" is a later development of *lof* and *loof.* Splinter, however, seems the basic notion.[21] The image of a piece partially loosened from a parent body accords well with our understanding of a tack bumpkin, one end of which was lashed to the gunwale or inserted in a cleat on it, while the other was attached to the tack and extended beyond the hull on the weather side in order to boom out the sail. It is apposite to call attention to the related verbs *ýfa* (to rip, stir up), *ýfast* (to become ruffled, get angry), and Faroese *ýfnast* (to be blown up), all of which might be figuratively applied to the action of forcing the corner of a sail into the wind. By extension, *úfr* came to mean "contention or unfriendliness."

One possible reason for the subjection of *úfr* to the process of agglutination might be assimilatory influence. Just as the English adaptation of Sp. *la riata* as *lariat* may in part be due to the model of *lasso,* Norman *lof,* in its association with the wind, may owe something to the earlier mentioned ON-Icel. *lopt* and *loft* (air).

What are the possible implications of ON-Icel. *úfr* for the nautical vocabulary of other languages?[22] The conception of a "splinter" off the hull invites us to return to the gloss of Dutch *loef* with *scalmus* (thole pin), that is, a simple oarlock mounted on the gunwale. In somewhat different fashion, such a pin might also be construed as a splinter from the parent body. The loan from English or French would have preceded the evolution in meaning of *lof* or *loof* from "tack bumpkin" to "windward side of the sail/ship."

Modern-day builders of replicas of early medieval Scandinavian ships have experimented with extension booms of different kinds and have found them to enhance the vessels' sailing prop-

erties in circumstances that do not call for the expedient of the *beitiáss* (Andersen and Andersen, 302–4). It cannot be denied that *úfr* is unattested in this use in the extant Old Norse–Icelandic corpus. A Norman technical vocabulary more directly reflective of Old Danish (which has left few early written records) than of Norwegian-Icelandic might explain this lack. Given our evidence, we can only raise but not answer the question of whether the *lof,* successively freeing itself from its etymology, i.e., *úfr,* as words so often do, may not represent a Norman or cross-channel technological advance. The everyday Gallo-Romance/Norse jargon of the shipyard might have offered the metaphor of splinter, but the spar to which it was applied, functioning somewhat like the tacking spar but used under less demanding conditions may have been a continental European development in response to the particular sailing conditions often to be met in traffic between Normandy and England.[23]

The proposed derivation of Middle English *loof* and its antecedent, Anglo-Norman *lof,* from Norse *úfr* (splinter) via agglutination of a Gallo-Romance definite article some time before our first vernacular historical writing in Norman French, even if tentative in some respects, is consistent with the textual evidence for a relatively short spar used on either side of, and at various points along, the hull in order to extend the tack or weather corner of the sail into an optimal position under less than ideal wind conditions. Later, *lof* and *loof* would migrate to other European languages, even back to Scandinavian, and would variously take on both a wider meaning, the weather side of the ship, and a narrower one, the weather edge of the sail, surviving even the passage from the squaresail and its rigging to the fore-and-aft-rigged vessels still favored by the yachtsmen of today.

Notes

1. This summary draws on Bertil Sandahl's entry for *loof (luff)* in his *Middle English Sea Terms* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951–82), 2:53–62.

2. G. L. Brook and R. F. Leslie, eds., *Layamon: Brut* (London: Early English Text Society, 1963–68), 250, 277 (l. 3919; cf. ll. 10451–54, ll. 15434–36). Additional Middle English examples are found in Sandahl and the *Middle English Dictionary,* Robert E. Lewis et al., eds. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1952–), s.v. *lof* (4).

3. Wace, *Le roman de Brut,* Ivor Arnold, ed. (Paris: Société des anciens textes français, 1940), ll. 11190–238. Another manuscript tradition is followed in *La partie arthurienne du roman de Brut,* I. D. O. Arnold and M. M. Pelan, eds. (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1962), where the equivalent passage is found at ll. 2642–90. Yet a third edition of the passage may be found in *La geste du roi Arthur selon le roman de Brut de Wace et l'Historia regum Britanniae de Geoffroy de Monmouth,* Emmanuèle Baumgartner and Ian Short, eds. (Paris: Union générale d'éditions, 1993), vv. 2364–412. In all of these, the reader is cautioned against the translation and lexical notes as concerns nautical terminology. See, most recently, Judith Weiss, "Two fragments from a newly discovered manuscript of Wace's *Brut,*" *Medium Ævum* 68 (1999): 268–77.

4. For treatment of the French terms and Norse sources of loans, see William Sayers, "Old Norse Nautical Terminology in Twelfth-Century Anglo-Norman Verse," *Romanische Forschungen* 109 (1997): 383–426. The present discussion of *lof* supersedes that found there.

5. By the twelfth century, the use of the windlass on Scandinavian ships is generally assumed; see J. G. Marcus, *The Conquest of the North Atlantic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 102.
6. Also see Marcus, *The Conquest of the North Atlantic,* for an evaluation of relative tacking ability. For an account of tacking with a modern replica of a medieval *knörr* or cargo ship, see Max Vinner, "A Viking-Ship off Cape Farewell, 1984" in *Shipshape: Essays for Ole Crumlin-Pedersen,* Olaf Olsen, ed. (Roskilde: Vikingeskibshallen, 1995), 289–304. The author would be pleased to furnish more ample references to overviews of early northern sailing and the use of the tacking spar.
7. Guillaume de Berneville, *La vie de saint Gile,* Gaston Paris and A. Bos, eds. (Paris: Société des anciens textes français, 1881), ll. 876–906. To situate the author, see Mary Dominica Legge, *Anglo-Norman Literature and Its Background* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 254.
8. In defense of this interpretation of spilling lines, see William Sayers, "Textual Evidence for Spilling Lines in the Rigging of Medieval Scandinavian Keels," *International Journal of Nautical Archeology* 28 (1999): 343–54.
9. Denis Piramus, *La vie seint Edmund le rei,* Hilding Kjellman, ed. (Göteborg: Elanders boktryckeri, 1935), ll. 1373–82, 1449–58.
10. Wooden shroud pins, functioning like a spring catch, could be given a quick turn to tighten or release the ropes; see the discussion and illustrations in Ole Crumlin-Pedersen, *Viking-Age Ships and Shipbuilding in Hedeby/Haithabu and Schleswig,* Ships and Boats of the North 2 (Schleswig and Roskilde: Archäologisches Landesmuseum der Christian-Albrechts-Universität, Wikinger Museum Haithabu, The National Museum of Denmark, and the Viking Ship Museum in Roskilde, 1997), 133f.
11. Wace, *Le roman de Rou,* A. J. Holden, ed. (Paris: Société des anciens textes français, 1970–73), 2: 9838–40.
12. Yet so recent and informed a work as Ian Friel's *The Good Ship: Ships, Shipbuilding and Technology in England, 1200–1520* still advances the identification of *lof* as the tacking spar (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 94.
13. The evidence is complemented by the Gotland picture stones, coins, town seals, and other iconographical material. The first of these is examined by John Lindow in an earlier number of this journal in "Sailing and Interpreting the Ships on the Gotland Stones," *American Neptune* 53 (1993): 39–50.
14. Evidence for the considerable width of the medieval square sail and corresponding length of the tacking spar is found in Snorri Sturluson's *Ynglinga saga* in volume one of *Heimskringla,* Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, ed., Íslenzk fornrit 26–28 (Reykjavík: Hið íslenzka fornritafélag, 1978), ch. 46. The tacking spar, when not in use, was stored on trestles or forks along the axis of the ship; *Hallfreðar saga* in *Vatnsdoela saga,* Einar Ólafur Sveinsson, ed., Íslenzk fornrit 8 (Reykjavík: Hið íslenzka fornritafélag, 1939), ch. 11. The act of mounting the spar in very difficult sailing circumstances is alluded to in a skaldic stanza in *Orkneyinga saga* attributed to Rögnvaldr Kali Kolsson, jarl of Orkney; *Orkneyinga saga,* Finnbogi Guðmundsson, ed., Íslenzk fornrit 34 (Reykjavík: Hið íslenzka fornritafélag, 1965), ch. 87, 221, st. 66.
15. In "Altnordisches Seewesen," *Wörter und Sachen* 4 (1912): 1–122, Hjalmar Falk discusses some four hundred ON-Icel. words referring to parts of the ship and shipboard operations.
16. Until recently, the standard edition of Snorri's *Skáldskaparmál* was found in *Edda Snorra Sturlusonar,* Finnur Jónsson, ed. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1931). This stanza, which for simplicity's sake is here called the eighth on the ship motif and is given in standardized orthography, is found on 209 as st. 498. See also Anthony Faulkes, *Edda: Skáldskaparmál* (London: Viking Society for Northern Research, 1998). His interpretation of the versified list is reflected in his widely available translation, *Snorri Sturluson: Edda* (London: Penguin, 1987), 162f.
17. *Luff* and its equivalents are treated in all major Western European etymological dictionaries. Here, reference is limited to Emil Gamillscheg, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der französischen Sprache* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1928) and Augustin Jal's poly-

glot lexicographical work from 1848, now being updated and reissued in fascicules as *Nouveau glossaire nautique* (Paris: CNRS, 1970–). The entry for *lof* (fascicule L, 1998, 1135–38) offers a number of interesting examples, but unquestioningly refers to Gamillscheg for the etymology. The form cited is Old Norse *löf* and the meaning ascribed to this source word is *"côté de vent,"* roughly "windward." Gamillscheg's entry has the form *lôf,* by which he means not the closed, front vowel suggested by the modern orthography *löf,* but rather the long vowel that in standardized Old Norse–Icelandic would be rendered in the lexeme in question as *lóf.* Worse still, the *Nouveau glossaire* omits Gamillscheg's asterisk, the philologist's convention to indicate that the form is unattested. Thus, the *Nouveau glossaire nautique* cannot be a useful resource in the present inquiry.

18. R. C. Johnston, ed., *Jordan Fantosme's Chronicle* (Oxford: Anglo-Norman Text Society, 1981), l. 1550.

19. Latin or Germanic interconsonantal *u* is generally retained as *u* in Gallo-Romance, but there are numerous instances of initial *u* dropping to *o,* as here.

20. Guðni Jónsson, ed., *Egils saga einhanda ok Ásmundar berserkjabana,* in *Fornaldar sögur Norðurlanda* (Reykjavík: Íslendingasagnaútgáfan, 1951), 3:340. The English version is from *Egil and Asmund* in *Seven Viking Romances,* trans. Hermann Pálsson and Paul Edwards (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1985), 239. "Iron-lock" is literal but vague; I assume it to have been an iron bar employed to lock the windlass in position, thus maintaining the yard at the desired height on the mast, while the rope also served as a backstay.

21. See Richard Cleasby and Gudbrand Vigfusson, *An Icelandic-English Dictionary,* William Craigie, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957) and Leiv Heggested, Finn Hødnebø, and Erik Simensen, eds., *Norrøn Ordbok* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1993), s.v. *úfr.*

22. The possibility of a reflex in the nautical catalogue in the Middle Irish tale *The Battle of Ventry* is not explored in this article.

23. Rather than a bumpkin, the *lof* or *luff* may originally have been a wooden pin through the forward sheerstrake. Recovered hull planks display appropriate holes, and such pins have been used to good effect by the crews of modern replicas (personal communication from Max Vinner). Such a pin could quite plausibly have been called a *úfr* (splinter) in Old Norse/Icelandic.

“Big Ben,” Square Sail of the Yacht *America*

by Thomas R. Neblett

The schooner racing yacht *America* of 1851 carried a square sail as part of her routinely used sail array at sea. As far as can be determined, an actual illustration of the rig has never been available. Perhaps to marine historians such a void is understandable, considering the fame generated in 1851, when, without the use of a square sail, her lean, sharp lines and flat sails embarrassed *Britannia* significantly in its commanding victory. It could be argued that *America* seemed to have faded rather quickly from memory, and one would not necessarily remember the square sail that was not even used in the original race.

Thomas R. Neblett earned his Ph.D. in Microbiology and Public Health from Michigan State University in 1957. He is an avid yachtsman with an interest in the American Civil War navies. He has researched extensively the 1851 yacht *America* and has authored articles and presentations pertaining to that vessel. He thanks Nathaniel Wilson, sailmaker of East Boothbay Harbor, Maine, who offered learned comments about sail plan concepts, rigging, and artwork pertaining to the *America,* and Mark Mason of Laconia, New Hampshire, for significant encouragement, communications, and personal introductions within the yachting world.

What we know about the appearance of the famous yacht during her early years comes to us through naval architects' line drawings of her hull, sailmakers' plans, and artists' renderings, including numerous paintings of her under sail. Because photographing objects in motion was a difficult process until several years after *America*'s construction, historians are obliged to accept artists' expressions of how she appeared. Representations of the yacht under sail show her variously on either tack flying main, gaff topsail, foresail, and staysail. Some versions have shown her running before the wind with foresail and mainsail, “wing and wing,” but in these she never carried a square sail. A few of the popular *America* illustrations are significantly unrealistic. As an example, one artist omitted her main topmast, showing her mainmast as one continuous spar, while another painting portrayed scaled persons and flags aboard her that were grossly disproportionate to the yacht's size.

None of the artistic or model renderings of *America* show the presence on deck of anything resembling a yard or a furled rig capable of being hoisted aloft that would suggest a square sail. Moreover, there is no published visual depiction of the yacht that has ever shown the vessel to be flying a square sail, and examinations of the available versions of her sail plan likewise have never revealed a depiction or even the suggestion of such a sail.[1]

In view of the number of years that have passed since *America*'s construction, the paucity of the artists' depictions is especially perplexing, particularly as examination of reliable descriptions make the presence and use of a square sail on the yacht beyond dispute. Only the square sail's explicit method of rigging remains without a clear explanation.

Sailing vessels may be categorized broadly as being either fore-and-aft rigged or as square-rigged. A vessel said to be fore-and-aft rigged has its sail arrangement essentially parallel to the centerline of the hull. By contrast, a square-rigged vessel has its sail array hung at right angles to the fore-and-aft line or along an athwartship direction. Sails of fore-and-aft-rigged vessels are either hooped to the mast or tracked to the after side of its masts, while the sails of a squarerigger were hung from yard parrels that embraced the forward side of its masts. Such fore-and-aft vessels frequently had two masts, where the foremast was square-rigged, and the after or mainmast carried a fore-and-aft sail. Such ships were said to be rigged as hermaphrodite brigs, not schooners.

The yacht *America* was a two-masted fore-and-aft-rigged schooner. George Steers designed her closely along the lines of a New York pilot boat, quite similar to another Steers-designed vessel, the smaller pilot boat *Mary Taylor*.[2] A schooner is a vessel carrying two or more masts with the foremast either shorter or having the same height as its after or mainmast, and the masts carry no tops. The *America* was neither a hermaphrodite brig nor a topsail schooner; however, she was carrying one square fore-topsail and perhaps a topgallant sail and royal. Historians reported that she carried a square sail that was used only downwind and when voyaging. Her crew was hoisted from deck, and the square sail was pulled down as needed.

The information presented here is a compilation of notations describing the use of a square sail during sea voyaging by two of *America*'s captains, Dick Brown of New York, a pilot boat owner in 1851, and Henry Edward Decie from England and Ireland in 1861. The first distinct references documenting the use of the square sail aboard the *America* came during the early summer of 1851 when she was making her maiden voyage eastward across the Atlantic toward Le Havre, France. This shakedown voyage was eventually to become the first America's Cup race. Daily notations kept by James Steers, the brother of George Steers (the yacht's designer), described how *America*'s captain, "Old Dick" Brown, referred to the square sail as "big Ben" and also as "Old Broad mouth."[3] From the diary entries of James Steers between 21 June and 18 August 1851, we have the following brief descriptions:

> June 23rd Monday. 1851 . . . 9 o'c set the squaresail, or big Ben, as the captain called it, at ten took him [in], as he would not stand, the wind hauling.

> June 24th Tuesday 1851 . . . at 8½ set the big Ben, the wind blowing a stiff breeze. From 8 to 10 A.M. 13 knots, from 10 to 12, 13½ knots large, Run the last 24 hours, 284 miles.

The log of James Steers recorded a stiff breeze until 8:00 A.M. the next day, and the schooner logged ten to twelve knots. "Big Ben" was hoisted, and the ship was logged at 13½ knots. This 284-mile run proved the usefulness of the square sail when running before the wind. Other passages from James Steers's journal tended to document the use of "big Ben" when the breeze was stiff and all other canvas was set as well.

> Wednesday July 2nd 1851 . . . At 12:00 o'c A.M. had to get the yard out five or six feet outside the rigging, to help support the foremast, there was a heavy head sea, and she was making the water fly some.

> Thursday July 3rd 1851 . . . Blowing stiff. At 9 P.M. carried away the seizeing of the starboard

fore shrouds, hove her to with jib to the mast and lowered the foresail down, took the throat and squaresail haulyards to keep the mast up. She ran all night under jib and mainsail reefed, and up to 9:00 o'c A.M. when she was hove to to send up a man to seize

The schooner yacht *America* illustrated using rigging of a foremast square sail between June and July of 1851. Captain Brown nicknamed the sail "big Ben" and "Broad mouth." Ten years later, Captain Decie sailed the *Camilla/America* eastward across the Atlantic, and he, likewise, used the square sail. Painting by Rudolph Schroeder. Courtesy of Thomas R. Neblett.

> them; he did so, after a fashion. She shook him so, I could hardly think he could hold on, but he fixed it and came down. We made sail again.

These two days caused considerable difficulty because of the weather and partial failure of the standing rigging. The Atlantic crossing nearly became a disaster. At midday on 2 July, stiff winds blew and made heavy head seas that made additional support for the foremast necessary. The voyage had utilized the square sail rig numerous times, but this diary entry by Steers was the only reference specifically to the yard. The yard could only have been part of "big Ben's" rig. However, several methods might have aided the yard to steady the foremast. The next day, at 9:00 P.M., 3 July, the stiff wind separated the seizings of the starboard foremast shrouds, and the emergency required immediate actions to maintain the mast vertically. *America*'s shrouds carried two-inch diameter rigging, and for a tonnage of 170 tons, the yacht carried one-inch diameter throat and square sail halyards. The throat and square sail halyards held the mast support through the night and until the next morning when a crewman went aloft and replaced the seizings.

> Tuesday July 8th 1851 . . . This day commences with light breezes from the north. At 5 o'c P.M. the breezes freshened. The sea smooth. She commenced stepping along pretty lively, which I tell was very gratifying to all on board, after four days rolling about and not wind enough to keep her steady. At 2 o'c P.M. set the squaresail of big Ben or Broad mouth as the captain called it. We also set the staysail and gaff topsail.

The entry for 9 July included a notation that the twenty-four-hour run had been 272 miles, which amounts to an average of 11.3 knots. The journal seemed to indicate that "big Ben" remained in place until 10 July:

> Thursday July 10th 1851 . . . This day commences with fresh breezes and squally. At 8 P.M. took in our squaresail with gaff topsail, at 12 o'c P.M. double reefed our mainsail and took the bonnet off the foresail, at 4 A.M. shook out the reefs and set the squaresail, at 9½ A.M. took in the squaresail and set gaff topsail, at 12 o'c A.M. took in our gaff topsail. Three square rigged ships ahead of us. We had made them about 10 A.M. they had got everything set they can carry, but we are picking them up very fast. This sight is very exciting.

The twenty-four-hour run was 250 miles, yielding a calculated average speed of 10.4 knots.

> Friday July 11th 185. . . . This day commenced with fresh breezes from the NW At one o'c and thirty minutes made the Island of Scilly, and ran in for a pilot, at 2 P.M. hove to for a sloop, and by so doing the pearl of our gaff. At 7 o'c 30 minutes. Start point bore NE. by N distant 15 miles, at 9 A.M. Portland Bill Bar N by E. We have every [sail] set, and the way she slides along "knocks" the pilot. He wanted to heave the lead himself, so we gratified him, he could not believe she was going 12 knots, because she make so little fuss.

Although this entry did not mention "big Ben" specifically, it stated that all sails were set. The yacht's speed of 12 knots suggests that the square sail was doing its part.

A decade later, during June 1861, owner/captain Henry Edward Decie used the square sail aboard *Camilla/America.* The yacht had passed through four additional owners, and had been acquired as a fast sea-going conveyance by the Confederate States of America. On this voyage, she carried two of its emissaries from Savannah, Georgia, to Queenstown, Ireland.[4] One of the Confederate agents was a former U.S. Naval

officer, Edward Clifford Anderson, a native Georgian, who had been commissioned as a major of artillery in the Confederate States Army. Anderson, through his previous naval training and experience, possessed navigational skills and, as a passenger, did not trust the navigation and management of the yacht by its captain, Henry Decie. The former U.S. naval officer maintained his own positional observations and kept a personal log of the voyage. Major Anderson's diary recorded the use of a square sail during a voyage very similar to that made by the yacht on its way to England almost ten years previously. Anderson's diary jottings referred to the use of the square sail on the voyage to Queenstown:

> Sunday 26th, 186. . . . At sea. Finds us out of sight land running along with a smooth sea and very light southwest wind. The current was setting us at the rate of three and a half miles the hour. Furled the foresail and mainsail and fanned along pleasantly under the squaresail running off a good pace.
>
> Monday 27th, May 186. . . . We have been speeding along all night with the wind at southwest going to about ten knots. . . . Toward sunset we took two reefs in the mainsail and one to make all snug for the night. We are under the squaresail and mainsail.
>
> Thursday June 6th, 186. . . . A bright, sharp lovely morning with a light breeze from The westward—everybody on board in a good humor—drying out clothing and rubbing off mildew. We have the foresail and mainsail on deck undergoing repair and we are fanning along the squaresail only.
>
> Wednesday 19th June 186. . . . The Capt makes us only 378 miles from Cork, but he is wrong in his reckoning. We are more than that by some sixty miles. At noon a light breeze sprang up from the westward sending us along about 3½ miles the hour. The squaresail is set and the prospect is we shall get into Queenstown by next Saturday. The breeze gradually freshened until we are pulled up to nine knots an hour, the sea being smooth save in the ceaselessly heavy swell rolling in great humps every in a while.

Descriptions of the *Camilla/America* square sail as kept in journals by two different captains sailing aboard the yacht on voyages separated by ten years establishes convincingly that a square sail with its necessary fittings was a routine part of the ship's permanent gear. These observations dispel the notion that "big Ben" might have been a device rigged by Captain Brown's crew for the 1851 Atlantic crossing. For that initial crossing *America* carried a borrowed plan of working sails from another pilot boat, the *Mary Taylor,* a much smaller suit, 2,565 square feet. Could one suspect that the square sail was a component of the other smaller pilot boat's borrowed equipment, especially since captain Brown was half owner of the *Mary Taylor? America*'s own sail inventory consisted of 5,600 square feet beneath her circular cockpit. Yet, from all that we can surmise from Brown's comments, the "big Ben" or "Broad mouth" must have been a large sail, more proportionate to the *America,* and not likely from the *Mary Taylor.*

The plan for the initial 1851 Atlantic voyage was for *America* to cross in working trim and to be fitted out in Le Havre, sailing to the Isle of Wight, home of the Royal Yacht Squadron. When she arrived in France, she was dry-docked. The sea-weary gray paint from the crossing was covered with gloss black, and her bulwarks were painted in white. *Mary Taylor*'s smaller suit of sails was removed, and *America* was fitted with her own, tailored by the Wilson loft in Port Jefferson, Long Island. Notable today is the failure of any of the sketches or finished drawings of

America's sail by Wilson to suggest that she be equipped at any foreseeable time with a square sail. No appearance of the *America* square sail is recorded or mentioned after the yacht's arrival as a guest of the Royal Yacht Squadron.

Both the 1851 and 1861 descriptions of the square sail indicated that it was readily hoisted aloft and lowered as needed. The apparent flexibility of the rig suggested that the spar and course were hoisted as a unit rather than the spar being mounted to the foremast, as would be the case of a hermaphrodite-rigged ship or a fore-topsail schooner. Handling a composite unit certainly would have been the most convenient method on a small, primarily fore-and-aft rigged yacht.

Camilla/America was commanded by Henry Decie and inspected by Confederate Customs late in October 1861; however, the yacht then immediately disappeared. Decie had relinquished possession to the Confederate government, and she ran through the Union naval blockade early in March 1862 into Jacksonville, Florida, then never returned to sea. Unknown local authorities in Jacksonville decided to hide her somewhere upriver. Even prior to Confederate scuttling, the yacht's top rigging had been removed. The steamer *St. Marys* towed the derelict yacht upriver into Dunn's Creek, one of the tributaries off the St. Johns River in Florida. *America*'s hulk had been holed and filled until only her main spars protruded above water and diagonally over into the trees.[5]

Subsequent U.S. Navy records indicated that she was later salvaged and taken to Jacksonville and that her rigging was found and placed back aboard. Federal records further reveal that she was towed northward and refitted, but nothing has been found to indicate use of the square sail after her Confederate possession.[6] An 1863 photograph of her in Charlestown, Massachusetts, then in the U.S. Navy, shows no evidence of square sail gear on deck.[7]

I have long been perplexed why the yacht has not been illustrated running before the wind or just "fanning along" her old "big Ben." Perhaps the uncertainty about the rigging left accuracy-bound artists without the precise information. One artist whom I know, a marine specialist, declined a commission for such a work because of concerns about historical authenticity and the possibility of sullying her reputation. Another reason for this rather puzzling void may be that those artists who have painted *America* have been artists first and sailors second; hence, they might not have had the yachtsman's intimate knowledge of sailing gear. Besides, some of these artists probably were not scholars of maritime history and may not have thought it significant that "big Ben" was used primarily at sea.

In thinking about possible methods by which the yacht's square sail could have been rigged, Howard Chapelle's *History of American Sailing Vessels* comes to mind, in which he discusses systems applicable to schooner-rigged yachts of the period.[8] *America* would fall into this category. Although nothing was standardized, two methods were employed on the fore-topsail and fore and main topsail yards. The yards were made as light as possible so they could be lowered. The lower yards on a fore and main topsail schooner and the fore yard on a fore-topsail schooner were moved by a unique rigging method. A heavy vertical support line called a jackstay was passed around the masthead above the trestle trees, under the forestay, and the jackstay was set up close to the foot of the mast by deadeyes and lanyards or bullseyes from a ringbolt in the deck or mast bed. A lignum vitae thimble was seized to the yard and served as a fairlead by which the yard could ride the stay. The jackstay was the means to guide the yard aloft and was not intended to support the spar once it was hoisted. Chafing on the stay by the thimble would surely have caused the jackstay to part and create a serious mishap. The load to the mast was transferred by a truss-pendant or parrel line around the mast above the gaff

jaws and set up by a fall leading to the deck. The square yard only traveled along the jackstay. Chapelle comments that in such schooners as pilot boats, the course was rarely furled to the yard aloft because both yard and sail were easily lowered to deck.

A Great Lakes tall ship schooner owner, historian, and charterer offered a solicited opinion on how the square sail on *America* might have been rigged. He suggested that the yard could have been secured to the mast while on deck by means of a parrel with ribs and trucks then hoisted aloft ahead of the fore gaff jaws and mast hoops. However, by such an arrangement, the square sail could be rigged and hoisted only when the foresail was down.

The appearance and dimensions of the square sail are best described by the names Captain Dick Brown gave the sail. The name "big Ben" implied that the course was large; "Broad mouth" perhaps was meant to convey the notion that it was wide compared to the breadth of the yacht's deck. The fact that the sail was used by the pilot boat's tough captain (and therefore existed) attests to its value. Dick Brown's disdain for what he considered gimcracks was evident in his expression over loss of the yacht's flying jib boom later during the August 1851 race against the British. Brown was opposed to a flying jib to windward. However, a decision had been made by one of the *America*'s owners, after the yacht had arrived in England, to install the flying jib boom. The recommendation by the Ratsey sail loft of yellow pine as opposed to white pine for the spar was ignored by the owners. Shortly thereafter, the deck crew, unfamiliar with the boom, mishandled and broke it, thereby delaying *America*'s start somewhat while the wreckage was cleared. This revealing comment was made by one of the Steers: "I remember that Dick Brown said he was damned glad it was gone, as he didn't believe in carrying a flying jib to windward."[9]

America's history over the ten years following her stunning win at Cowes was somewhat akin to that of a foster child. She had four owners, none of whom possessed her for long. We have no information about the use of the square sail by Lord de Blaquiere, the yacht's next owner, and none from Viscount Templetown who owned her after that. Lord de Blaquiere made sea voyages in her to the Mediterranean, and Templetown was ill much of the time while she was in his possession. The yacht's fourth owner was Pitcher, a shipbuilder who refitted her after her early deterioration between 1859 and 1860. Not until Henry Decie's ownership in 1861 do we have direct evidence of the square sail being used aboard *America*.[10]

In essence, what is known about "big Ben," the *America*'s square sail? The rig's very existence is puzzling, because its use was never reflected in any of the sketches or drawings of the yacht's sail plan made either by George Steers, the Wilson sail loft, or from any evidence from the Ratsey loft whose consultants helped to fit the ill-fated flying jib boom. Yet, the *America* square sail was used and apparantly found useful by the yacht's first captain, "Old Dick" Brown, as evidenced by documentation of its routine use during the Atlantic crossing to England in June and July of 1851. Owner-captain Henry Edward Decie used the square sail during 1861.

The sail's size and shape can be inferred only by Dick Brown's terms "big Ben" and "Broad mouth." The method and tackle to hoist "big Ben" into place remain unclear. Methods described by Chapelle suggest that the square sail might have been bent to a yard that was hoisted aloft along a jackstay collared around the masthead and secured on deck by a ringbolt. As Brown's nicknames implied, the square sail must have been large and wide. From descriptions provided by various owners during its use, whatever system of rigging was used, it was expeditious and flexible because "big Ben" could be hoisted aloft and returned to deck quickly.

Confederate Major Anderson described the square sail as being used for "fanning along" before the wind when mainsail and foresail had been furled. However, it was also used in strong breezes, combined with main, gaff topsail, and foresail to help drive the vessel, reaching up to 13½ knots. As written in James Steers's log, the *America* square sail was noted to be less desirable in winds hauling forward of the beam. This suggested the amount of trim by the braces was limited, and "big Ben" was taken in when the wind hauled around.

"Big Ben" or "Broad mouth" has been omitted from history too long.

Notes

1. B. Tomsett, "*America* Analyzed: Sail Plan," *Nautical Research Journal* 40 (1995): 192–99.
2. Winfield M. Thompson, William P. Stephens, and William J. Swann, *The Yacht* America (Boston, Mass.: Charles E. Lauriat, 1925), 47.
3. The log of the yacht *America* from 21 June to 18 August 1851 was kept by James R. Steers, the brother and partner of George Steers, her designer and builder. The passengers on this voyage were George Steers, James R. Steers, and George Steers Jr., the son of James R. Steers. The log was copied for the New York Yacht Club by James R. Steers on 2 January 1905 and entries are quoted through courtesy of the New York Yacht Club.
4. Edward Clifford Anderson Papers, vol. 5, E. C. Anderson Journal, no. 3602, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
5. Thomas R. Neblett "The Yacht *America:* A New Account Pertaining to Her Confederate Operations," *American Neptune* 27 (1967): 233–53.
6. Logbook, U.S. Steamer *Ellen,* March 1862, 8:00 A.M. to noon watch. Naval Records Group, U.S. National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.
7. Diary of Edward H. Saltonstall, a captain's clerk aboard the U.S. gunboat *Ottawa,* Report of Lt. Thomas Stevens to Flag Officer S. F. DuPont, a commander in the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 28 March 1862, New York Historical Society, New York.
8. Howard I. Chapelle, *The History of American Sailing Ships* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1935), 236.
9. Charles Boswell, *The* America (New York: David McKay, 1967), 70.
10. The Abstract of Registry bill of sale no. 5031 dated 30 July 1860 in the Office of the Registrar General of Shipping and Seamen, Cardiff, South Wales, established that Henry Edward Decie, Esquire, of Clipston House, Northamptonshire, became sole owner of all sixty-four shares of the vessel.

Navy Wives and WAVES:
Sources for Women's History in the Naval War College's Naval Historical Collection

by Evelyn M. Cherpak

The Naval War College's Naval Historical Collection in Newport, Rhode Island, is the repository for the college's archives, manuscripts, and oral histories treating the history of the institution, the navy in Narragansett Bay, and the history of naval warfare. While it seems unlikely that a researcher would find the oral histories, personal papers, and photographs of Navy wives and WAVES in an archive as overwhelmingly masculine as this, the collection contains significant material documenting the lives and experiences of women connected with the military, both officially and unofficially.

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Oral Histories

The contributions of World War II WAVE officers and enlisted personnel to the war effort have been largely ignored by oral historians, with the exception of the U.S. Naval Institute's staff, who interviewed the WAVES leadership in the early 1970s. A small collection of WAVE interviews conducted by Eleanor Stoddard is at California State University at Long Beach. The fiftieth anniversary celebrations commemorating World War II inspired me to begin an oral history program interviewing Rhode Island WAVES, navy nurses, and women marines who served during the war. The roster of the Ocean State WAVES, an affiliate of WAVES National, an organization of women who served in the navy, provided a base from which to start. Most of the unit's members were interviewed, and contacts through them and academic colleagues expanded the interviewee pool. A notice about the project appeared in *White Caps,* the newsletter of WAVES National, and WAVES from all over the country sent me their memoirs.

There are now over one hundred and fifty oral histories and written reminiscences of World War II military women in the collection. The

interviews contain information on their family background, education, and occupation before enlistment in the service; their motivations for joining; when they joined; their boot and advanced training; billets; living conditions; social life; camaraderie; civilian attitudes; discrimination; V-J Day; demobilization; return to civilian life; and postwar marriage and family. The women were overwhelmingly positive about their experiences in the service, and many remained in contact with the women with whom they served. They attended postwar WAVES reunions and joined both their state and national organizations. When the war ended, some women were reluctant to leave the military. They reenlisted when the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, which allowed women to join the regular and reserve military, was passed in 1948. To thousands of women, military service was a high point in their lives, allowing them the opportunity to travel, meet men and women from other areas of the country, serve their coun-

World War II WAVES in Hawaii in 1945. WAVES director Mildred McAfee is in the center. Courtesy of the Naval Historical Collection.

try, learn new skills, take on nontraditional jobs, and widen their perspective. The GI Bill gave them the opportunity to pursue a college education and graduate work, and thus the benefits of military service extended well into civilian life.

The oral histories of navy wives and navy juniors offer a different perspective on life in the military that has also been neglected, except by the Naval Institute staff who conducted interviews with Mary Smith, whose ancestors served in the navy since the American Revolution, and Frances Mitscher, the wife of Admiral Marc Mitscher, who was involved in most of the major sea battles in the Pacific Theater during the last two years of World War II. Our holdings contain interviews with several women whose fathers or husbands were flag rank officers during the first half of the twentieth century; they include Floride Hewitt Taylor, Mary Rowan Belknap Howard, Mary Smith, Isabel Eccles, Wilma Miles, and Hester Laning Pepper.[1] While these interviews tell each individual's unique story, they contain information on navy social life and customs; the U.S. Naval Academy; the World Wars; life in foreign lands; the Naval War College; impressions of flag rank officers, royalty, and civilian leaders; travel experiences; the benefits and drawbacks of military life, including the added responsibilities that wives had to assume when their husbands were at sea; and life in retirement.

Manuscripts

The personal papers of navy wives and WAVES can be found in either their own collections or with their husband's manuscripts. Their collections consist of letters, official documents, photographs, personal reminiscences, published and unpublished writings, autobiographies, and miscellaneous items, such as programs, booklets, and maps. They are a fine supplement to the oral history interviews. Specifically, there are letters to parents and friends describing their daily routines; photographs of WAVES in uniform, buildings at the U.S. Naval Training School (Women Reserve) at Hunter College, the Bronx, New York, and at Cedar Falls, Iowa, barracks, regimental reviews, recreation halls, dances, nightclubs, and tourist spots; base newspapers; newspaper clippings announcing their enlistment; military papers, including discharge papers, certificates, and letters of appreciation from Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal; pamphlets and booklets, including a commemorative booklet of the U.S. Naval Training School (WR) at Hunter College, New York, WAVES song books, joke books, prayer books, and a leaflet on returning to civilian life; and commemorative pins, including the ruptured duck given to navy enlisted service women on their discharge.

One of the more noteworthy items included in the collections is an unpublished manuscript by Laura Rapoport Borsten entitled "Once a WAVE: My Life in the Navy, 1942–1946." She was one of the first professional women recruited by the WAVES. Her biography recounts her training at the U.S. Naval Midshipmen's School (WR) at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, her duties as operations officer at the U.S. Naval Training School (WR) in Bronx, New York, and an assignment in Hawaii where she was responsible for closing WAVES installations in 1946. She supported the recruitment of Black women into the WAVES in 1944.

Several outstanding collections of letters in our holdings merit mention: they include letters of Luisa White, a link trainer instructor at Lake City, Florida, to her parents describing her daily routine; postcards of L. Jane Irvine Williams to her parents from the U.S. Naval Hospital in Philadelphia and the U.S. Naval Hospital in San Diego between 1944 and 1946; and letters in the Barbara Aldrich collection describing a visit of WAVES director Mildred McAfee. The Norma Smith collection houses an unusual photograph album with pictures of the V-J Day parade in Honolulu, Hawaii, in September 1945.

Most of the papers of navy wives date from the twentieth century, with the exception of the letters of Frances Georgiana Belknap. Wife of Rear Admiral George E. Belknap, Frances was the daughter of George Washington Prescott II, who served as a naval agent in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in the 1860s. She married Belknap, a widower, in 1866 in Calcutta, India, and lived in Kobe, Nagasaki, and Yokohama, Japan, from 1889 to 1892 when her husband was commanding officer of the Asiatic Station. Her letters to relatives span the years 1864 to 1912; however, those of most interest to researchers were written to her mother and to her aunt, Fannie Lear, from Japan on long sheets of rice paper. Her correspondence gives a picture of social life—balls, receptions, and visits to the Imperial Palace, sightseeing, the climate, her dress (she adopted the kimono to keep cool), people they met, family problems, health, and recreation. Frances Belknap relished her three years in Japan.

In contrast, her daughter-in-law, Julia Averill Belknap, wife of Navy Lieutenant Reginald Rowan Belknap, lived in Japan, China, and Manila, during 1900 and 1901 but did not enjoy her time in the Far East. Two holograph accounts, written some fourteen years later, describe her daily routine in a hotel with other navy wives, and then in a private home where she was able to observe Japanese customs and people.[2] The difficulty of traveling and living in the Orient where she was alone much of the time made her decide to return to the United States in the spring of 1901, and she regretted that she was not able to sightsee more extensively as her husband was at sea most of the time.

The manuscript collection of Wilma J. Miles, wife of Admiral Milton E. Miles, who headed the U.S. Naval Forces in China during World War II, consists of letters, writings, photographs, and her autobiography entitled *Billy, Navy Wife,* published in 1999. Wilma Miles's letters to her mother and vignettes of Canton, Peking, and Kowloon City describe her two-year residence (1925–27) in China, where her husband was commanding officer of USS *Pampanga,* a gunboat on the West and Pearl Rivers. Both Milton and Wilma immersed themselves in Chinese culture and grew to love the country. The Miles family returned to China in 1936 for three years, when Milton was commanding officer of the USS *Black Hawk.* Wilma and her three sons lived in Chefoo and followed the fleet to Manila in the winter. Her letters and autobiography describe the challenges of daily living in China, her trip to Peking (which was cut short by the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937 that initiated hostilities with Japan), and a three-month journey alone through the Dutch East Indies and Indo-China in 1938. There she took photographs of harbors that proved useful to the navy during World War II, and thus she aided the war effort in a small way. The collection also contains an account of the family's car trip over the Burma Road in 1939; they were the first American family to exit China by this route. Notes, letters, and itineraries for the family's trips throughout South and Central America when Admiral Miles was commanding officer of the Fifteenth Naval District in Panama between 1954 and 1956 are part of the collection. The papers include an extensive photograph archive that documents each of the many countries they visited. The couple took and developed all of the photographs, which are a valuable resource for the period between 1925 and 1960.

Edith Crose of Cincinnati, Ohio, married Lieutenant William E. Crose in 1895 and accompanied him on a number of foreign tours. Her memoirs, entitled *A Navy Wife Remembers,* written after her husband retired in 1923, and photographs of Samoa, ships, naval officers, and family make up the collection. Shortly after they were married, Edith moved to Sitka, Alaska, where she maintained a household under primitive conditions. She described their home, lack of supplies and food, the Native Alaskan population, enter-

Commander George Belknap and his wife, Frances Georgiana Prescott Belknap, in Hong Kong, China, ca. 1867. Courtesy of the Naval Historical Collection.

Wilma Miles and her three sons in Kunming, China, before they embarked on their journey over the Burma Road in April 1939. Courtesy of the Naval Historical Collection.

taining on a meager budget, and delivering her first child without medical help. In 1910, her husband was appointed governor-general of Samoa. These two and one-half years were the happiest of her life because she loved the island and its people, whose customs she described. When her husband was named commandant in the Philippines, she lived in Manila and traveled to Baguio, where she encountered the native Igorot tribe and their tribal practices. She recounted the navy's efforts to aid victims of the 1918 pandemic and her role in caring for those stricken at the naval station in Hampton Roads, Virginia.

The Mary Taylor Alger Smith manuscript collection contains fascinating letters from Shanghai, Chefoo, and Manila for the period between 1925 and 1927. When her husband, Roy C. Smith, was named commander of USS *Noa,* she and their four children accompanied him to the Far East. Her correspondence with her mother and sister describes the cities, people, customs, climate, daily living, travel, and the U.S. Navy's rescue of missionaries and corporate personnel besieged in cities along the Yangtze River during the Chinese civil war. Almost every letter mentions the political situation, the civil war, the Chinese armies, the strikes, Russian influence, and the antiforeign demonstrations.

The papers of Vice Admiral Benedict J. Semmes, former Naval War College president in 1971 and 1972, contain a memoir written by his wife, Katharine, of their assignment in Bahrain when he was commander of the Middle East Force in 1962 and 1963. The memoir, based on letters to her mother, is illustrated with photographs and paintings by the author. The couple traveled throughout the Middle East, visiting Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, the Sudan, Jordan, Nepal, Aden, Abu Dhabi, Lebanon, and southern India. Her descriptions of the food, customs, religion, peoples, dress, status of women, cities, and the countryside some thirty-eight years ago provide fascinating insight into this troubled region. Mrs. Semmes concluded that she developed a deeper understanding of the Middle East and an appreciation for its history and culture during her year there. Three of her articles—one on the Washington Navy Yard, another on Bahrain, and the third on her experiences as a navy junior and navy wife–are in the Semmes Papers as well.

Admiral William S. Sims was president of the Naval War College in 1917 and again from 1919 to 1922. In 1905, he married Anne Hitchcock, the daughter of Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allan Hitchcock, in Washington, D.C., and the couple had five children. The Sims collection contains typescript copies of the admiral's letters held by the Library of Congress, but also includes four boxes of original correspondence of his wife as well. Anne wrote regularly to her husband during his many absences. Her letters to him from her summer residence in Monadnock, New Hampshire, in 1906 and between 1909 and 1911 and between 1915 and 1917 tell of family life, the children, illnesses, travel, visitors, problems with servants, social life, and summer excursions. Several contain comments on naval matters. In addition, there are letters to her sisters Sarah Shepley in St. Louis, Missouri, and Margaret Hitchcock that are dated between 1904 and 1906. One of these is a touching letter that announces her engagement to William S. Sims and her newfound happiness. The collection gives a fine picture of navy life during the first two decades of the twentieth century.

Author Thomas Buell's research source materials for his biography (entitied *The Quiet Warrior*) of World War II Admiral Raymond A. Spruance published in 1974 contains tapes and transcripts of interviews with the admiral's wife, Margaret, and his daughter (Margaret Spruance Bogart) regarding the admiral. There are correspondence files with Mrs. Spruance as well. The papers of Rear Admiral James C. Shaw include the writings of his wife, Bettsy, and a draft of her



Oct 1.
1925—

Dear Mama—

I enclose as lucid an account of the present state of Chinese affairs as I've seen. Mr. Bernard says it is accurate. He also says he was talking to a Chinese doctor here who is a friend of his—and there met a Chinese general on his way to somewhere near, and he told Mr B. that inside a week fighting will break out. He believes that will mean the S.V.C. (Shanghai Volunteers Corps) being called out, a state of emergency being called again—etc. I trust they won't fight near this part of the French concession. No one here is in the least concerned and school keeps as usual. If it should be bad you can believe I will use my Manila tickets—which are safely locked in my trunk.

But all this is Chinese against Chinese and there is no reason at all for uneasiness I do believe. If anything comes off in a hurry I can take the children and go down to the Astor Hotel for a few days. It is a huge stone place on the water front, next the Consulate, and absolutely all right.

All this because you may think something is coming off—not because I expect anything. The fighting is supposed to be an hour from Shanghai—or off here and there in the country. Chuncking is hundreds of miles (literally) away—Nothing exciting has happened today. Mary's cold has all but gone and the others are fine. Lou's exercises are doing her

Excerpt from a 1 October 1925 letter of Mary Smith regarding the political situation in China. Courtesy of the Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

book about their lives during World War II entitled *Washed Away by Strife.* Another item of a navy wife in the collection is an 1872 letter of Virginia Farragut, widow of Admiral David Farragut, petitioning the U.S. Congress for the sum of two thousand dollars to pay her husband's funeral expenses.

In addition, there are two collections of papers that were not written by navy wives, but they have a military connection nonetheless. The papers of Captain Roy Campbell Smith contain estate papers of his mother, Maria McGregor Campbell Smith, as well as a description of her harrowing journey from Petersburg, Virginia, in 1864, when her husband, Charles, assistant surgeon general of the Confederacy, was posted to Cooperstown, New York. As she relates in her account entitled "My Blockade Running," she successfully crossed enemy lines with her children before the fall of Richmond.[3] Katharine Scott Umsted was the mother of the late Rear Admiral Scott Umsted of Jamestown, Rhode Island, and three boxes of her writings and travel diaries and several folders of letters to her son are part of his collection. The writings consist of published and unpublished travel articles, poems, and fiction as well as daily diary entries describing her travels in Europe in 1912 and 1913, her residence in Manila, Baguio, and Shanghai from 1922 to 1924, where her son was stationed, and a Caribbean cruise in 1927 and 1928. The letters are from Bermuda during the winter of 1921 and from the Caribbean

islands during the winter of 1927/1928, where she visited almost every island pursuing relaxation and gathering historical data for her writing. Mrs. Umsted, an inveterate traveler, described life aboard ship, social life, the American colony, British colonial society, flora, fauna, native peoples and their customs, and the rigors of travel some eighty years ago.

Scholars in search of primary source materials on the WAVES in World War II and the lives, experiences, and adventures of navy wives in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will find the documents in the Naval Historical Collection worth investigating. Interested researchers can contact the curator, Evelyn Cherpak, Code 1E3, at the Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841, or e-mail <CherpakE@nwc.navy.mil> for additional information.

Notes

1. Floride Hewitt Taylor is the daughter of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, commander of the major European invasions during World War II, including Operation Torch in North Africa in 1942, the invasions of Sicily and Salerno in 1943, and Operation Dragoon, the invasion of Southern France, in 1944; Mary Rowan Belknap Howard was the daughter of Rear Admiral Reginald Rowan Belknap, who headed the navy's rescue and rebuilding mission following the earthquake at Messina, Italy, in 1908 and commanded the North Sea Mining Squadron during World War I; Mary Alger Smith came from a navy family whose service dates back to the American Revolution. She was the daughter of Captain Philip R. Alger, a mathematics professor at the U.S. Naval Academy and the wife of Commander Roy C. Smith; Isabel Eccles was the wife of Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, an expert in naval logistics; Wilma Miles was the wife of Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, commanding officer of the Fifteenth Naval District between 1954 and 1956; and Hester Laning Pepper's father was Rear Admiral Harris Laning, president of the Naval War College between 1930 and 1933.

2. Julia Belknap's reminiscences are also located in the Belknap Papers at the Library of Congress.

3. I edited an account of the journey that was published in *Southern Studies* 3 (1992): 209–20.

The Last Voyage of the *Juan de Fuca*

by James E. Valle

Most historians of the United States Merchant Marine are concerned primarily with the Battle of the Atlantic. During World War II, this was one of the most dramatic and drawn out campaigns on record. As this battle was winding down in the fall and winter of 1944, the men of the merchant marine and Naval Armed Guard found themselves facing a new and equally desperate challenge, this time in the Pacific theater. Japanese kamikazis and conventional bombers put up a determined fight that began with the defense of the Philippines and lasted until the final surrender in August 1945. American merchant ships were a prime target of the suicide bombers. The saga of the *Juan de Fuca* and her final voyage is but one of many stories that could be told containing some elements in common with the experiences of other ships. Other aspects of this tale are unique. Undoubtedly, the men of the *Juan de Fuca* upheld the highest traditions of the merchant marine, the navy, and the army.

Dr. James E. Valle was born in Oakland, California, on 13 October 1943. He received his B.A. degree in history from San Francisco State University in June 1965 and completed his Master's Degree program at UCLA in December 1967 with a specialization in United States history. In February 1968, Dr. Valle began his teaching career at Delaware State University. After completion of his Ph.D. studies at the University of Delaware in the field of maritime and naval history in June 1979, he was promoted to the rank of professor and served two terms as chairman of the Department of History and Political Science at Delaware State. Dr. Valle has published books and articles on both maritime and railroad history.

In her case, greatness sprang from relatively humble origins. The *Juan de Fuca* was one of hundreds of standard Liberty Ships. She was launched at the Kaiser shipyard at Vancouver, Washington, in January 1943. Assigned to the Weyerhaeuser Steamship Company, she was commanded for most of her wartime career by Captain Charles S. Robbins. Her maiden voyage was something of a disaster. During docking at San Francisco, a harbor tug punched a hole in her side necessitating a dry docking to effect repairs. Upon her relaunching, she ran over a sunken barge and was obliged to return to the shipyard for additional repairs. Finally clearing port in March 1943, the *Juan de Fuca* began the first of four wartime voyages that took her to the Persian Gulf twice and to the beachhead at Anzio where her armed guard gunners claimed two German bombers shot down while the ship offloaded supplies for the army, sometimes under bombardment from shore batteries. After shuttle service in

the Mediterranean, she sailed for New York where she closed out the books on her third voyage.

The fourth and most eventful voyage of the *Juan de Fuca* officially began in June 1944. She opened articles to sign on a new merchant crew and took aboard a fresh contingent of Naval Armed Guard gunners. The armed guard signalman Martin Vallee, by then a seasoned veteran with three previous voyages and combat experience at the Salerno beachhead and Bari under his belt, recalled that the *Juan de Fuca* seemed clean, efficient, and well run, indicating she had a good skipper and competent officers.[1] In fact, most of her original officers remained with the ship for this fourth voyage, but the merchant seamen and armed guards were all new to each other and to the ship.

After the cargo was completely loaded, the *Juan de Fuca* departed New York in Convoy NG-440 bound for Guantanamo. From there, she sailed in Convoy GZ-73 for the Canal Zone and transited the Panama Canal on 22 and 23 June. Once in the Pacific, convoying was suspended and she proceeded independently to Hawaii, San Pedro, and San Francisco. At San Pedro, additional armed guard gunners came on board along with more ammunition and a navy radioman. At San Francisco, she completed her cargo of army quartermaster supplies and departed for Brisbane, Australia, on 9 September. Sailing independently, as was customary in those days, she arrived after a thirty-one day passage. For the remainder of October, she shuttled between Brisbane and Sydney while the crew and gunners enjoyed the legendary hospitality of the Australian civilians.

Up to this point, the voyage had been routine. The *Juan de Fuca* and her men had yet to be tested by anything more strenuous than monotony and training. The armed guard commander, Lt. (j.g.) John Root, had been a lawyer in civilian life. Close-mouthed and reticent by training and by inclination, he stayed out of the way of the ship's civilian officers and trained his gunners and signalman until they were a well-drilled team. By this stage of the war, the hard-case merchant mariners of the pre-war era were spread very thin, and most of the seamen were as young as the armed guards. Captain Robbins and his officers adjusted their leadership techniques accordingly. Drawing on his own resources as a seasoned master mariner and experience as a combat soldier in World War I, Robbins strove to explain to his men what it was like to be under fire and the vital need to quell panic and keep functioning.[2]

The Australian interlude drew to a close. On 22 October, the *Juan de Fuca* loaded a cargo of invasion supplies and departed Brisbane for Lae and Hollandia. After a four-day stay at Hollandia, she took on board twenty-seven army combat engineers under the command of Lt. H. E. McPherson and departed in a navy convoy bound for Leyte. It was on this passage, which lasted from 8 to 15 November, that they experienced their first scattering of air attacks. To veterans of the Anzio and Salerno landings like Captain Robbins and signalman Vallee, these seemed half-hearted and ineffectual, but once they arrived at Tacloban all that changed. From 15 to 22 November, they were obliged to offload their original cargo and stow a new one while enduring constant air attacks. Many of these were being pressed home with great determination by kamikazis making a desperate effort to stop the flow of invasion supplies. LSTs and Liberty Ships were a favorite target, and the suicide pilots were skillful enough to aim consistently for the bridge of their victims.

Under this relentless pressure, service-related boundaries were all but disregarded. Everyone turned to work cargo, army, navy, and merchant seamen alike. During attacks, they all helped man the guns. Work went on around the clock in broiling heat and high humidity. Some one hundred air raids were recorded, and the men of the *Juan de Fuca* witnessed a number of ships being

hit and set ablaze. The nightly visits of "Washing Machine Charlie" ensured that they got very little sleep, and regular morning attacks had them on deck again at the crack of dawn.

Despite these grim working conditions, the ship discharged her original cargo and took aboard a new lading consisting of piling logs, airfield matting, cement, and construction supplies, some of it from another Liberty Ship that had been damaged. The piling logs were stowed in the number two lower hold while the army engineers berthed in the number two 'tween decks. This arrangement was to have fateful consequences later.

By the time this cargo was completely loaded, all hands were more than willing to get out of Tacloban where they had endured so many air raids. They had no way of knowing that they were going into an even hotter situation. After a five-day interlude spent waiting at anchor south of Tacloban, the *Juan de Fuca* was assigned to a navy convoy carrying supplies to the recently established beachhead on Mindoro, which had been invaded on 15 December in order to secure strate-

View of a standard Liberty Ship showing the arrangement of the forward gun tubs and the number two hatch. Virtually all of the *Juan de Fuca*'s major damage was sustained in this forward part of the ship. Courtesy of William F. Huitgren.

gic airfields necessary for the support of projected landings on Luzon. The small Japanese garrison on Mindoro had been overcome without much difficulty, but the enemy was now determined to prevent the rebuilding of the airfields at all costs.[3]

The mixed convoy of LSTs, LSMs, and Liberty Ships, officially known as the First Mindoro Resupply Echelon, together with the escorting destroyers of Destroyer Division 46, commanded by Captain R. W. Cavenagh, set off for Blue Beach on Mindoro via Surigao Strait and the Mindanao Sea. This roundabout course gave them some cover. There were no deadly attacks until they approached the Cuyo Island group approximately one hundred nautical miles short of their objective.[4] At 1700 hours on 21 December, a beautiful tropical afternoon was suddenly shattered by the arrival of several suicide bombers. One plane singled out the *Juan de Fuca* and came boring in on the port quarter at an altitude of about 1,500 feet, obviously aiming for the bridge. The ship's gunners scored numerous hits, but this only deflected the attacker a little. It crashed with a roar squarely on the number two hatch, penetrating to the 'tween decks where its five-hundred-pound bomb detonated. The men on the monkey bridge were thrown backwards. Signalman Vallee later recalled lying flat on his back looking straight up at a swirling mass of hatch covers and beams pinwheeling through the air. One hatch beam came down just inches from his head, slicing through the deckhouse and wrecking a lifeboat. He was uninjured, but Third Mate Allen D. Miller was struck in the legs by flying splinters or shrapnel.

Two army men in the hold were not as fortunate. They were killed outright while in their quarters, the only fatalities recorded in this attack. A large fire immediately broke out and, while the naval armed guards continued to man their guns, the merchant crew and army engineers began to fight the fire. While this was going on, the attack continued as two conventional bombers bracketed the ship with bombs. The ship's gunners promptly shot them down.[5]

Meanwhile, other ships in the convoy were being hit with numbing frequency. Two determined Japanese planes passed over the *Juan de Fuca* and crashed into the two ships immediately ahead of her, LST 460 and LST 749. Both ships

The Navy's Liberty Tanker USS *Porcupine,* which was attacked and set on fire soon after arriving off Blue Beach during the Mindoro Operation. Courtesy of the United States Naval Institute photographic archives.



Hundreds of rounds of tracers lighting up the night as Naval Armed Guard gunners try to rid themselves of "Washing Machine Charlie" at Tacloben Anchorage, Leyte, Philippine Islands. Courtesy of the United States Naval Institute photographic archives.

instantly burst into flames and sheered out of line, falling astern of the convoy. As the shaken crew of the *Juan de Fuca* put up a curtain of anti-aircraft fire, they witnessed another kamikazi crash into the forecastle of the *Hobart Baker*.[6] Both LSTs eventually had to be abandoned, but the *Hobart Baker* contained her damage and continued with the convoy. The *Juan de Fuca*'s men quickly put out the blaze in the number two hold. Subsequent examination revealed that the piling logs in the lower hold had prevented the bomb from penetrating the ship's bottom, and they only had a 3' x 6' hole at the waterline on the port side. Chief Engineer William Purdie was able to lift the hole clear of the water by transferring ballast, intentionally creating a five-degree list.[7] Since there was no grave damage to the ship, she caught up with the convoy and arrived off Blue Beach the next morning.

Blue Beach, located near the town of San Jose, Mindoro, proved to be even more nerve-wracking than Leyte had been. Some 327 air attacks were recorded between the time of their arrival on the morning of 22 December and the

The only known ship portrait of the *Juan de Fuca.* Courtesy of the United States Naval Institute photographic archives.

first week in January, when the Japanese shifted their attention to convoys in Lingayan Gulf headed for the invasion of Luzon. Air attacks, it turned out, would not be the only problem the *Juan de Fuca*'s men faced at Mindoro. Right in the middle of their stay there, while all hands including the armed guards and even the ship's purser were frantically discharging cargo, a major attack by surface units of the Imperial fleet, supported by land-based aircraft, developed.

The great Battle of Leyte Gulf had effectively smashed the main striking forces of the Japanese Navy, but there were still some potent light forces scattered around the South China Sea. On 24 December 1944, Admiral Masanori Kimura sortied from Camranh Bay with one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and seven destroyers. His orders were to support a Japanese invasion force and to raid the American airfields around San Jose. Incredibly, this force was not spotted until 1500 hours on 26 December, when they were just a few hours away from their objective. Although the projected invasion never materialized, the Japanese warships arrived off San Jose just after sunset with nothing to oppose them but a few army and navy aircraft and PT boats. Admiral Kimura had stumbled onto an opportunity of which every professional officer of that era dreamed. A lightly defended invasion force lay between the beach and his guns and squarely among them was the *Juan de Fuca.*

To their credit, the American defenders put up a gallant fight. Bomb hits on light cruiser *Qyodo* and destroyer *Kiyoshimo* must have unnerved Kimura, for he failed to recognize his opportunity and opted, with a stunning lack of imagination, to carry out his original orders and bombard San Jose, the beaches, and the airfields. Only a few shells from the cruiser's guns landed among the invasion support group, but they were forced to maneuver frantically under intensive Japanese air attack while the ships were bombed and strafed from stem to stern in the twilight and darkness.[8] With PT boats closing in, Kimura withdrew at 2000 hours, subsequently losing one of his destroyers, the unlucky *Kiyoshimo,* to a torpedo hit. The Japanese force returned to Camranh Bay to sit out the rest of the war, leaving behind some very relieved Americans.

The strenuous and nerve-wracking business of offloading the *Juan de Fuca* and her consorts continued, punctuated this time by the grim humor of war. On 30 December, the Liberty tanker USS *Porcupine* (IX-126), with a navy crew on board, arrived at Blue Beach as part of the Second Mindoro Resupply Echelon. This group had been more intensively attacked en route than the *Juan de Fuca*'s group. While on passage from Leyte, three of its four Liberty Ships had been hit by kamikazis.[9] The *John Burke* had blown up and sank with all hands, taking a small army transport down with it. The *William Sharon* took a suicide bomber on the bridge and had to return to Leyte under tow. The *Porcupine* entered the landing area on 30 December and anchored opposite the *Juan de Fuca.* As soon as her crew secured the anchor detail, the *Porcupine*'s signalman semaphored the *Juan de Fuca* asking if there was very much enemy activity at Mindoro. Before signalman Vallee could start his reply, a kamikazi suddenly came roaring up from astern, dropped a bomb that missed the *Juan de Fuca,* then banked sharply and crashed squarely on the *Porcupine*'s bridge. Soon the tanker was beached and abandoned, with uncontrollable fires that burned brightly for days afterward.[10]

By this time, the entire personnel on board the *Juan de Fuca* had been working for eight days to get the ship unloaded. The only break for the armed guard crew had occurred on Christmas Day when Lieutenant Root called them all together and issued a tot of grain alcohol mixed with fruit juice in honor of the holiday. By 30 December there was still a significant amount of cargo on board but the *Juan de Fuca* was obliged to get underway that evening to get out of the glare of the *Porcupine*'s fires. She was steaming just off shore in the Mindoro Strait when her luck finally ran out at 0300 hours on 31 December. A Japanese aircraft circled the ship, made a determined approach under intense fire, and launched a torpedo that struck abreast the number two hold on the port side.

This time there was no fire, but the hold was opened to the sea. Shock from the torpedo blast destroyed the ship's compass and put communications gear out of commission. The boilers and engines continued to steam normally. Because no list developed, Captain Robbins attempted to steer the ship into a cove on Ambuloni Island. Predawn darkness and the lack of a functioning compass partially frustrated this plan. At about 0410 hours, the *Juan de Fuca* grounded on a coral reef off Pabugan Point.[11] There she rested on an even keel, somewhat down by the head, while the captain and his officers tried various combinations of helm and engine maneuvers to free her. Finally, Chief Engineer Purdie reported that salt water was starting to contaminate the feedwater. Robbins ordered the plant secured and began to organize the evacuation of the ship. Everyone went ashore except the master, one merchant seaman, the armed guard officer, and two of his petty officers.[12]

As dawn broke over the Mindanao beaches, the navy beachmaster, Commander Jack P. Bandy, was confronted with a very dismaying situation. Two of his Liberty Ships, the *Hobart Baker* and the *John M. Clayton,* had been bombed and beached, a third, the *James H. Breasted,* was stranded off Ilan Island being raked by machine gun fire from Japanese paratroopers hidden on shore, and nobody knew where the *Juan de Fuca* was. These damaged ships contained virtually all of the remaining supplies needed to get the Mindoro airfields functioning.[13]

On 1 January, the *Juan de Fuca* and her men were discovered. The Naval Armed Guard personnel now left the ship and were taken to a nearby PT boat base for return to the United States. Throughout their ordeal, they had only one man seriously injured, a gunner who jumped overboard from the 20mm gun tub just forward of the number two hold during the attack of 21 December. He was picked up along with survivors from the two LSTs, having sustained injuries to both legs. The merchant seamen estab-

lished a camp for themselves on Ambuloni Island where they were offered repatriation home.

It would be another month before most of them actually did leave. With so many ships sunk or damaged, the *Juan de Fuca*'s remaining cargo was vitally needed ashore. Captain Robbins believed that she could be refloated when salvage vessels became available.[14]

At any rate, with the boilers still capable of steaming, the deck winches were operational, and so the remainder of the cargo could be recovered. By 2 January, the crew were back on board assisting a gang of army laborers to discharge cargo. Although a small group of men left for home on 5 January, the rest stayed with the captain and completed unloading on 30 January, whereupon the *Juan de Fuca* was declared a total constructive loss and her people taken to Mindoro.[15]

In a way, they had gotten off easily. From the time of her stranding until 6 January, their old landing area endured relentless air raids. On 4 January, the Liberty Ship *Lewis Dyche,* loaded with bombs and fuses, blew up and sank with all hands when a kamikazi hit her off Magrin Bay. She was the last major casualty of the Mindoro operation, as the Japanese shifted their attention to the Luzon invasion force. The merchant seamen had come through their ordeal with only one casualty; Allen D. Miller, a third mate wounded in the legs during the 22 December attack, was hospitalized at Leyte on 5 January.

Although it was customary to fly stranded merchant seamen out of the war zone and return them to their original port of embarkation, Captain Robbins and the remainder of his crew were offered another option. The Liberty Ship *John M. Clayton,* bombed and beached on New Year's Day, had been refloated and patched up by navy salvors. Robbins and his crew were asked to take her over and sail her back to the United States for permanent repairs. By this time, the *Juan de Fuca* was firmly embedded on her reef. Number one, two, and three holds were flooded, and cracks were developing in the hull abreast the number four hold. The navy had plans to salvage her and take her into the service as a self-propelled lubricants barge with a navy crew on board. Captain Robbins and his men left her and took on the job of returning the *John M. Clayton* to the mainland. They actually got as far as Hawaii before the *Clayton* became too decrepit to continue and was forced into the naval shipyard for repairs.[16]

The *Juan de Fuca* was refloated on 15 February and taken into the navy. Aside from patching up her flooded holds, no serious repairs were ever made. She was assigned the name *Araner,* given pendant number IX-226, and presumably a small caretaker crew under the command of Lt. Henry Morath. After taking these steps, the navy appears to have hesitated. Various commands, including ComServPac, CinCPac, and even the CNO traded proposals back and forth, sometimes expressing concern that the ship was in too poor shape to be useful, and once reassigning her name and pendant number to the *John C. Fremont,* also lying damaged in the Philippines. In September 1945, she was placed in service as floating storage and towed to various locations. January 1946 found her in Subic Bay, where she was stricken from the Naval Register and returned to the War Shipping Administration, once more resuming the name *Juan de Fuca.*

The WSA had no use for a crippled Liberty Ship thousands of miles from home. Consequently, the *Juan de Fuca* was once again declared a total constructive loss and sold to the Asia Development Corporation of Shanghai, China, as a scrap hull. She departed Subic Bay under tow in September 1950 on one last voyage, but never reached her destination. On 26 September, the tug *Margaret Moller,* with the *Juan de Fuca* in tow, was intercepted by Chinese Nationalist gunboats in international waters some

three hundred miles southeast of the mouth of the Yangtze River. Under orders from the gunboats, the *Moller* cut her tow adrift, leaving the *Juan de Fuca* at the mercy of the winds and currents. She was sighted once more off Northern Taiwan and is presumed to have sunk, possibly in the Formosa Strait.[17]

And so ended the last voyage of the *Juan de Fuca,* a gallant ship, a seasoned veteran, and a potent symbol of a hard-fought campaign in which men of three different services worked side by side to get a vital job done.[18]

Notes

1. Taped interview with Martin Vallee, armed guard signalman on the *Juan de Fuca,* 6 May 1944 to 1 January 1945. Interview conducted and recorded 16 July 1996. Hereafter cited as Vallee interview.
2. Edwin T. Connell, "Steady," *Mast Magazine,* a publication of the United States Maritime Service, May 1946, 15–16.
3. Daniel E. Barbey, *MacArthur's Amphibious Navy* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969), 284–85.
4. Document no. FB4-46/H2-10. Serial 040. Rescue of Personnel from LST 460 and LST 749, 21 December 1944. From Commander Destroyer Division Forty-Six (Cdr. R. W. Cavenagh) to Commander Task Unit 78.3.13 (Capt. T. B. Dugan), dated 26 December 1944. Hereafter cited as Cavenagh report.
5. Vallee interview. See also document no. 302792, Summary of Statements of the Survivors of the *Juan de Fuca,* 12 March 1945, Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as statements of survivors.
6. Cavenagh report.
7. Statements of survivors.
8. Paul S. Dull, *The Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1978), 344; Connell, *Mast,* 17.
9. Barbey, *McArthur's Amphibious Navy,* 286. For details of the individual ships, see Arthur R. Moore, *. . . A Careless Word . . . A Needless Sinking* (Kings Point, New York: United States Merchant Marine Academy, 1985), 152, 389.
10. Vallee interview.
11. Connell, *Mast,* 17.
12. Statements of survivors.
13. Barbey, *McArthur's Amphibious Navy,* 286–87.
14. Connell, *Mast,* 17.
15. Moore, *A Careless Word,* 172.
16. Connell, *Mast,* 42.
17. L. A. Sawyer and W. H. Mitchell, *The Liberty Ships* (Newton Abbot, England: David and Charles, 1970), 87. Details of the *Juan de Fuca*'s services as USS *Araner* (IX-226) are derived from her official service record, Secnav document no. 289423 and appended summary.
18. Careful readers of this article may wonder why there was not more effective American air cover available for the Mindoro operation. The answer lies in a succession of unfortunate circumstances. The fleet carriers that were supposed to support the invasion had been disabled by the powerful typhoon that struck Admiral Halsey's ships on 19 December 1944. At the same time, army aircraft based on Leyte were grounded by monsoon conditions that affected that island but not Luzon, where most of the Japanese aircraft were concentrated. For these reasons, air cover for the resupply echelon convoys and beachhead was very sparse and intermittent, a situation of which the Japanese Army and Navy air forces took full advantage. The American High Command was well aware of this situation, and the men on the ships had at least

a dim idea of what was going on. The airfields on Mindoro were considered so important to the success of the Philippine campaign that the calculated risk of going ahead without adequate air support was taken.

Juan de Fuca was born Ioannis Fokas in the village of Valerianos on the Island of Kefalonia in the Greek portion of the Aegean Sea. He took to the sea in early youth and worked his way up to master mariner in the various Mediterranean trades before enlisting in the service of the King of Spain. In 1592, he led an expedition to search for the fabled Pacific entrance of the Northwest Passage. After weathering Cape Horn and sailing up the West Coast of the Americas, he discovered a broad arm of the Pacific Ocean that penetrated inland for approximately one hundred miles with powerful tides and currents. Taking this to be his long sought goal, he returned to Spain after having named his discovery the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Eventually, his claims for the strait could not be sustained. He died in obscurity in his adopted homeland.

The Liberty Ship *Juan de Fuca* was a standard emergency type dry cargo vessel of 7,197 gross registered tons. She was powered by a 2,500-horsepower triple expansion reciprocating engine fed by two watertube boilers and had a service speed of just over eleven knots. For her final voyage, she was armed with one five-inch gun aft, a three-inch gun forward and eight single 20mm antiaircraft guns. She carried a crew of fifty merchant seamen and officers, and twenty-eight Naval Armed Guard gunners and signalmen.

Correction

On page 295 of number three of volume sixty in the article entitled "Greenpoint, Greenport: At Opposite Ends of Long Island," the third sentence of the first paragraph should begin in the following fashion: "In 1866, the Treasury Department." Unfortunately, the typographical error that caused the wrong year to be published escaped my negligent eye during the final proofreading, for which I assume full responsibility.

Henry P. Silka

Book Reviews

Hal Roth, *We Followed Odysseus*. Port Washington, Wisconsin: Seaworthy Publications, 1999. 225 pages, maps, black-and-white photographs, notes, bibliography, index. Alkaline paper. ISBN 1-89239-903-2. $27.95. (Seaworthy Publications, Inc., 507 Sunrise Drive, Port Washington, Wisconsin 53074.)

Hal Roth, journalist and sailor-adventurer extraordinaire, has joined the ranks of those trying to gain some new perspective on the most influential voyage story in Western culture. His credentials as an ocean voyager are impeccable. With his wife, Margaret, he has sailed around the world in their thirty-five-foot sloop; sailing larger boats in single-handed races, he has completed two solo circumnavigations. In this book, his ninth, he is less interested in redefining the route of Odysseus than in casting a sailor's eye on it by comparing it with his own experience during twenty-six months in the Mediterranean.

Studying the geographical track of historical voyages has always been a preoccupation of some maritime historians—witness the unending disputes about Columbus's landfall in the 1492 voyage—and charting this literary voyage has aroused similar passions and generated a shelf of books. For the ancient writers, pride of place was at stake in claiming the venue for various adventures that beset Odysseus in his struggle to reach Ithaca. After Schliemann proved that Troy, Mycenae, and Tiryns had historical dimensions and were not mere figments of literary imagination, French scholar Victor Berard set out to establish and document the *Odyssey* track in the 1870s, producing many volumes. He has been followed by a flock of sailor-adventurers chasing Odysseus, among them Goran Schildt, Ernle Bradford, Erich Lessing, and Tim Severin. Roth now joins the fleet of those who retraced the voyage, and I must admit to having spent a whole summer afloat in the Mediterranean studying the conditions of ancient seafaring represented in the text of the *Odyssey*.

Retracing Odysseus's long voyage home has always been both tantalizing and frustrating. Some detailed descriptions of places seem to call out for identification while others are generic to the topography in various coastal regions of the Mediterranean. The index to certainty comes from Homeric place names, which are geographically precise throughout the Aegean Sea and along the Ionian coastline of Greece. In the track that the narrative spins, identification is unquestioned until Odysseus is blown offshore at Cape Malea, presumably southwest to the African coast, when certainty evaporates until he again approaches Ithaca.

In the central portion of the voyage—loaded with major adventures—speculation about their venue reigns, but many scholars accept a track that includes Tunisia, Sicily, Corsica, the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy, Malta, and Corfu, while continuing to argue about the detailed identifications. Unlike most who preceded him, Roth sidesteps the geographical issues of recharting or modifying Odysseus's track in the central Mediterranean, and he simply points the bow of

his sloop along the sea route that was outlined by Ernle Bradford.

What Roth attempts is a project of a different sort, perhaps best described as creating a double exposure that will set the original voyage and the retracing side by side, using the latter to help bring the former to life for modern readers. This bifurcated structure grows from his perception that most of his readers will not be familiar with the *Odyssey:* "To make sense of my modern parallel journey, I realized that I would have to tell bits of the ancient story here and there" (page xi). The technique is tricky to manage and ends up consuming a substantial portion of the book's 225 pages, clearly setting a context for each segment of the Roths' adventure, but not always enriching their story with added insights and reflections on the implications of the original voyage story. The alternating structure runs the risk of seeming mechanical and is sometimes marred by jocularity or ill-advised padding to fill out the story. For example, in describing the unintended passage away from Greece to Africa, he fills out the retelling with graphic details nowhere to be found in the Homeric description—homesickness, endless bailing, bruised and rotten fruit, and a diet consisting of olives, dried meat and fish, onions, cheese, and shellfish.

Roth is adept at introducing capsule summaries of scholarship into his own story, sometimes blending them with direct observation. His treatment of the beginning and ending contexts, Troy and Ithaca, is thorough, and there are good brief sections on ancient coast pilots *(periploi)* and the geological and tidal anomalies that produce whirlpools and tidal bores in the Strait of Messina. The storm in the northern Aegean gets extended treatment, but the crucial significance of Cape Malea gets only a page without any discussion of the katabatic gales that made this infamous turning point the Cape Horn of the Mediterranean for ancient seafarers. From a sailor who has written a respected book on seamanship under sail *(After 50,000 Miles),* there is less precise information on ancient seafaring and boat building than one might expect. For example, the continuing scholarly debate about how close galleys could sail to the wind is dismissed in a single sentence: "we could sail to windward, something impossible for Odysseus's squaresail" (page 15). The chapter on "Men and Ships" is more thorough, with an interesting hypothetical calculation of manning levels, but it does not use the two key scholarly resources for such a description, J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams's *Greek Oared Ships, 900–32 B.C.* (1968) and Lionel Casson's *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (1971 and 1986), neither of which is listed in the bibliography.

Fundamentally based on direct experience rather than library research, this is a skilled sailor's book rather than a comprehensive treatment of the subject, with all the benefits and limitations that choice implies. Roth documents his sources in notes and provides a representative bibliography for the use of general readers. Anyone who goes to sea in small vessels will enjoy reading it, and maritime scholars who are not specialists in the field will find many useful perspectives on ancient seafaring.

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John Kendrick, *Alejandro Malaspina: Portrait of a Visionary.* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999. xi + 200 pages, 14 illustrations, bibliography, notes, index. 6" x 9". Hardcover. ISBN 0-77351-830-4. $34.95.

Portrait of a Visionary is the first English biography of Malaspina, and as such will be a new story to many. However, as Kendrick traces the life of this Spanish naval officer from his birth in Italy through his Enlightenment education and initiation into the Order of Malta, to his official visit to the outskirts of the Spanish Empire, and

finally to his imprisonment as an enemy of the state, it is a story that both illuminates and captivates. Kendrick is able to paint a "portrait" of this complicated and "visionary" figure based on official documents, Malaspina's own journals, and personal correspondence.

Born into the minor nobility of Hapsburg Italy, Malaspina also had connections with high-ranking members of the Spanish Bourbon court through the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Following an education at the Clementine College in Rome, where he was heavily influenced by the writings of the Enlightenment philosophers, Malaspina joined the Spanish navy (Real Armada) as a *guardiamarina* at the age of twenty. From that point on, his climb up the naval ranks was nearly meteoric. By 1782, Malaspina was a frigate captain after having served in several campaigns in support of the American Revolution.

Following two trips to the Spanish Philippines, Alejandro submitted a proposal to the Spanish naval authorities for a voyage to the Spanish American colonies to survey and chart their coasts. In addition, he planned to study the "commerce of each province, its natural and fabricated products, and its capability for resisting attack" (page 34). As Kendrick points out, this part of the proposal was quite acceptable to the Spanish government. However, heavily influenced by Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations,* Malaspina goes on to suggest that his study of the colonies would develop "political axioms on the national prosperity, which would be accepted or rejected by judges worthy of respect" (page 34). This latter portion of Malaspina's proposal was more problematical and would eventually land him in a damp, cold cell in the fortress of San Antón in the harbor of La Coruña.

It is worth noting that one aspect of Malaspina's voyage was to be kept secret. His ships were to stop at the fledgling British colony at Botany Bay as well as visit the Russian footholds in northwestern America to evaluate their respective threats to trade and to general Spanish security.

Between 1789 and 1794, Malaspina's ship *Descubierta* would depart from Cádiz and make port in such varied locations as Montevideo, Valparaiso (via Cape Horn), Vavao, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Guam, Nootka Sound, San Blas, Acapulco, Lima, and eventually on back to Cádiz via Cape Horn and the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands. Throughout the voyage, the scientists and naturalists aboard took careful notes regarding plant and animal life seen on the journey, many of which were also sketched for the record. In addition, much time was spent on hydrographic studies and reports dealing with the indigenous peoples encountered. However, it was Malaspina's own notes and reflections regarding the Spanish colonies in Latin America and the Pacific that would eventually end what had been developing as a stellar naval career.

Returning to Spain in 1794, Malaspina began to assemble his notes into a narrative of the voyage. Within the narrative, he outlined his views for a more just and enlightened Spanish Empire. Furthermore, he warned that a lack of reform within the Spanish colonial system would lead to revolution in Spain's American colonies. With the influence of revolutionary and "enlightened" France to her north, the Spanish court was in no mood for the suggestions of her well-traveled navigator. Kendrick masterfully reveals how these political views of Malaspina's led to a charge of treason and imprisonment.

Portrait of a Visionary is a first-rate piece of scholarship. Kendrick's study and analysis of an often overlooked voyager is a worthy contribution to the literature of naval exploration. As Kendrick clearly demonstrates, the name of Alejandro Malaspina deserves to be added to the pantheon of great European sea explorers.

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Lincoln P. Paine, *Down East: A Maritime History of Maine.* Gardiner, Maine: Tilbury House Publishers, 2 Mechanic Street, 2000. xxii + 180 pages, foreword, preface, illustrations, bibliography, notes, index. Softcover. ISBN 0-88448-222-7. $14.95.

This work, published in cooperation with Op Sail Maine 2000, seeks to examine the historic and varied features surrounding the extensive maritime history of this celebrated state. Lincoln Paine, displaying strong affection and familiarity toward his home ground, commences with an overview of the state's geological, topological, and other environmental features that were determinative in sparking Maine's seafaring traditions. During the seventeenth century, French and English colonists capitalized on the region's abundant forest lands, fine harbors, and plentiful offshore fish stocks—particularly cod and haddock. (The almost immediate realization by the original settlers of the opportunities for shipbuilding was reflected in the construction of the pinnace *Virginia,* only months after Englishmen had established a settlement at the Kennebec River in 1607.) Maine, subsequently joined to Massachusetts, played a significant role in the objectives of Britain's self-serving mercantile system, including the construction of the first American ships for the Royal Navy. It also rendered important contributions during Britain's recurrent wars with France.

Following the colonial period, Paine surveys the effects that the years from the American Revolution through the War of 1812 had on Maine residents. Divisiveness was evident in the Revolutionary War contentions between loyalist and patriot inhabitants, the subsequent unpopularity of Jefferson's embargo policy, and various forms of dissent that occurred before and during "President Madison's War." Conversely, national respect for the abilities of "Down East" seafarers was demonstrated when Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton selected Captain Hopley Yeaton to head the important U.S. Revenue Cutter Service (precursor of the coast guard) and "the first maritime officer of any kind appointed under the Constitution" (page 51).

The latter portion of this well-organized treatise covers Maine's nautical environment from the attainment of statehood (1820) to the close of the twentieth century. These years saw considerable changes and development, but simultaneously, a notable continuity in the state's maritime traditions. The principal fishing catches broadened from a focus on cod and haddock to encompass other species, such as herring, mackerel, lobster, clams, and sardines. More recently, aquaculture, i.e., "the raising and harvesting of fish stocks previously found only in the wild," has been developed (pages 132–33). Lumbering variations were observed in new logging procedures and reforestation, while in shipbuilding, new craft appeared in the form of the nineteenth-century four-masted schooners, stone sloops, yachts, steamships, gundalows, clipper ships, and even navy gunboats.

Within this time frame, Paine also mentions the most serious sailing disasters involving ships departing from Maine. Further coverage notes that the state also contributed significantly to this nation's large-scale twentieth-century wars through its impressive and sometimes record-setting production of submarines, destroyers, and Liberty Ships. Simultaneously, an expansion of agriculture, diversified industries, and the large-scale increase in tourism necessitated significant adjustments to the steadfast, opinionated reputations fixed on these "Down East" inhabitants. Paine's well-ordered narrative concludes with assessments of Maine's nautical future, and he complements his text with a useful "Maritime Maine Chronology," notes, and a bibliography.

Allowing for its modest size, *Down East* provides a worthy overview of Maine's rich and enduring maritime history. The text includes several pertinent primary source quotations, useful maps and illustrations, and, for the layman, Paine

offers the requisite explanations of less familiar nautical terms.

My own reservations are admittedly minor. For example, the abortive expedition of Sir William Phipps in 1690 was directed against Quebec, not Montreal (page 35), and Paine's "Chronology" mistakenly gives the dates of the American Civil War as 1860 to 1865. Also, I felt that reference might have been made to the important political influence that maritime Maine had on a national level during the latter part of the nineteenth century. This political imact was effected by such individuals as Senator James G. Blaine, Supreme Court Chief Justice Melville Fuller, and the cited shipbuilder Arthur Sewall, who ran for vice-president in the election of 1896. However, such minor qualifications do not limit this commendable and revealing study of the vibrant and still marine-oriented traditions of this remarkable and venerable state.

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Lindley S. Butler, *Pirates, Privateers, and Rebel Raiders of the Carolina Coast.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. xvi + 275 pages, illustrations, maps, glossary of nautical terms, notes, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 0-80782-553-0. $29.95. Softcover. ISBN 0-80784-863-8. $15.95.

Although historians have long recognized the importance of North Carolina's maritime past, most have focused on the life on the Outer Banks, those sand spits that guard the state's coast, or the countless shipwrecks that render the adjacent waters the "Graveyard of the Atlantic." In *Pirates, Privateers, and Rebel Raiders,* Lindley S. Butler, noted North Carolina historian and retired historian-in-residence at Rockingham Community College in Wentworth, has expanded that vision to include the exploits of native North Carolinians or men who gained notoriety on the state's waters. In a series of eight finely crafted biographical vignettes, he details the adventures of pirates, privateers, and Confederate naval commanders and commerce raiders. Their professional commonality was ocean warfare, or more particularly, the practice of organized theft at sea at which they were all masters.

Butler opens with the fascinating stories of pirates Blackbeard and Stede Bonnet. Always immensely popular in myth and legend, Blackbeard has recently forced his way on the historical consciousness more pressingly with the discovery in 1996 in Beaufort Inlet of a wreck that probably was his flagship, *Queen Anne's Revenge.* So little is known about Blackbeard that it is difficult to separate legend from reality. However, Butler provides the best available treatment of the notorious buccaneer and offers a useful correction to the many tales that have been spread about Blackbeard over the years. He finds no evidence that Blackbeard engaged in piracy after taking the Act of Grace (pardon) from the governor of North Carolina in 1718, and that he was killed later in the year at Ocracoke Inlet by an illegal invasion of North Carolina from Virginia, authorized by the governor of Virginia.

Overshadowed by the infamy of Blackbeard was Stede Bonnet, the "gentleman pirate" from Barbados, who met his demise a month after the death of his compatriot. Bonnet, a planter of means, outfitted his own ship for piracy, but knowing little of sailing and less about his intended profession put him at a disadvantage. Mentored to some degree by Blackbeard, Bonnet, after a brief stint at piracy, was found and captured in the Lower Cape Fear region of North Carolina by South Carolinians. After an escape, recapture, and trial, Bonnet was convicted and hanged in Charleston.

The deaths of Blackbeard and Bonnet helped to bring an end to the so-called "Golden Age of Piracy" in the English colonies. Interestingly,

both men were seized in North Carolina, a province that had failed to take any action to curb their activities.

The War of 1812 provided the backdrop for the exploits of Otway Burns and Johnston Blakeley, North Carolina's most famous privateer and naval commander, respectively, in that war. From an obscure coastal trader, Burns achieved fame and fortune as captain of the *Snap Dragon.* Butler concludes the chapter on Burns with a brief sketch of his subsequent career that included public service as well as the construction of the first steamboat in North Carolina. Blakeley was not as fortunate. After outlining his early years, Butler details Blakeley's command of the naval vessel *Wasp* in 1814 that ravaged English shipping on the Atlantic and in the English Channel. Reports of stirring victories and numerous captures by Blakeley and the *Wasp* filtered back to the United States, heightening morale in the gloomy days of the third year of the war, but the captain and ship proved to be among the last casualties of the conflict. After compiling one of the most outstanding records of any naval officer in the war, Blakeley and the *Wasp* simply disappeared, leaving North Carolinians and Americans to wonder about their fate.

The four remaining subjects of the volume achieved fame in the American Civil War, a contest only too well known for its gore and glory. James W. Cooke, after demonstrating his skill in defending, albeit unsuccessfully, North Carolina waters from a United States naval invasion in 1862, found greater fame as commander of one of the South's most successful ironclads, the CSS *Albemarle,* in 1864. In the same year, John Taylor Wood made his presence felt as "a pioneer of naval commando tactics" (page 21). Later, Wood joined John N. Maffit and James I. Waddell as three of the Confederacy's most noted commanders of commerce raiders. These vessels were designed to ravage the Union's merchant fleet, disrupt its economy, lower morale, and lure warships from the ever-tightening blockade of the South. Theirs was an exceptionally successful enterprise. With other Confederate cruisers, those commanded by Wood, Maffit, and Waddell inflicted a heavy toll financially upon the United States and wreaked havoc upon its merchant fleet.

Arguably, the best entree to history is biography, for the lives of humans are entrancing. Butler is superb at the genre. Although a scholarly volume, exceptionally well researched and well documented, *Pirates, Privateers, and Rebel Raiders* will appeal to a wide audience. Not only are the subjects intriguing, but Butler writes felicitously, turning the right phrase and finding the appropriate descriptive adjective. The sea and its freebooters, rogues, and patriots come alive at the pen of one familiar with maritime life and schooled in the historical context of his subjects. The volume commends itself to North Carolinians and all who would enjoy the excitement and glamour of history at its best.

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I. C. Campbell, *Gone Native in Polynesia: Captivity Narratives and Experiences in the South Pacific.* London: Greenwood Press, 1998. 167 pages, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-31330-787-3.

This is a well-written, scholarly, and thoughtful book, and highly recommended. In the Pacific, the term "beachcomber" refers to those foreigners who joined island communities early in the cultural contact period. Human flotsam and jetsam cast on Pacific beaches, they were beholden to the hospitality and tolerance of their hosts for their survival and were obliged to integrate fully into their host communities. Often, these beachcombers were at the forefront of cultural exchanges, and some served their hosts well to cushion the inevitable onset of extensive cultural change.

Campbell does not overplay their influence. Rather, he places them in their foreign and local contexts, conveying well the range of their origins, their personal limitations, the brevity of their influence, and the diversity of their host communities. This is a good book that I sincerely recommend, even for those without much prior knowledge of these Pacific communities.

That said, however, I feel this interesting survey falls short of excellence. First is the extraordinarily inaccurate title: Hawaii is not in the South Pacific. Most of the material quoted on Fiji is not about Polynesian communities there. Inexplicably, New Zealand, which is part of Polynesia and has extensive records of early beachcombers, is scarcely mentioned.

Moreover, the book seems inadequately edited, with a dozen or more minor errors that detract from its overall scholarship. The main whaling ports were not "Connecticut and New Jersey." The fur traders that impacted so heavily on Hawaii were seeking sea otters, not seals. Metcalfe was not killed by Polynesians; Fanning was not a whaler; and at Samoa, the Mata'afa chiefly line is not mentioned. Minor errors like this would not have slipped through tighter editing or a peer review.

There is also a structural problem in that, after a twenty-eight-page overview, the published accounts of eleven beachcombers and their contemporaries have been condensed selectively into only fifty pages. Analyses of these eleven cases, and a few passing references to some other beachcombers, follow in seventy pages, but without quantitative comments. To me, Campbell's bald statement on page 14 that "there can be few islands that did not at one time or another before 1840 harbor a temporary resident whiteman," was unacceptably imprecise. Testing such an unsubstantiated generalization would have been an excellent task for this book. The sort of in-depth delving that is now possible is evident in a contemporary *Double Ghosts* by David A. Chappell, who listed and analyzed the scattered references to Polynesians and other islanders who chose comparable bicultural lives when they joined foreign ships. Campbell's survey is excellent for the general reader, but specialists will feel it lacks Chappell's intensity.

Campbell mentions Chappell's work once in passing, but surprisingly, given the continuing proliferation of publications mentioning the early contact period of Pacific history, Campbell's footnotes and "select bibliography" cite only two publications since 1990 and only six more since 1980, including four by Campbell himself. Broad surveys of this nature often take decades to write, but a later updating of his bibliography could well have directed readers to recent works by K. R. Howe, Greg Denning, and other South Pacific contemporary Pacific writers, and to R. G. Ward's eight-volume *American Activities in the Central Pacific, 1790–1870,* plus many good works on whaling, including at least Honoré Forster's comprehensive two-part bibliography entitled *The South Seas Whaler.*

Nevertheless, my initial recommendation remains: do buy this book. It is readable, scholarly, and an excellent summary of the range of influence of eleven disparate beachcombers who were obliged to live within Pacific communities as they began coping with foreigners.

Rhys Richards
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Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, *Abandoned Oceans.* Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2000. xiv + 362 pages, illustrations, end notes, appendix, index. Hardcover. ISBN 1-57003-319-6.

Abandoned Oceans is destined to be recognized as an authoritative discussion of how the United States merchant marine—not once, but twice in its history—gained a predominant commercial presence on the oceans and why that

dominance has now dropped to the point where the American flag is a rare sight on the high seas.

Authors Andrew Gibson (no relation to me) and Arthur Donovan hold impressive credentials for tackling their subject. Gibson, the senior author, entered the merchant marine in 1942. By the age of twenty-two, he had risen to command his own ship. Following the war, he held various shoreside positions with the Grace Lines, becoming a senior executive with that company, and later president of Delta Lines. During the Nixon Administration, Gibson headed the U.S. Maritime Administration. More recently, he was an Admiral Emery S. Land Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. Arthur Donovan, the book's coauthor, teaches maritime history at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and has published widely in the fields of science and technology.

The book begins with the story of American shipping during the colonial era. For that coverage, carried through the era of the American Civil War, it relies heavily on secondary sources. Beginning with the closing years of the nineteenth century, the work stands on its own, utilizing a wide variety of primary sources that helps explore in substantive detail the causations, both political and economic, that have brought about the decline in the American shipping industry. Gibson and Donovan make a compelling argument that the multitude of subsidy programs put into place over the years by Congress have at best been stopgaps to slow that decline. There have been a series of recoveries over the years, the industry enjoying a spectacular rebound with the advent of the First World War that resulted in a huge shipbuilding effort by the Wilson Administration. That rebound was but temporary, reversing itself by the early 1920s.

The futility of trying to regain its position through federal action was spotlighted by the Hugo Black Senate committee of 1935 that concluded that congressional assistance, especially through mail subsidies, had been a disaster to the taxpayer and had only worked against solid economic principles. Black's committee recommended that, if the merchant marine were to continue to serve the public good, it should become totally government-operated. Such an approach proved impossible to implement due in major part to lobby pressures. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was a compromise measure that for a time created a more perfect partnership between ship operators and the government, and while doing so gave the government a handle over ship construction and the implementation of higher safety standards within the industry. It was also intended to help America get back to work, both in the shipyards and on the ships, and it laid the groundwork for a training program aimed at improving the quality of ships' crews. However, the real plus of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, albeit unplanned, was that it became a vehicle to help the United States prepare for World War II, a conflict in which the American merchant fleet was to play a key role leading to victory.

Following World War II, the merchant marine transported foodstuffs and other materials necessary for the European recovery, and the industry remained healthy during the late 1940s, a condition continuing through the Korean conflict. By the middle of the 1950s, decline had again set in and, although tempered somewhat by Vietnam, this time there was to be no reversal.

In describing what brought about America's lost position in ocean commerce, Gibson and Donovan pull no punches, and they state their case with factual objectivity. They are tough on all the players: management, labor, and Congress. There seems but little doubt, though, that the majority of nails hammered into the coffin were supplied by labor. The maritime industry has been ill-blessed in the past with a multiplicity of unions whose rivalries in large part lay behind strikes that intensified during the mid 1960s, finally forcing four of the nation's largest shipping companies out of the business. By 1970, labor leadership had become enlightened, and their improved sophistication would allow the indus-

try's remnants to survive. As the book points out, however, there was no margin left for any real progress in the harshly competitive world of the shipping markets.

The book also takes to task Congress and those U.S. laws that restrict our coastwise commerce to American crews and to only those ships constructed in American yards. The authors believe that the rationales for such restrictions no longer exist, explaining that, although shipping was once paramount in the transport of domestic commerce on all of our coasts, the large bulk of that commerce was lost to the shipping industry during World War II when the needs of that war diverted tonnage, especially tankers, to overseas routes. The result was that pipelines built during the war filled the gap, as did the railroads, for the carriage of other coastal commerce. This displacement of business was accelerated by the construction of the federal highway system during the Eisenhower Administration and the subsequent growth of the trucking industry. Only heavy doses of political contributions made by the labor unions and shipyard interests through their political action committees have kept such protections in force.

The drafters of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (and subsequent acts) took the position in large measure that the merchant marine was a necessity toward serving as a naval auxiliary in time of war. Gibson and Donovan stress that this belief is also an outmoded concept given the American merchant marine in its present form. By way of making that point, they note the situation of the recent desert war wherein Saddam Hussein decided not to move on Saudi Arabia at the time he invaded Kuwait. Had he moved against Saudi Arabia, our demonstrated slowness in moving in military equipment and related impedimenta would have left us no alternative but to employ nuclear weapons. A lack of adequate response potential on the part of the U.S. flag merchant fleet has further worsened as our present commercial fleet is insufficient both in numbers and ship types. The result has been that the government, through the Military Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration, has found it necessary to purchase RO/RO (roll-on; roll-off) ships as part of the military's inventory. The majority of that tonnage is kept on inactive standby, but it is kept loaded and immediately available whenever the need should arise.

Abandoned Oceans is not shy in putting forth the theory that national defense needs in this day and age are separate and apart from commerce. The book drives home the message that as a nation we must begin to accept the fact that a merchant ship's sole purpose is to return a decent profit on investment. In opposition to that concept, the United States (alone among the world's nations since the breakup of the Soviet Union) has exercised a policy of multiple layers of regulation and an almost religious belief in subsidization that, taken together, have resulted in the near disappearance of an American oceangoing merchant marine. Gibson and Donovan maintain that government policy has long been geared solely toward maintaining a merchant fleet for the benefit of American shipyards and maritime labor to the detriment of sound economic theory. This is an essential work for all who hold an interest in maritime matters, both past and future.

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David Griffith, *The Estuary's Gift: An Atlantic Coast Cultural Biography.* University Park, Penn.: Penn State University Press, 1999. 196 pages, 23 illustrations, bibliographical essay, index. Paper. ISBN 0-27101-951-4. $18.95.

"Seacoasts," writes David Griffith, "test the limits and potential of human qualities we value highly: independence, hard work, and the skill and vigilance it takes to read nature's signs and respond to her calls and warnings with agility and

balance." *The Estuary's Gift* explains that coastal areas, such as the Mid-Atlantic, serve as an expression of human relationship with the sea. In brief essays, Griffith creates snapshots of human use of the Atlantic coast (particularly in the Carolinas) throughout the period of human habitation. These snapshots unite to create a most effective biography of a locale and the people who live in it. Along the way, Griffith stresses themes of exploitation and balance that give the stories compelling depth and meaning.

Griffith, a senior scientist and associate professor of anthropology at East Carolina University, studies coastal cultures in order to work with policy makers in creating sustainable fishing guidelines. He has come to know coastal peoples well. In *The Estuary's Gift,* he uses the form of nature writing to create an intimate portrait of the coastal users. There are better books for each of these specific eras, but possibly no other that deftly weaves together the eras by stressing the ethics and choices that define people's relationship with the sea.

The unifying theme that Griffith finds coursing through these eras is the dynamic nature of the coast. "People raised on shifting landscapes and fluctuating populations of fish and shellfish acquire a cynicism toward new laws infringing on their life on the water, laws designed to freeze fishing practices in time and space or to restrict the use of gear that families have used for centuries, cutting away their individual rights." These individuals, he argues, have become part of the organic whole. Many efforts at regulating the seas infringe on their long-evolved practices. Ironically, the rhythms of population management have been part of such people's lives forever, and now they are often entirely absent from policy discussion. His research seeks to overcome this exclusion and will help such voices be heard.

The meaning of *The Estuary's Gift* is not quite so straightforward. Griffith couches the book's argument in anthropological theory of gift exchange. He writes that the book seeks to "insert human relations into natural cycles by considering the ways we treat one another in light of the ways we treat nature, measuring both by the standards we invoke when we give and receive gifts." His text makes little mention of environmental ethics and the use of resources. Instead, he pursues an image of the sea as giver and the human as recipient. Ethics suggest much more reciprocity or dualism than does gift theory. At times, the scope of the text yearns to extend well beyond the bounds of the gift metaphor, and the reader is left to ponder exactly why he sought to employ it. He sees environmental concern and awareness as our gift that completes the cycle for the resources that the human has received. This is a hotly contested idea by environmental ethicists and environmental historians, but Griffith uses it to create a compelling organization to his book.

Each of the interlocking essays is built around firsthand research and interviews, and is surrounded by a fairly well-known historical or ecological context. The essays are interesting and at times beautifully evocative. Each describes a specific portion of the coastal culture, including plantation slavery, Carolina whaling, Florida real estate development, commercial fishing, and female crab pickers. It is the strength of nuance contained in these essays that makes this book a "must read" for those interested in maritime studies and coastal ecology. While there have been many books written lately that claim to be intimate portrayals of a community's relationships with the sea, Griffith's unique base of knowledge makes his the most effective of the lot. Additionally, the text's brevity and use of authentic people and stories make it an excellent choice as a humanities text in marine ecology courses.

While much of the book argues that policy makers can no longer ignore the traditional users of the coast, gift theory makes it impossible for Griffith to conclude on such a note. After arguing that commercial fishers have used power and influence to create policies favorable to them, he can only look to them for future policy. "Yet for

all their weaknesses, commercial fishers today are our best hope for a diversified, interesting, clean Mid-Atlantic coast. They are the estuary's gift to us, and it is they who—collectively, joined with others concerned about the estuary . . . fight against the forces that daily, everyday . . . divest us of our coast." Here, Griffith creates a jarring conclusion that will stir the debate and concern of marine ecologists. This debate, however, just as *The Estuary's Gift* does, can do nothing but aid coastal users in understanding the context of their relationship to the sea.

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Kenneth Poolman, *The* Speedwell *Voyage: A Tale of Piracy and Mutiny in the Eighteenth Century.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 208 pages, 7 maps, 6 line drawings, notes, glossary. Hardcover. ISBN 1-55750-693-0. $26.95.

One of the great advantages of the history of seafaring over, say, the history of the family, has always been the naturalness of its narrative arc. Recognized by the West's most ancient poet-historians, every sea voyage, however uneventful, is a ready-made story, its spine a universally graspable sliver of time. As novelists, playwrights, and screenwriters have repeatedly demonstrated since, the confines of the ship (or submarine) serve as an excellent stage with the crew as a cast of human types drawn as if by lots. In truth or fiction, to set sail is to set the pot to boil.

Just when one might have thought either the narrative was dead or all the good ones were taken, Kenneth Poolman turns up a pleasant surprise. In *The* Speedwell *Voyage,* Poolman rescues one of the most inherently dramatic and unjustly neglected tales of "a voyage round the world" produced in the great age of sail. The voyage in question is George Shelvocke's circumnavigation between 1719 and 1722, an ill-fated (but strangely lucky) trip if there ever was one. These were interesting times, particularly in overseas-obsessed England. The tale of Robinson Crusoe had just come out, whetting the reading public's appetite for tropical adventure as moral tale. Just as the metaphorical "South Sea Bubble" was bursting in London, Shelvocke's "corporate raiders" found themselves struggling for survival against the South Sea's all-too-real squalls.

Another great advantage of seafaring history, of course, is that even minor voyages often got recorded, sometimes, as in the *Speedwell* case, via competing survivor narratives. Sources for the Shelvocke voyage are thus not only available, but already in "blow-by-blow" form. Unhindered by analytical frameworks or larger thematic concerns, Poolman trims and updates *Speedwell's* twice-told tale, emphasizing the inherent drama of life and death aboard this particular world-roving privateer. Naturally, in the course of three years' sailing, there were enough personality clashes, ethnic rivalries, strange encounters, and trying circumstances to beat the most imaginative fictional voyage cold. To top it off, Shelvocke's trip included a "soviet-style" rebellion and an ill-advised bit of fowling suggesting a portent of Homeric proportions.

On the subject of birds, Poolman is well-informed by ornithology manuals, but a Darwinian subtext with respect to the terrain emerges and is applied to humans. Poolman's Shelvocke is the ultimate survivor, discrete in his exercise of authority yet never so flexible as to lose ultimate control. The mutineers of the subtitle, like the arrogant Captain Clipperton (of the fellow, then rival, ship *Success*), fare less well. Compared to these "savage" English subjects, *Speedwell's* numerous Spanish victims (not to mention African slaves and Native Americans encountered along the way) come off as remarkably civil, non-violent, and even generous. Shelvocke wisely inverted these images in self-defense throughout his account.

Cleaving to the embattled captain's perspective has the merit of providing a consistent view of characters and events, but it leaves little room for skepticism. When it comes to portraying the mutiny following *Speedwell's* wreck on Juan Fernandez, Poolman assumes the crew's "leveler's talk" to have been silly and even self-destructive. Perhaps under these harsh and seemingly hopeless circumstances, a leader was necessary. Perhaps it was not. Whatever the case, the men's esteem for Shelvocke was understandably at low ebb, given his tendency to hoard plate and withhold information. That they should have remained loyal to their London sponsors while stranded on a desert island seems downright ridiculous.

Relying on Shelvocke's account too heavily also detracts from geographical and linguistic accuracy at times, such as with regard to Spanish place names and surnames (Coiba Island is always called "Quibo," for example). Of lesser note, Poolman's suggestion that Shelvocke just missed finding gold in Pacific coastal sands and might have set off an early rush reads as a careless aside (and the key year of the genuine California bonanza was 1849, not 1845). Forgetting these quibbles, *The* Speedwell *Voyage* makes for a fascinating tale, indeed, and it is a credit to the author that its pages turn almost of their own accord. Although nearly three centuries have passed, it is plain to see how such an incredible and true story inspired Coleridge to pen a masterpiece.

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Steven E. Maffeo, *Most Secret and Confidential: Intelligence in the Age of Nelson.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. 392 pages, 25 illustrations, 5 maps, appendices, bibliography, notes, index. 6¼" x 9". Hardcover. ISBN 1-55750-545-4. $32.95.

This book offers a fresh perspective on naval operations in the wars of the French Revolution and Empire. Steven Maffeo, an officer in United States Naval Reserve intelligence working at the Air Force Academy, defines intelligence as the collecting of information and the processing of it into a useable product, not the mere acquisition of raw data. By linking his work with the recent but rapidly expanding field of intelligence history, Maffeo warns naval historians against parochialism and lack of width. He also reminds intelligence historians that the study of eighteenth-century naval warfare has much to offer.

The ten chapters begin with a discussion of the British national intelligence effort, linking the work of the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the Post Office, which intercepted and decoded correspondence, and Lloyd's, which had the best information on shipping movements in the creation of the cabinet-level strategic appreciation. Much of this work reflected the use of secret service money to buy information, and the distribution lists for such material and the identification of key ministers establishes a consistent pattern of activity. The role of Evan Nepean as an under secretary at the Home Office, then as secretary to the Admiralty, is the clearest case of a civilian specialist, although his role, and that of the intelligence gathering system in responding to the Spithead Mutiny of 1797, is missed. There was no distinction between internal and external intelligence in the eighteenth century.

The quality of the product was often affected by transmission systems. Telegraphs and letters took time, and shaped the environment in which intelligence worked. Much of the routine of the detached frigates involved intelligence gathering, with Lord Cochrane as an exemplar. The key quality of deception, one of the mainstays of Soviet planning, is assessed, and the work of captains and admirals is considered. The book ends with three case studies: the battle of Pulo Aur in 1804, when a fleet of East India Company merchant ships persuaded the French squadron that

they were escorted by battleships with bold shiphandling and earlier disinformation; the attack on Copenhagen in 1801 that demonstrated Nelson's ability to process information and exploit the results; and the Nile campaign that stretched him to his limits on the grandest scale. In the two latter examples, Nelson's strategic and political vision was such that he invariably ranged beyond his more pedestrian colleagues, a point that comes through strongly in the Nile chapter but is missed when discussing Copenhagen.

The book opens with a quote from Clausewitz, stressing the importance of intelligence as the basis of plans and operations. By referring to Clausewitz and the other major Napoleonic strategic analyst, Jomini, Maffeo takes the focus beyond the ships, fleets, and battles of the era, important as they were, to the wider political, strategic, and diplomatic context. These wars were, in Clausewitz's new terminology, total. They embraced whole nations, civil and military, and they were fought for issues of the utmost importance. It was in this context that Nelson's unique genius flourished. He was an outstanding intelligence officer, running a complex theater command from a desk in his cabin with a small, irregular staff and limited information. His deductive capacity, the process that turned data into product based on deep study and years of experience, enabled him to ask the right questions of his sources, and to anticipate the actions of the enemy. The same insight informed every facet of his professional life; after all, only Nelson anticipated the storm that followed Trafalgar.

One of the key problems for intelligence history is the relative paucity of sources, with most of the secondary materials for this period showing little or no interest in the issue. Fortunately, Nelson's correspondence provides an outstanding source that offers numerous examples of skill and insight at work. He used his intelligence system to manage uncertainty. His astonishingly correct transatlantic pursuit of Villeneuve in 1805 was based on a far-from-complete set of data.

To supplement the historical evidence, Maffeo occasionally has resorted to the naval fiction of Forester and O'Brian. This is an interesting approach, for both authors were deeply versed in the subject and wrote with insight. In addition, O'Brian had been an intelligence operative. However, it has to be stressed that the concerns of these texts are those of the twentieth century, an age in which intelligence had become respectable, even heroic. Consequently, both authors, but particularly the more recent O'Brian, make explicit what is only hinted at in older accounts. How far this material can be taken is an open question. Maffeo wisely uses it to supplement the more obvious sources, often as illustration, rather than as critical evidence.

A thoughtful, stimulating, and important overview, this book will open up new perspectives on the role of intelligence and ensure that it receives proper attention in future studies of the great age of sail, as well as the more recent past.

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Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution in the British Caribbean*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000. xvi + 357 pages, bibliography, maps, illustrations, index. Softcover. ISBN 0-81221-732-2. $22.50.

Unlike most books reviewed by the *American Neptune,* Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy's *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution in the British Caribbean* is not about maritime affairs, but rather it is a history of the British West Indies during the American Revolution. In 1776, when revolution burst forth in the thirteen British mainland colonies in America, the seven British colonies in the Caribbean—Jamaica, Barbados, the Leeward Islands, Grenada, Tobago, St.

Vincent, and Dominica—remained loyal to the British crown. The failure of the British colonies in the West Indies to follow the American mainland colonies down the path to revolution has posed a problem for historians. At first sight, both regions appear not only similar to each other, but also to have a commonality of economic and political interests.

Both the colonies of the American South and the British islands of the West Indies were slaveholding plantation societies producing a single product for export. Historians have even argued that the British Caribbean islands had more in common with the American South, especially Georgia and South Carolina, than either region had with New England. The British West Indian islands and the American mainland colonies were economically, in terms of the respective economies, closely linked. The West Indies were the mainland colonies' largest market, and the British sugar islands were dependent on supplies of provisions and timber from North America. Additionally, the British islands in the West Indies enjoyed similar types of government as the American mainland colonies. Indeed, throughout the colonial period, the West Indian colonial assemblies, as well as the islands' lobbyists in London, protested, as did the assemblies of the mainland colonies, at what they considered to be violations of their colonial rights and privileges by the British authorities. Yet, when revolution came to America, the British colonies in the West Indies did not choose rebellion.

O'Shaughnessy disputes the widely held assertion that the British colonists in the West Indies supported the political objectives of the American Revolutionaries but were prevented from rebelling against royal authority by circumstances of geography and demography. He shows that those protests against British authority that came from the white inhabitants of the British Caribbean during the era of the American Revolution were, for the most part, only sound and fury and of no lasting political importance.

The planter ruling classes of the British sugar islands had radically differing political objectives than their brethren on the American mainland. O'Shaughnessy's thesis is that the economic, social, and security interests and concerns of the planter oligarchies of the British West Indies were totally different from those of the Americans. It was clearly seen by the British in the West Indies that rebellion and withdrawal from the British empire would be a catastrophe. Economically, the sugar plantations of the British West Indies could not have competed in the world market with sugar from the French West Indies, and the British sugar planters were therefore wholly dependent for the sale of their product on the protected British market. The planter classes in the British West Indies were also totally dependent on the British armed forces for both internal and external security. The only defense against foreign invasion was the Royal Navy and, more importantly, the only security against slave rebellion was the British army.

The population of the sugar islands, to a greater extent than was the case in mainland colonies, consisted mostly of Black slaves. Whites were a very small minority and lived in constant fear of slave rebellion. Unlike the mainland American colonists, the West Indian sugar planters not only welcomed the presence of the British army, but were also more than happy to support British garrisons in the islands financially.

Finally, in contrast to the American mainland, there were a great number of absentee land holders in the sugar islands. The islands of the West Indies were not seen by the British as places to inhabit permanently, but rather as places to get rich before returning home with a West Indian fortune. When revolution came to the thirteen American colonies, the seven British sugar colonies in the West Indies, for reasons of economic interest, fears of slave rebellion, and social aspirations, remained loyal to the British crown.

As one might imagine, there are no statues of George Washington in the British West Indies.

The largest and most impressive public monument of the era is the Rodney Memorial in Spanish Town on the island of Jamaica. It commemorates the British admiral, acknowledged by the White planter oligarchy as the savior of the British West Indies for defeating the French and Spanish fleets in the Battle of the Saints during the American Revolutionary War.

An Empire Divided is an important book. It is clearly written and based on extensive research in numerous manuscript collections in Europe and the Americas. It will be required reading for any historian interested in the American Revolution. Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy has made a major and valuable contribution to the historiography of both the American Revolution and the West Indies.

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Richard Hill, *The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815*. Stroud, England: Sutton Publishing, 1998. xx + 268 pages, appendix, bibliography, glossary, illustrations, maps. $44.95

The decline of the Roman Empire meant the end of the Pax Romana, not only on the continent and islands of Europe, but on the seas surrounding them as well. Just when new nation-states were raising national armies to enforce their own peace within their respective realms, chaos ruled the seas.

Theologians, philosophers, and lawyers had found Christian thought to be consistent with warfare on land under certain circumstances. Why not at sea? By the sixteenth century, nations found that they could justify maritime attack and seizure of merchant ships and cargoes, either as reprisal for wrongs suffered or in pursuit of legitimate warfare. Limited national navies existed, therefore, and monarchs accomplished their purpose also by licensing private armed vessels to make these attacks and make "prize" of what they could seize of ships and cargoes. These crews were generously rewarded from the proceeds of prizes brought home. Prizetaking flourished for four centuries until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the British Royal Navy, then monopolizing sea power, became restive and jealous of privateers, both domestic and foreign.

In 1856, Britain abruptly ended privateering by persuading forty-five nations to sign a convention to that effect. The next century was marked by few writings on the subject; most of them are not of scholarly quality. The doctrine and practice of the maritime prize became a lost chapter in the long history of men at sea, but in the last two decades that omission has been corrected by the appearance of a number of works by competent scholars in both Britain and this country. Richard Hill's *The Prizes of War: The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars, 1793–1815* is a welcome addition to the list and belongs in any library of maritime prize assembled by institutional or personal collectors. The book is logically organized, lucidly presented, and well documented.

The first third of the book, devoted to law and operations, is no less valuable for having been prepared by a non-lawyer. Richard Hill, a retired rear admiral of the Royal Navy, has made a point I have long urged upon colleagues in America: the files and records of prize cases are a treasure trove of historical data understandable by any competent historian. The second and third sections are of considerable value to the scholar who has not found elsewhere such clear and detailed exposition of the actual workings of the agency system and of the role of court officials.

This is not an easy book for a novice, and particularly an American novice, to follow. This is primarily a result of Richard Hill's decision to limit his work to Royal Navy captures between 1793 and 1815. His inspiration for this book was the judge of the High Court of Admiralty from

1798 to 1825, William Scott, Lord Stowell. Because of his diligence, lucidity, and lengthy tenure, Stowell's reputation as a prize judge is second to none, both in England and abroad. However, Hill does not make clear that Stowell's written opinions, from which he draws so heavily, were always cases where the captor was a Royal Navy ship. He omits all discussion of activities by British privateers, nor does he mention the more than ten thousand British ships captured by Britain's enemies during the years he covers (the cases of these vessels needed to be adjudicated in the captor's court). Among those enemies was the United States, whose ships, principally privateers, captured 2,500 British merchant vessels during the brief War of 1812 and sent them, when it was possible, into American ports for adjudication.

Hill's selection of material has deprived him of the opportunity to demonstrate the extraordinary universality of the practices he so ably elucidates. Without lessening his achievement, I believe one can describe *The Prizes of War* as less a historian's view, than an admiral's view, of maritime prize at the height of British naval power.

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ROBERT BLAKE, *Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999. vii + 280 pages, 25 illustrations, bibliography, notes, index. 6" x 9½". Hardcover. ISBN 0-29782-501-1. $50.00.

Robert Blake's "official" history of Jardine Matheson is quite unlike most company-sponsored histories of commercial enterprise. Instead of the usual dry-as-dust laudatory business tome, Lord Blake has written a fast-paced account that is in keeping with the swashbuckling early years of "the firm." The book ends with the departure of the firm from Shanghai between 1949 and 1950. Given Blake's distinction as a historian and the tenor of his previous work, we should not be surprised that much of the book is taken up with the British side of Anglo-Chinese relations and politics, not with the minutia of Jardine's day-to-day activities. It is still the best known of all the Western trading companies in East Asia. It grew out of the exciting and confused early decades of the nineteenth century that culminated with the confirmation of British sovereignty over Hong Kong at the end of the first Opium War in 1842, and it is one of two British *hongs,* or trading houses that have survived into the twenty-first century (the other is Swire).

William Jardine, the founder of the firm, got his first taste of China in 1802 as a surgeon on the East India Company ship *Brunswick.* He met James Matheson in 1820. Already heavily involved in the opium trade, the two formed the famous partnership in 1828. The firm was formally established in Canton in 1832, just two years before the East India Company lost its monopoly of the China trade. The timing was perfect. By the terms of the Treaty of Nanking (1842), not only was Hong Kong Island ceded to Great Britain in perpetuity, but Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were declared free ports (treaty ports). From that point on, the firm never looked back, spreading itself across eastern China and into Korea and Japan (unfortunately, Lord Blake does not mention the firm's activities in the Korean peninsula), until by the end of the century, it was the best known and most powerful trading organization in East Asia. In the decade following the Convention of Peking (1860), Jardine Matheson gradually moved out of direct trading in opium, tea, and textiles, on which its fortune had been largely built, and became more and more involved in shipping, banking, insurance, and commission accounts. In 1906, the firm became a limited liability company. Despite the turmoil in China during the next forty years, the firm continued to prosper until the Pacific War disrupted all Western commercial life. The subsequent Communist victory seemed to sound the

death knell for Jardine Matheson and all other such enterprises in China. It is at this point that Lord Blake draws his story to a close. This is a pity. The story of the company since 1949, especially its activities in Hong Kong and the growth of strong local competition from organizations like those of Li Ka-shing, is important and needs documenting.

The book is a well-told narrative rather than a piece of historical analysis. Thankfully, Lord Blake avoids any discussion of the evils of economic imperialism. Enough has been written on that subject already. Sadly though, based on spotty use of the Jardine Matheson archives and a heavy reliance on the more obvious secondary sources (especially the semiofficial account edited by Maggie Keswick, *The Thistle and the Jade,* which was published in 1982), this book is not up to Lord Blake's usual rigorous standards of scholarship. For a scholar of his reputation, the bibliography is surprisingly sparse. For example, he does not appear to have consulted any of the large collections of British government documents on China, opium, and so on, housed in the Public Record Office. For the other side of the story, that is the Asian side, Lord Blake relies on outdated Western sources. As a consequence, the Chinese and Japanese with whom the Jardine officials had to interact are portrayed as one-dimensional figures. The result is a tone of "never the twain shall meet" that pervades the book. Although a definitive account of Jardine Matheson still has to be written, this is an absorbing work and a worthwhile piece of mercantile history.

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Aldelbert Mason, *Herald before the Mast: The Life and Works of John W. Mason, Nineteenth-Century Shipcarver.* Brunswick, Maine: Aldelbert Mason, 1999. vi + 75 pages, 18 illustrations (1 in full color), 4 original drawings, source notes, bibliography. 5½" x 8½". Softcover. ISBN 1-87941-863-0. $10.00.

Aldelbert Mason, the great-great-grandson of John W. Mason, has interwoven the personal and biographical information of his ancestor with his career as a shipcarver. John Mason's often tragic personal life is recreated from family letters and notes. The book details his roots in Montreal and Dublin where he and his siblings were raised, then to New England where he began his career as one of Boston's most noted shipcarvers, and finally his decline into obscurity as personal tragedy and failures took their toll.

As Aldelbert Mason mentions in the introduction, there is such a dearth of information about the elder Mason's shipcarving career that the monograph is prematurely handicapped. In fact, the entire bulk of knowledge about Mason's work is contained in the original drawings of figurehead and stern designs at the Peabody Essex Museum and descriptions of his work on ships published from the "Atlas" by Duncan McLean. There is not one piece of shipcarving that can be attributed to his hand. From these two main sources, Aldebert Mason has woven John Mason's career as one of Boston's leading carvers and the shipcarvers' world in which he lived.

While being a private publication, the book would have greatly benefitted from a professional book designer and editor. Still, Aldelbert Mason's monograph is a welcome addition that adds to our knowledge of his great-great-grandfather's art and life.

Ryan M. Cooper
Yarmouthport, Massachusetts

John W. Grattan, *Under the Blue Pennant; or, Notes of a Naval Officer, 1863–1865,* Robert J. Schneller, ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999. xi + 239 pages, illustrations, maps.

Hardcover. ISBN 0-47124-043-5. $27.95. Softcover. ISBN 0-47139-021-6. $16.95.

John Grattan was an acting ensign who served on the staff of the commanding officer of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron from October 1863 until the end of the Civil War. He served initially as a clerk for Rear Admiral Stephen P. Lee and continued in this position under Lee's successor, Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter. Because of his position, Grattan had personal knowledge of operations that involved not only his vessel but also the entire squadron. Throughout his tenure, he kept a diary, and after the war he supplemented his memoirs with information taken from official reports to produce a manuscript. Although a finished work, it was never published and remained in the Library of Congress until its recent publication by John Wiley & Sons.

Grattan's writing is well paced and descriptive. His work is similar to accounts written by Civil War army staff officers and contains keen personal observations of personalities and events. In his manuscript, he not only details day-to-day life on board the flagship, but also describes his extensive service in the James River during General Benjamin Butler's 1864 abortive Drewey's Bluff campaign and General U. S. Grant's later Richmond-Petersburg campaign. Grattan relates the use of Confederate torpedoes and gives a firsthand account of the attack made by the Confederate torpedo boat *Squip* against the Union flagship USS *Minnesota.* He also describes the Federal operations in the North Carolina sounds, the fights against the CSS *Albemarle,* and the phenomenal exploits of Lieutenant Commander William B. Cushing, the Northern daredevil who destroyed the *Albemarle.* Among Grattan's most descriptive passages are his accounts of the attack on Fort Fisher and President Lincoln's visits to the fleet and eventual entrance into Richmond.

Grattan's memoirs are complemented by the fine work of the book's editor, Robert Schneller. A noted naval historian, Schneller inserts informative footnotes in the text, but because Grattan's manuscript was so complete, these footnotes are few, well placed, and do not interfere with the flow of the narrative. What Schneller does contribute is an excellent introduction that encapsulates the entire story of the North's naval campaigns and Grattan's involvement in certain key operations. He also provides information on Grattan, a descriptive list of vessels mentioned in the manuscript, and an excellent bibliography. The introduction and narrative are enhanced by Grattan's own sketches and artwork, maps, and period photographs.

Such firsthand naval accounts of the Civil War are rare. Those that do exist tend to be composed by high-ranking commanders, with few manuscripts originating from junior officers and sailors. Grattan's manuscript, coupled with Schneller's superb introduction and editing, brings to life an often ignored but vital aspect of the Civil War. This book will satisfy the interest of naval experts, and it will also appeal to the novice as a fascinating bit of Civil War lore.

Stephen R. Wise
USMC Museum at Parris Island, South Carolina

Gene A. Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xx + 223 pages, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55750-848-8. $35.95.

"Jones would have gained a place among the pantheon of American naval heroes had he died at the Battle of Lake Borgne defending the American flag against overwhelming odds. He went on, however, to live a long life of adventure and controversy, and ultimately disgrace" (page

32). These sentences sum up the thesis of Gene Smith's well-crafted biography of an important, if lesser-known, naval officer of the early nineteenth century. Thomas ap Catesby Jones is remembered for two exploits: command of the U.S. gunboats in the Battle of Lake Borgne in 1814, an American defeat that gave Andrew Jackson time to prepare defenses that led to American victory at New Orleans; and the capture of Monterey, Alta California, in 1842 under the mistaken impression that the United States and Mexico were at war. Smith's investigation of all aspects of Jones's career is useful for an understanding of the early American naval officer corps.

Smith judiciously evaluates Jones's accomplishments and failings. Jones was a good officer who fell short of greatness. Among the Pacific islands, he advanced America's interests against her commercial rivals, the British, by treating the islanders with respect. Jones's even-handed arbitration of the Hawaiian monarchy's debts to foreign merchants had the unintended consequences of saddling the Hawaiian commoners with a heavy tax and of decimating the kingdom's sandalwood forests. During his term as the navy's chief ordnance officer, he initiated no revolution and made no scientific advances. A meticulous report recommending reforms in the maintenance and storing of ordnance that Smith evaluates as Jones's most important contribution to the navy was ignored by the department. The South Seas Exploring Expedition, for which Charles Wilkes won lasting fame, had originally been Jones's to command; he surrendered the position before the expedition sailed when his health broke under difficulties in organizing it. Although judging as unethical his use of public funds for private profit in the California gold fields that led to the commodore's disgrace, Smith questions the correctness of Jones's court-martial conviction because of logical contradictions in the court's findings. He handles forthrightly the accusation of sodomy made against Jones early in his naval career. He presents the circumstances surrounding the accusation, the accusers' evidence, as well as their possible motives, and the reasons the secretary of the navy dismissed the charges. Smith judges that the truth of the accusation cannot be determined. This case, rare in the disciplinary records of the early navy, does not help answer the perennial question of how common homosexual activity was in the sailing navy.

As a leader, Jones was a strict but just disciplinarian, more popular with his men than with his subordinate officers. Smith traces his contentiousness to psychological needs deriving from the circumstances of Jones's childhood.

Besides examining Jones the naval officer, Smith delineates Jones the progressive agriculturalist, the calculating slaveholder, and the pious Presbyterian. Jones worked to make his Fairfax County, Virginia, farm a model. He systematically experimented with crops, promoted fertilizers for restoring worn-out land, and published essays in farming journals. Jones was a southern man of southern principles. A slave, Griffin Dobson, constantly attended Jones because an injury received at the Battle of Lake Borgne limited use of his left arm. Jones retained Dobson in servitude for sixteen years after the slave should have been freed according to the terms of the will of Jones's sister. Smith concludes that he eventually allowed Dobson to buy his freedom and that of his family only because he needed the money. As a practicing Christian, Jones supported the Seaman's Friend Society, promoted temperance, opposed dueling, and founded the Lewinsville, Virginia, Presbyterian Church. In stark contrast to "Mad Jack" Percival, he supported the moral objectives of Christian missionaries in Hawaii.

Thomas ap Catesby Jones is more readable, more thoroughly researched, and a more rounded portrait than the only other full biography, Udolpho T. Bradley's 1933 dissertation "The Contentious Commodore." In its recounting of Jones's commercial diplomacy among the Pacific islands, Smith's study complements John H. Schroeder's *Shaping a Maritime Empire: The*

Commercial and Diplomatic Role of the American Navy, 1829–1861 (1985). This book makes a worthy addition to the shelf of naval biographies.

Michael J. Crawford
Naval Historical Center
Washington, D.C.

Spencer C. Tucker, *Andrew Foote: Civil War Admiral on Western Waters.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xvi + 259 pages, 2 photographs, 10 black-and-white illustrations, 3 maps, chronology, bibliography, notes, index. 9¼" x 6½". Hardcover. ISBN 1-55750-820-8. $34.95.

A modern biography of Civil War naval figure Andrew Hull Foote has been long in coming. Now it is here, ably rendered by Virginia Military Institute professor and naval historian Spencer C. Tucker as part of the Naval Institute Press's Library of Naval Biography.

Foote's story consists of more than just his intrepid contributions to help save the Union. In fact, Tucker's portrait of the Connecticut Yankee reveals much about the antebellum navy, its officer corps, and several critical social issues of the period. It is true that Foote is best known as the commanding officer of the Union gunboat flotilla at Forts Henry and Donelson as well as Island No. 10 during the war, but Tucker shows how he was also an important personality in the social history of the nineteenth-century navy. Foote was a devoted champion of temperance, a vociferous antislavery spokesman, and a strong reformist of the officer corps.

Born in New Haven, Connecticut, in 1806, he briefly attended West Point before finding his true niche as a midshipman and lieutenant in the navy. He served typically, if prosaically, from the Caribbean to the Pacific and the Mediterranean to the shores of Africa, where he acquired a hearty distaste for enterprise in human bondage. In fact, from that service came a book, *Africa and the American Flag,* published in 1854. From such stints also came his concern for shipboard temperance. Later, as a member of naval efficiency boards and after shoreside assignments in navy yards and asylums, he derived an interest in the state of the fleet—from the human perspective. Tucker's portrayal suggests that Foote had a stuffy puritan streak, a trait always associated with him by his contemporaries on the quarter deck or among the crew. Yet, there was another dimension to the man, and that was Andrew Foote as a fierce combatant.

Foote, as captain of the sloop *Portsmouth,* shelled and captured the Chinese barrier forts at Canton in November 1856, thereby displaying an impetuosity for smashing any affront to the American flag. Here was the nineteenth-century naval officer at his best—independent of Washington control, stalwart of honor and duty, and practitioner in the line of Stephen Decatur, David Farragut, and George Dewey for defying odds, damning the faint of heart, and overcoming enemy opposition. In fact, it was this kind of pluck that served Foote at his greatest moment of fame—commanding the unsung, unattractive, yet indispensable ironclad gunboat flotilla of the riverine navy in the early campaigns of the Civil War. It was the aging but eminently respected Foote who took over the construction and the fighting of that squadron, and who literally made the career of Ulysses S. Grant through the joint army-navy victories at Forts Henry and Donelson. It was Foote who first coined the term "unconditional surrender" that later attached to Grant's legend. It was Foote who battled past Island No. 10 in the Mississippi to forge ahead with conquest of the Father of Waters. Yet, as Tucker so ably shows, it was Foote who, at the apex of triumph, lost his nerve.

Wounded in body and pride during his failure to take Fort Donelson without army support, as he had at Henry, the fighting spirit left Foote, notwithstanding his promotion to flag rank for the victories. No longer would modern ordnance

backed by stalwart defenders in fortifications ashore provide the easy victories of the barrier forts. Moreover, years of arduous service now took their toll. He fell victim to Bright's disease in June 1863 while en route to becoming commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, having briefly headed the navy's Washington bureau of equipment and recruiting. Tucker concludes that it was true that Andrew Hull Foote's chief accomplishments came while battling shore forts from the oak decks of his ships *à la* Horatio Nelson. In the end, however, his combat success lost much of its luster for the naval professional.

Tucker hints that Foote's happiest moments may well have been preaching from the pulpit against sloth, indolence, and depravity that he identified with the abominable institution of slavery. In keeping with the purpose of the series, this welcome and sprightly biography best portrays the whole man—the fighting sailor, but also the reformer, hard at work promoting temperance, better conditions for seamen, and reform in officer promotion while fostering education and scientific study. Andrew Hull Foote, in the hands of Tucker, emerges as a pivotal force in the nineteenth-century American navy, not only because of his war record, but also because of his fervor and commitment to ameliorating social concerns.

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W. H. Bunting, comp. and ed. *A Day's Work: A Sampler of Historic Maine Photographs, 1860–1920.* Part II. Gardiner, Maine: Tilbury House Publishers and Portland, Maine: Maine Preservation, 2000. 384 pages, photographs, bibliography, index. Softcover. ISBN 0-88448-207-3. $35.00.

Many images replay in one's mind after the first look at *A Day's Work:* diligent, serious faces pausing in their labor to have their photographs taken; workaday views of wharves, shipyards, quarries, factories, woods, and farms; and glimpses of archaic technology. All those lime casks piled on that wagon seem to be an impossible load (page 87).

Bill Bunting has compiled a fine and varied collection of photographs of Mainers at work in the second half of the nineteenth century. His notes are rich in detail, with plenty of collateral information to help the reader interpret each image. Excerpts from local newspapers offer contemporary perspective and vernacular. There is an atmospheric quality to his remarks as well. He suggests sounds and scents to create a scene, and sometimes offers details that are not visible in the photograph, such as the vessels at the end of the hawser of a tug. In his introduction, he cautions us not to take history too seriously, and his descriptions often enhance our interpretation of the photograph on the page. However, alluding to a part of the image outside the frame leaves the reader wondering how he knows. Some photographs bleed off the page, and thus the reader can only assume that the image has been reproduced in its entirety.

For the maritime scholar, there is a rich variety of images, including shipyard and wharf scenes, roadstead views, and coastal panoramas. In addition to instate settings, Maine ships are depicted in Newfoundland, Cuba, Boston, New York, Buenos Aires, and the guano ports of the Chinchas Islands off Peru. The fleet is illustrated in all its varieties, from the grand view of the imposing five-masted schooner *Gov. Ames* on the ways at Leavitt Storer's shipyard in Waldoboro (the inaugural vessel that earned the town its moniker as "Home of the Five-Master Schooner") (page 301) to the worn deck of the stone sloop *Alletta L. Hamilton* of Portland (page 46). Freshwater vessels can be found as well, including guide boats, canal boats, and the various craft of the lumber trade. Shoreside marine industries are represented, from the sail lofts and

sparyards to a portrait of John McPherson, "hermit, poet, shingle 'weaver,' and shipknee 'expert'" (page 115). In some cases, views of the shipboard aspects of an industry such as coopering are complemented by photographs of their landside operations, providing a more complete look than a strictly maritime volume might offer.

The collection of photographs is compelling. Many are dramatically composed and sharp, and while the images are fairly large in size, it is disappointing that they are not reproduced with the same quality as Bunting's 1998 publication with Earle Shettleworth, *An Eye for the Coast: The Maritime and Monhegan Island Photographs of Eric Hudson,* also from Tilbury House. The reader may also find it takes a while to get used to looking for the title or subject of the image in the bottom margin of the page.

Photographs offer a genuineness in looking at history that fascinates in a way a painting or journal does not. Sometimes their lack of sharp focus enhances the sense that the viewer is catching a glimpse of the past. Bunting should be commended for choosing images not always for their "photographic" qualities, but sometimes for the stories that they tell. Those lime casks are new and therefore empty, so the load is not as heavy as it may appear. Still, it is a masterful loading job.

HELEN RICHMOND WEBB
Phippsburg, Maine

KEVIN LITTLEWOOD AND BEVERLEY BUTLER, *Of Ships and Stars: Maritime Heritage and the Founding of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.* London and New Brunswick, N.J.: Athlone Press and the National Maritime Museum, 1998. xxiv + 275 pages, illustrations, appendices, notes, index. Softcover. ISBN 0-48512-146-8. $33.95. (Transaction Publishers, 390 Campus Drive, Somerset, New Jersey 08873.)

Offering an art collection worth some £340,000 and the funds to equip the prospective buildings, shipping magnate Sir James Caird asked Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald in 1933 to support the founding of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich. Although other museums presented the kingdom's exploits on the high seas, the National Maritime Museum would uniquely become, he hoped, "a Valhalla of both our naval and our mercantile maritime history" (page 68). Parliament acted favorably in 1934. The genealogy and early history of that institution are the often fascinating subjects of Kevin Littlewood and Beverley Butler, freelance writer and university lecturer, respectively. Commissioned by the museum, *Of Ships and Stars* was published to mark Prince Phillip's fiftieth anniversary on the board of trustees. It should also be noted that Prince Philip contributed to the book's foreword.

Tracing the museum's roots, Littlewood and Butler highlight the role of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich (1873), and the Royal Naval Exhibition of 1891. Even more important was the 1909 launching of the Society for Nautical Research and its journal, the *Mariner's Mirror.* The Society for Nautical Research was on the decline by the early 1920s, but was reinvigorated by Royal Naval College historian Geoffrey Callender. "Drenched in the ethos of the Navy League with its worship of Nelson and its quasi-religious approach to national naval monuments," he persuaded it to assume the rescue of Nelson's flagship HMS *Victory.* Callender admitted becoming "physically sick" by the ship's irreverent sightseers, including "giggling girls, flirting in Nelson's cabin" with young Marine guides (page 34). The campaign would have failed but for a donation of fifty thousand pounds by Caird, who regarded the navy as Britain's "vital weapon" (page 41).

Hoping to revive "the imperial spirit," Callender was meanwhile "busily reinventing Maritime Greenwich" by making its history more central to the kingdom's expansion (page 49). The Society for Nautical Research followed suit in

1927 by forming the National Maritime Museum Trust to promote the founding of a museum, whose title was chosen by Rudyard Kipling to commemorate not only the Royal Navy, but all seamen. Other proponents included Royal Naval College Admiral Barry Domville, "a devotee of National Socialism" whose Greenwich pageant in 1932 "was as close as England came to fascist theatre" (pages 60–61).

With King George VI and his entourage in attendance, the museum opened in 1937. Over five thousand people attended the public debut, prompting Callender's complaints about the boisterous crowds who smoked cigarettes in the galleries and, lacking adequate conveniences, used the fireplaces in the Queen's House as "lavatories." Lord James Stanhope, an influential Conservative peer and chairman of the National Maritime Museum trustees, was appalled by the "filthy dirty beasts" (page 96). Director until his death in 1946, Sir Geoffrey ran his museum in naval style. With aesthetics dominant, it was initially little more than "a shrine to naval heroism" (page 110). Fortunately, its buildings escaped major structural damage during the war.

Frank Carr became director in 1946 but, lacking any clear vision, the museum drifted. Still a picture gallery with limited ambitions, it failed to save HMS *Implacable,* despite Caird's proffered restoration, and turned down the clipper *Cutty Sark,* which was saved by an independent group led by Carr and Prince Philip. The latter, appointed trustee in 1947, tried to break the Callender mold by encouraging the staff and board to develop a more modern, public-oriented museum. With limited success, the National Maritime Museum remained a third-rate museum, according to government standards, and its funding suffered. With the addition of the Royal Observatory, some change was effected by the 1960s, but an embittered Carr was forced to retire in 1966. Because of Britain's thirty-year protection of public records, Littlewood and Butler end their story there, although an upbeat afterword by National Maritime Museum Deputy Director Roger Knight briefly details the institution's recent progress.

In some ways, the National Maritime Museum is to be commended for encouraging a critical examination of its history, although its narrow scope is perhaps unfair to Carr. That analysis would have been more insightful, however, had Littlewood and Butler examined more of "the big picture." Little is said, except in passing, about the cultural, political, and social meaning of major acquisitions or the museum's relevance to the British nation during those traumatic decades. Likewise, the authors contribute only indirectly to the debate over the relationship between history and heritage, the construction of national and imperial identities, and the cultural politics of historic preservation. Regardless, *Of Ships and Stars* offers a revealing look at the internal affairs of a world-class museum.

JAMES M. LINDGREN
State University of New York at Plattsburgh

A. B. FEUER, *The U.S. Navy in World War I: Combat at Sea and in the Air.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1999. 224 pages, index, black-and-white photographs, maps, bibliography. ISBN 0-27596-212-1. $55.00.

Rather than writing a traditional history of naval operations in the Great War, Mr. Feuer presents a series of vignettes highlighting the major actions and activities of the U.S. Navy in that conflict. Beginning with the May 1915 sinking of *Lusitania*—which prompted President Woodrow Wilson to support a massive naval building program—Feuer traces the expansion of the navy, the development of new types of vessels, and the creation of a formidable fleet air arm. Although the Navy Bill of 1916 called for the construction of cruisers and dreadnought battleships, America's entry into the war in April 1917 quickly

prompted a change of emphasis to the laying down of escort and patrol vessels for antisubmarine warfare and to convoy American troops to France. Not surprisingly, the role of the navy in convoying and transporting the doughboys to the Western Front is treated in some detail.

The major American contribution to the war at sea was the North Sea Mine Barrage to prevent German U-boats from reaching the North Atlantic shipping lanes. In all, the U.S. Navy laid fifty-seven thousand of the sixty-seven thousand mines in that barrage. The mines used were of a new type developed by Ralph Brown of the Naval Torpedo Station at Newport, Rhode Island. Other American developments included the "Y" Gun for propelling depth charges, a class of wooden sub chasers (110 feet in length) used in Adriatic, Atlantic, and English Channel coastal waters, as well as a class of mass-produced steel "Eagle Boats" (204 feet in length with three-thousand-horsepower steam turbines) built by Ford in Detroit, even then unquestionably the automotive capital of the world.

Much of this work is devoted to naval aviation, including the famous 1st Yale Unit formed by future Assistant Secretary of the Navy Trubee Davidson, the evolution of the Davis recoilless aerial gun—a forerunner of the WWII bazooka—and the Kodak gun camera. The U.S. Navy's Northern Bombing Group based in Flanders and its flying boat squadron out of Porto Corsini, Italy, are granted ample space, as are the stories of several naval aviators, including the U.S. Navy's first and only WWI flying ace, David Ingalls, who flew from Flanders with the British Royal Air Force.

Leonard G. Shurtleff
Western Front Association

Roy Humphreys, *The Dover Patrol, 1914–1918*. Stroud, Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing, 1998. 216 pages, photographs, illustrations, select bibliography, index. £18.99.

The naval aspect of World War I unfolded in a manner unanticipated by pundits and planners before the war. The decisive clash of dreadnoughts took years to occur and then proved indecisive. Small ships and submarines became the active combatants, struggling to prevent or enable the flow of shipping, with the English Channel being a focal point of the shipping war. The acquisition of naval bases by the German navy in Belgium posed particular danger to Allied shipping. The Royal Navy base at Dover commanded the forces challenging the Belgian-based German Navy, and the force protecting Allied shipping in the central part of the English Channel became known as the Dover Patrol.

Eighty years after the war, Roy Humphreys, a vocational historian, set out to remind readers of the achievements of the Dover Patrol. The resulting book is a "slice of life" view of the naval war in this particular area. The main focus is the Royal Navy, with the German and French Navies covered as necessary. The primary approach is chronological. The result is a good overview of the events and people of the Dover Patrol, although the analytical context regarding the relationship between events in the English Channel and the rest of the war is minimal.

The world that Humphreys reveals is filled with thousands of ordinary sailors and a handful of key naval officers. The commanders of the Dover Patrol—Rear Admiral Hood and especially Vice Admirals Bacon and Keyes—receive considerable attention, with their plans, ambitions, accomplishments, and errors noted. Ordinary sailors are highlighted when events bring them into view. Individuals are presented against the backdrop of events in the Dover Patrol. The two main themes in that war were the protection of Allied shipping and the efforts to neutralize or threaten the German bases along the Belgian coast. Both efforts involved what in the

Napoleonic wars would have been called flotilla forces—small craft designed to carry out the actual task of "sea control" in an essentially continuous manner.

The actual warfare resulting from the outline sketched in the book would have been understood by naval officers who had sailed with Nelson, but new technology multiplied the complexity of operations. Mining and mine sweeping became endless: both sides used massive numbers of mines. Modified fishing vessels formed the core of the mine sweeping effort, for the most part manned by fishermen who had volunteered for the hostilities, harvesting high explosives rather than haddock. Finding and destroying submarines evolved rapidly. The eventual introduction of depth charges proved very important, but extensive Allied minefields set at depths where only submerged submarines would be destroyed proved critical to Allied success. Ultimately, the Dover "barrage" of mines would make the English Channel a prohibitively costly avenue for U-boats seeking access to the Atlantic.

Humphreys also details the evolution of aircraft and airships from a curiosity to a necessity in the battle to control the English Channel. They also supported another effort, the bombardment of the German bases on the Belgian coast, by spotting for monitors. Regular bombardments inflicted damage but never succeeded in shutting down the German efforts. The most famous attempt to neutralize these bases was the raid on Zeebrugge. The almost suicidal bravery of the Royal Navy and Royal Marine parties that tried to scuttle blockships in Zeebrugge's channel has been recounted many times, and is well covered again here. The modest results of this incredible action are an unfortunate reminder that bravery is not sufficient to guarantee success.

The book is filled with one hundred pictures, illustrations, diagrams, and sketches. These are well chosen and of good quality, providing an excellent backdrop to the events described in the text. Humphrey has relied on secondary sources, and has not used notes. The result is therefore readable but of limited value to serious researchers. As the dust jacket notes, the book has a "lively narrative" that presents "inspiring stories of derring-do." General readers will find this book enjoyable, and experts may find the brief overview worthwhile. However, the book would have profited from better editing. Repetition is frequent, as are minor errors of fact regarding names and titles. Despite these minor points, however, *The Dover Patrol* is a good account of a fascinating part of the First World War that many readers would find enjoyable.

DOUG MCLEAN
Ottawa, Ontario

MICHAEL ALFRED PESZKE, *Poland's Navy, 1918–1945*. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1999. xii + 222 pages, 29 black-and-white photographs, 7 appendices, notes, bibliography, index of names. 9" x 6". Hardcover. ISBN 0-78180-672-0. $29.95.

Many smaller fleets contributed to the Allied victory of World War II. Michael Peszke's new book, *Poland's Navy, 1918–1945,* examines a lesser known member of this contingent. It is a good book and well worth your consideration. The author of numerous articles and books, Peszke is an expert on the military forces of interwar Poland. Here he provides the reader with an operational history of Polish naval forces from their inception at the end of World War I until VE day in 1945. He skillfully injects political and diplomatic issues throughout, so the reader can better follow the sometimes confusing course of Poland's naval history.

This history begins in 1918, when the reborn Polish republic launched plans to build ships, ports, and a support infrastructure. Peszke details the problems of creating a fleet from a nation with limited naval traditions and a poor econo-

my. *Poland's Navy* manages to tell the story of battles on just about every front of World War II's European Theater. These include a glorious, albeit brief, campaign along Poland's Baltic coast, the escape of major fleet units to England, blue water actions against U-boats, amphibious operations, and even support for Allied espionage. Interesting details emerge, like those about the *Orzel,* a wrongfully interned submarine, whose crew overpowered their guards and sailed from Estonia to Great Britain without the benefit of charts. Readers also learn how Polish destroyers joined the Royal Navy and were used for antisubmarine patrols off Ireland, since this was less likely to stir up Irish-American voters in the critical years of 1940 and 1941. At the same time, Polish crews manned a small squadron of feluccas, employing these ancient sailing vessels for clandestine operations in the Mediterranean.

Although *Poland's Navy* abounds with operational details, it also records a steady decline of Polish influence within the Allied coalition, most evident after 1941, when both Britain and the United States recognized the tremendous power of their new partner, the Soviet Union. Peszke clearly demonstrates how diplomatic affairs affected the Polish fleet. Despite sailing under such dark skies, the Poles came through the war with a good record, and could proudly claim important contributions to the Allied victory.

While this book is a good introduction to the actions of this lesser-known fleet, some might argue that it lacks coverage of the river actions during the Russo-Polish War (1919–21) and the naval strategy and building plans of the 1930s. It certainly needs maps. These, however, are minor issues. Naval, Polish, and World War II enthusiasts will benefit from reading *Poland's Navy.*

John P. Dunn
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Keith Yates, *Flawed Victory: Jutland, 1916.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xviii + 352 pages, 23 photographs, maps, bibliography, index. 6" x 9¼". Hardcover. ISBN 1-55750-981-6. $34.95.

An ocean of ink has been spilled over this battle, one that flared briefly in the North Sea in 1916 and ultimately became the only engagement between the main battle fleets of Britain and Germany during World War I. The immediate results seemed mildly adverse for the British. Certainly, the Royal Navy, weaned on the legend of Nelson's smashing victory at Trafalgar, could list only a disappointingly small number of sunken German warships, while several British battlecruisers succumbed to catastrophic explosions. The losses in tonnage were 113,000 for the British and only 61,000 for the Germans.

The Germans made much of their apparent triumph publicly, and this boosted morale for a short while. Carefully reviewing the evidence and assessing it objectively, Yates argues persuasively that it was the Royal Navy that prevailed in the most important aspects of the battle. The Royal Navy did fail in important ways, but its achievements graphically demonstrated to the Germans how appallingly poor their odds of survival were when they faced the British Grand Fleet. The German High Seas Fleet made only one brief sortie after Jutland, and then remained alongside for the rest of the war, giving the British effective naval supremacy on the surface of the sea.

Yates spends the first third of the book describing the opening actions of the war at sea, succinctly setting the stage for the main event. The changes in naval warfare that preceded the Great War were profound, leaving admirals and theorists with serious questions as how to employ or neutralize the possibilities that long-range gunnery or, more challengingly, underwater weapons such as torpedoes and mines offered. The account provided here offers no new material, as Yates candidly admits in his preface. His goal is to summarize as simply and as clearly as possible the

issues surrounding the battle, not to unearth new evidence. The result is a very clearly written account, but one that explains existing interpretations rather than proposing new ones.

The bulk of the book is related to the battle itself. Yates again relies on the mass of secondary sources, focusing on providing a comprehensible account of this immensely complex and multifaceted battle. He is quite successful in this, portraying the engagements clearly, weaving together the many actions and incidents in a way that illuminates key points, and avoids details that might cloud or confuse a reader's understanding. He is painstakingly balanced in his assessments, pointing out courage, foolishness, skill, and stupidity with unswerving lucidity. His account shows Beatty, the commander of the British battlecruiser fleet, to be brilliant in his overall role of leading the German fleet into range of the Grand Fleet. On the other hand, Beatty is almost astonishingly poor at communicating his intentions to either his own ships or to Jellicoe, the commander of the Grand Fleet. Clear descriptions and critical analytical assessments are the real strength of this account.

A major theme running throughout the account is the accuracy—or lack thereof—of the various ships and groups of ships. The bewildering arrays of numbers that can be brought to bear in discussions of this nature call to mind Disraeli's dictum on statistics—lies, damned lies, and statistics. Once again, however, Yates threads his way carefully through the thickets of numbers to demonstrate that, with one glaring exception, gunnery results for both sides were relatively similar. The British battlecruiser fleet was heavily criticized because of the combination of their very poor shooting and the long period of engagement. Some authors suggested that British artillery, overall, was significantly worse than the German. Yates marshals a compelling case that it was a combination of appalling shooting by one segment of the British Navy and a substantial failure in shell design that combined to reduce the German fleet battlecruiser losses at the naval confrontation of Jutland.

The last part of the book assesses who really won the battle and briefly surveys the amazing debate regarding the history of the battle known in Britain as the "Jutland controversy." The suppression of parts of the historical record by key individuals who remained in prominent positions of power after the war, such as Beatty, provide an object lesson in how not to learn from history. The clear description of how history was warped by the influence of powerful individuals is one of the strongest parts of this account. The tactical lessons of Jutland may now be of limited applicability, but we learn that the dangers of letting history be manipulated are clearly as relevant today as they were then.

Flawed Victory is an excellent general history of the battle, but is less successful as a scholarly source. Yates's focus on a readable and general account of the battle resulted in his decision to forego notes. This omission is partially offset by the identification of key sources of information in the text, but it still limits its academic utility. The bibliography is reasonable, but it is certainly not an exhaustive listing of the mass of material that has been published on this battle. Finally, while the book does an excellent job of describing the generally accepted account of the battle, it does not attempt to encompass some of the recent literature that explores alternative explanations of the key events.

Flawed Victory is an excellent read and a lucid account of a complex battle. Yates clearly succeeds in his main objectives of laying out what happened in an accessible manner. The lack of some scholarly depth does not detract from his achievement.

Douglas McLean
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John H. Bryant and Harold N. Cones, *Dangerous Crossings: The First Modern Polar Expedition,* 1925. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xii + 232 pages, 31 illustrations, 5 maps, 4 appendices, notes, bibliography, index. 6" x 9". ISBN 1-55750-187-4. $27.95.

John H. Bryant, professor of architecture, and Harold N. Cones, professor of biology, are both students of radio history. In *Dangerous Crossings,* they have produced a brief study of the first Arctic exploratory expedition employing both shortwave radio and airplanes, making it the first modern Arctic expedition. This book is of special interest because the authors had access to manuscript collections that had not been available before. One source was the collection of photographs and papers kept by Cdr. M. A. Schur of the United States Navy, an aviator on the expedition. Another source was the papers of Eugene F. McDonald Jr., founder of the Zenith Radio Corporation and a sponsor of the expedition. These two collections had not been examined by scholars before.

The expedition was planned by Donald B. MacMillan, an Arctic explorer who had accompanied Robert Peary on his ventures in the Arctic, and Eugene F. McDonald Jr. They were the first to plan on using heavier-than-air craft in the far north as well as using shortwave radio. Previous expeditions had tried using radio with little success because they were broadcasting on what today we would call "medium wave." This was a serious limitation; the daytime range was less than three hundred miles. During the long daylight, Arctic summer expeditions were largely out of touch with the outside world, but by using shortwave, the expedition communicated with their Chicago Zenith station WJAZ and ham operators all over the world. The success of their radio contacts helped to improve morale during the isolation of the long Arctic winter night. Their success convinced the navy to adopt shortwave radio for their ships.

The discussion of the Loening amphibious airplanes, with their inverted engines, is especially interesting. The aircraft, under the command of Richard E. Byrd, allowed the expedition to explore more area in a few hours than previous expeditions could cover in weeks. Significantly, this was Byrd's first attempt at Arctic exploration.

It bothers me somewhat that Bryant and Cones believe everything MacMillan and McDonald said about the origins of the expedition plan, but appear to disbelieve nearly everything Richard E. Byrd said about the plans. Some important information seems to be missing. On 7 March 1925, Byrd claimed that the National Geographic Society intended to back his planned expedition to the tune of forty thousand dollars, which Bryant and Cones state was untrue (page 33). Indeed, they then cite a letter dated 19 March 1925 from the society's president, Gilbert Grosvenor, denying Byrd's request because of the apparent lack of time to prepare the expedition. Grosvenor added that he would later take up the request with the society's research committee, but when the expedition was finally approved, the Navy Department's press release stated that "the Expedition would be known as the 'Macmillan Arctic Expedition under the auspices of the National Geographic Society.'"

Bryant and Cone offer no explanation of how or why the National Geographic Society became involved. Is it possible that Byrd was responsible for obtaining funding from Grosvenor? Byrd claimed that MacMillan stole his plans, which Bryant and Cone dismiss. Both Melville Grosvenor of the National Geographic Society and Grover Loening, in his book about the expedition, agreed that MacMillan and McDonald somehow took over Byrd's plans (page 36). There is probably more to this story than has so far been discovered. Byrd was a friend of Grosvenor and of many of the naval officers involved in planning the expedition, and there is no telling what private conversations and understandings took place. In addition, Byrd had been responsible for

the creation of the navy's Board of Aeronautics a few years earlier.

In Appendix B, "A True Copy of a Letter from E. F. McDonald Jr. to Hon. Charles D. Wilbur," the following statement appears: "The first American Arctic expedition was financed and sent out by Congress in about 1850 under the command of Lt. De Hadin." McDonald was likely referring to the DeLong expedition, but obviously was referring to the famous Grinnell expedition sent out in 1850 under Lt. Edwin J. DeHaven. The DeLong expedition sailed in 1880, as indicated on the map on page 28.

The significance of the use of aircraft on the 1925 expedition is of the first importance. Bryant and Cones noted that, with less than eight days flying, the planes covered over six thousand miles, allowing the men to view more than thirty thousand square miles of terrain (pages 155–56). They covered more territory than could be viewed on foot in many years. The expedition was important for proving that high-frequency radio could penetrate the auroral zone and, perhaps most significantly, for introducing Richard E. Byrd to polar exploration. This book is a valuable contribution to the history of Arctic exploration.

HAROLD B. GILL JR.
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BOB MACALINDIN, *No Port in a Storm.* Caithness, Scotland: Whittles Publishing, 1998. xii + 146 pages, 57 illustrations, bibliography. 6½" x 9½". Softcover. ISBN 1-87032-537-9. £13.95.

Lightships are a unique part of the world's maritime heritage. To many, these vessels conjure up romantic images of floating beacons not unlike lighthouses. Lightships, however, were vastly different from other ships. As seamarks, they remained for long periods at sea, yet sailed nowhere. While the crews experienced some pleasant days on station, they also faced some of the most dangerous and grueling duty imaginable. During good weather, the crew could expect boredom and monotony. In fog, heavy seas, and hurricanes, their lives were in peril. Moored near the shipping lanes, even the ships they safely guided to port were at times their worst enemies. Lightships were frequently struck while carrying out their duty as beacons for safe navigation.

Because these ships served in isolation and are now obsolete, they are often overlooked or forgotten. Bob MacAlindin's collection of narratives in *No Port in a Storm* speaks specifically to the hazardous duty of these ships. Even as technology improved, the danger on lightships never changed appreciably from the earliest vessel moored in the Thames River in 1732 until the last one was withdrawn from the Western Hemisphere in 1994. MacAlindin, who was the manager of the North Carr Lighthouse Maritime Museum, leaves his readers with a clear understanding of the perils these ships faced.

MacAlindin begins his book with the Nantucket station, one of the most dangerous lightship positions in the world. The vessels that marked the Nantucket Shoals guided transatlantic and coastwise traffic through one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. In addition to the danger of collision, the exposed anchorage subjected the lightships and their crews to some of the ocean's fiercest storms. During the almost one hundred and thirty years that a lightship marked this thoroughfare, storms frequently caused the mooring cables to snap and the lightships to stray from their post dozens of times. For this particular station, the most defining moment came when the ocean liner *Olympic,* sister ship of the *Titanic,* collided with LV-117 and sent her to the bottom, killing seven of her eleven-man crew.

MacAlindin's stories and anecdotes include lightship stations around the world, yet he focuses much of his book on British lightships. His personal favorite, the North Carr Station, saw its share of bad weather and disasters. He clearly demonstrates that all lightship sailors shared sim-

ilar experiences. The sailors on the North Carr Lightship were subjected to a dramatic and tragic series of events during a storm in 1959. During this storm, the lightship's cable broke, and she began to drift toward the lee shore. The Royal National Life-Boat Institute launched the lifeboat *Mona* and the Royal Air Force sent rescue helicopters to bring off the crew. With great effort, the men on the lightship managed to get out the emergency anchor to save the ship. Tragedy, however, befell the rescue efforts of the *Mona.* The storm pounded the little vessel and killed all on board. Eventually, two Royal Air Force helicopters successfully airlifted the lightship's entire crew to safety.

While MacAlindin's book is filled with many entertaining stories, he unfortunately fails to bring to life the men who served on these ships. The readers are left wondering about such things, for instance, as their daily routine, what they did in their spare time, and what they ate. More importantly, we never fully understand how they felt about their duty and why they continued with their professions considering the hardships, privations, and dangers they faced. He cited mainly British sources for his book, unfortunately omitting some of the standard and important works that deal with American lightships, which may account for certain errors. For example, he calls the United States Coast Guard the U.S. Coastguard. He also does not use the correct name of the U.S. Bureau of Lighthouses, calling it the U.S. Lighthouse Bureau. The *Nantucket* (LV-117) was not sliced in half by the *Olympic* (page 6). She is known to be severely damaged but intact on the bottom of the ocean.

Nevertheless, MacAlindin has produced a useful, entertaining, and lively narrative of some of the most important lightships around the world. I would recommend this book to those who are interested in reading about a group of unusual ships that performed difficult service, and were manned by a special group of men who were constantly challenged by the elements.

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Eric Mills, *Chesapeake Rumrunners of the Roaring Twenties.* Centreville, Md.: Tidewater Publishers, 2000. xi + 92 pages, 65 photographs, 1 map, notes, bibliography, index. 9¼" x 6¼". Hardcover. ISBN 0-87033-518-9. $25.95.

Eric Mills presents his readers with a fast-paced anecdotal record of the activities of the watermen, businessmen, federal agents, and coast guardsmen on both sides of the law during Prohibition on the waters of the Chesapeake Bay. In addition to the coast guard records in the National Archives, his sources are mainly local newspapers and interviews with actual rumrunners or their descendants. The first two chapters deal mainly with the establishment of Prohibition in Maryland and Virginia and, in particular, Maryland's opposition to Prohibition. Mills juxtaposes the actions and speeches of the pro-Prohibition forces, such as the 16 January 1920 speech in Norfolk, Virginia, by Billy Sunday with the immediate actions taken by the rumrunners. Chapters three, four, and five deal not only with the rumrunning activities in Chesapeake Bay waters but also the activities on "Rum-Row," the line of large vessels waiting beyond the U.S. territorial limits along the Maryland-Virginia coast to off-load cargoes of spirits to small boats for runs up the bay. Two of the best stories are a description of the activities at John Pope's Cabaret in Norfolk in chapter three and the tales of lawman Lone Wolf Asher in chapter four.

One drawback with this book is Mills's method of referencing his sources. In his "notes," he gives extensive references in particular to local newspaper sources and coast guard records. Unfortunately, these references are not numbered in the text, and there is some difficulty in relating a specific piece of the text to a specific source. A

second, but not major, problem is that quite a few of the photographs are dark or blurred. I would, however, recommend *Chesapeake Rumrunners* to anyone seeking a readable, action-filled description of the Prohibition era on Maryland and Virginia waters. For someone seeking an in-depth political, social, or economic analysis of this era, the book might not prove totally satisfactory.

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HOWARD SAUER, *The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait.* Palo Alto, Calif.: Glencannon Press, 1999. xvi + 206 pages, illustrations, bibliography, appendices, index. ISBN 1-88990-108-3. $26.95.

As the ranks of World War II veterans thin with the passing years, each piece of recorded testimony that they leave behind increases in value. For that reason alone, Howard Sauer's *The Last Big-Gun Naval Battle: The Battle of Surigao Strait,* the memoir of a junior officer on the battleship *Maryland,* is a welcome addition to the literature on America's largest naval war.

It bears stating, however, that Sauer's title is misleading. This book is more than an eyewitness account of a single battle. Rather, it tells the story of Sauer's three years of wartime service. The book also represents yet another variation on a theme that permeates so many tales of the sea—the love of a sailor for his ship and his shipmates.

When Sauer graduated from the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University of California at Berkeley on 13 May 1942, he already held orders assigning him to the USS *Maryland* (BB-46). Caught in the Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, the *Maryland* came through with less damage than any of the seven other battleships present. She was quickly repaired, refitted, and returned to duty, but she would not assume the dominant role in the Pacific War for which she had been intended. Like her sisters built before the war, the *Maryland* experienced difficulty in making the eighteen-knot fleet speed when combat-loaded in warm waters. Unable to keep up with fast carrier task forces, she would be restricted to providing artillery support for amphibious landings.

Despite the *Maryland's* shortcomings, Ensign Sauer fell in love with her at first sight on 19 May 1942, and his affection would never falter for the rest of his life. Those feelings color his description of life aboard the *Maryland.* He also provides enthusiastic descriptions of the ship's performance at the American invasions of Tarawa, Kwajalein, and Saipan.

The book climaxes with the action at Surigao Strait, 24–25 October 1944, arguably the most dramatic phase in the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf. Thanks to the impetuosity of Admiral William F. Halsey, who sailed north with his fast carriers and new battleships to chase down some Japanese carriers, the transports and other ships supporting the Leyte invasion sat exposed to attack by Japanese fleet units under Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura. Fortunately, the *Maryland,* four of her sisters from Pearl Harbor (*West Virginia, California, Tennessee,* and *Pennsylvania*), and a sixth older battleship (the *Mississippi*) checked Nishimura. The obsolete battlewagons joined with American cruisers and destroyers in sinking the Japanese battleships *Yamashiro* and *Fuso,* as well as most of the rest of Nishimura's ships.

Sauer called the fight at Surigao Strait "the U.S. Navy's greatest single triumph" (page 109). That pardonable hyperbole aside, this long-gun duel certainly represented a moment of sweet revenge for the American sailors—the final payment on a debt that had been outstanding since that humiliating "day of infamy" in 1941.

Sauer follows the *Maryland's* story into the Okinawa Campaign, when a kamikaze struck the battleship on 7 April 1945, forcing her to retire to the Bremerton Navy Yard. She was undergoing modernization when two atomic bombings in

Japan convinced the Japanese to surrender in August 1945.

It is clear from Sauer's text and bibliography that he worked hard to get his facts straight before he committed his memoirs to paper. His own reminiscences are confirmed and enlivened by passages supplied by some of his shipmates. The book's only fault is its unvaryingly positive point of view. According to Sauer, the officers and men of the *Maryland* composed one big, happy family that always got along, always did its duty, and never committed serious errors. Even well-run ships experience a certain amount of friction, but no sign of that can be found in these nostalgia-tinged pages.

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ARNOLD HAGUE, *The Allied Convoy System, 1939–1945: Its Organization, Defence, and Operation.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. xiii + 208 pages, 49 photographs, 7 appendixes. 8¾" x 11¼". ISBN 1-55750-019-3. $34.95.

Arnold Hague, a retired Royal Navy officer, has been studying the naval war between 1939 and 1945 for more than five decades. This book is the latest fruit of a lifetime's work. He has packed a wealth of information into this deceptively slim volume, providing a detailed account of the Allied convoy system (including its origins, structure, and organization), methods of operation, and its development over the six years of World War II. Hague bases his account on extensive archival research in Britain, Canada, and the United States, although, in spite of the book's title, his major focus is on the British system. This is particularly true with regard to the organizational and administrative structures behind the convoys; the British structures are examined closely and in considerable detail while the comparable administrative aspects of the Canadian and United States systems do not receive quite the same attention.

Under clear and well-organized headings, Hague looks at the many interlocking elements that together accounted for the ultimate success of convoying in World War II. He examines the shore establishment that kept convoys in operation and touches on the effects of political and economic pressures. He describes the men who served, both navy and civilian, where they came from, and how they were trained. Of particular interest is the picture he paints of convoy commodores. Ocean convoy commodores were generally retired admirals and captains; almost without exception they were over sixty years of age when they were appointed, and some were older. Hague clarifies the relationship between the commodores, the civilian merchant ship masters and crews with whom they sailed, and the naval forces designed to protect them. He explains the different kinds of convoys, distinguishing trade convoys for commercial traffic from operational convoys composed of ships chartered for military purposes, such as troop transport. This leads naturally to a description of the many different kinds of vessels involved, both those bearing the vital cargoes and their navy escorts. In a particularly incisive section, Hague examines the threats to convoys from surface commerce raiders, from land-based aircraft, and most of all from the German U-boats. He also discusses the many forms of convoy defense, from intelligence, to tactics, to weapons. Finally, he demonstrates how replenishment was effected at sea and even has a couple of sections on rescue ships and rescue tugs.

One of the most expansive aspects of the book is the description of far-flung convoy operations stretching across the globe. In addition to the well-known North Atlantic and Mediterranean convoy routes, Hague describes such less familiar runs as those in the Indian Ocean, those around Africa, and those in Australian and Southwest Pacific waters.

A minor quibble one might raise is that at least one map would have been helpful to the reader who may not be able to picture easily the locations of such convoy destinations as Freetown, Sierra Leone, or who might have trouble imagining convoy routes such as that passing from the Downs westward to Liverpool.

Obviously, a work of this scope must rely on condensation, reducing a huge subject to a manageable read, and this is one of the things that Hague does best. Without sacrificing significant detail, his spare descriptions and definitions are illuminating. He even allows himself the occasional and very British touch of humor (or should I say humour), clearly enjoying, for example, the notion of one particularly acerbic commodore who had to be replaced because he antagonized all the masters of the civilian ships. Splendid and plentiful photographs, many of them from Hague's own collection, add to the book's appeal and illuminate the text.

The most significant contribution to the field, however, is made by the appendices that occupy the entire second half of the book. They list casualty statistics, convoy codes, and comprehensive convoy tables with sailing and arrival dates, points of departure and arrival, numbers of vessels involved, and numbers lost. Together with the index of ships lost, the appendices represent an impressive compilation of hard-to-find data.

This is the best short account of the convoy system around. It is a valuable reference for those already engaged in the field and an excellent, comprehensive overview for the new reader.

Kathleen Broome Williams
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Ken Small with Mark Rogerson, *The Forgotten Dead: Why 946 American Servicemen Died off the Coast of Devon in 1944—and the Man Who Discovered Their True Story.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999. 198 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 0-74754-467-0. (Bloomsbury Publishing, 38 Soho Square, London W1V 5DF, England.)

As the title and lengthy subtitle of this work—first published in 1988—suggest, Ken Small's account refers to a maritime disaster. It informs readers how he learned about the deaths of hundreds of American soldiers and sailors who, forty years earlier, had been participating in Exercise Tiger, a practice amphibious landing on Britain's south coast that was supposed to prepare them for the Normandy Invasion six weeks later. Those men never made it to Normandy, and Ken Small explains why.

Readers expecting new information in the 1999 edition will be disappointed since this is little more than a reprinting of earlier editions. Nevertheless, more than one hundred thousand copies have been sold, so obviously Small's account continues to arouse interest. Part of the reason for this phenomenon is the sheer scale of the disaster. However, it is also attributable to the passion he brings to his subject. When referring to his efforts to bring public remembrance to "The Forgotten Dead," Small had this comment: "Obsession is the word I have used, but I think it was also a crusade" (page 174). He spoke honestly. Finding out what had happened to the forgotten victims, and then raising a memorial to them, became his decades-long quest. This is the book's strength. It is also its weakness.

After opening his history with a description of an emotional church service honoring the American dead in Devon in 1984, Small devotes several chapters to the actual incident. He describes in accurate detail how a convoy of slow-moving Landing Ships Tank (LSTs) suffered torpedo attack from German high-speed motor torpedo boats (E-boats) in Lyme Bay in late April 1944, during which two LSTs were sunk and another heavily damaged. The death toll that night was 749 servicemen—two hundred more troops may have died later during the practice

landing on Slapton Sands. By this time, the reader has perused about one-third of the book.

The second-two thirds of *The Forgotten Dead* becomes intensely personal. It explains how Ken Small conquered cumbersome bureaucracies (both American and British) to create a memorial to the fallen, namely a long-submerged Sherman tank. It was he who found the resources, overcame all hurdles, and placed the tank on dry land. Ken Small is astute enough not to use the word "discovered" when referring to the victims. The dead servicemen, as other authors had already pointed out, had not been covered up in some conspiracy as some accounts of the mid-1980s suggested. Nor had they been buried in hastily dug graves in Devon pastures as other ghoulish stories claimed. Official accounts of the victims had surfaced as early as August 1944 in the *Stars and Stripes* after the Normandy Invasion when military secrecy was no longer necessary. Nevertheless, the victims off Slapton Sands had become "forgotten dead" in succeeding decades until Small dug up their story. It is at this point that his account becomes personal.

For the rest of his book, Small provides an autobiographical sketch including his humble origins, unsatisfying work as a young London policeman, his retread as a successful hair stylist, his move to Devon followed by midlife crisis, his self-made therapy as beachcomber, and finally—*voilà!*—his discovery of "The Forgotten Dead." It is at this point that obsession takes over. Fighting bureaucrats and skeptics on both sides of the Atlantic into a stupor, Small brought in the tank, erected his memorial, and thereby brought belated recognition to all those who had died during Exercise Tiger. There is no denying him this.

Whether or not the incident and its victims would have remained forever forgotten is problematical. After all, there were other maritime disasters of World War II involving large losses that have also came to light in recent years, and they did so without the services of a lone crusader. For example, public awareness has grown concerning the SS *Leopoldville,* torpedoed by a U-boat in December 1944 off Cherbourg with 880 soldiers killed. There is also the saga of the HMS *Rohna,* sunk by a Luftwaffe radio-controlled bomb off North Africa with 1,100 men lost in late November 1943. Nevertheless, Ken Small richly deserves credit for bringing recognition to the victims of Exercise Tiger. Until his crusade began, its victims, like so many others, had been relegated to the legions of the forgotten. In fact, his obsession may well have provided a model for others who decided that they, too, should finally bring recognition to victims long lost. After all, World War II consumed vast hordes of victims, all of them—or their surviving relatives—hoping for remembrance.

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Shorter Notices

by Briton C. Busch

Richard A. Gould, *Archaeology and the Social History of Ships.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. xiv + 360 pages, illustrations, bibliography, indices. Hardcover. ISBN 0-52156-103-5. $85.00. Paper. ISBN 0-52156-789-0. $25.95.

In this comprehensive work, Richard Gould, a professor of anthropology at Brown University and a recognized authority on underwater archaeology, offers a wide-ranging, state-of-the-art review of the field, linking a discussion of underseas technologies and recent field studies with such topics as changes in shipbuilding, shipboard life, navigation, overseas commerce, and the like. Some seventy-four photographs, charts, and diagrams add to the value of an important work that, while no doubt an invaluable text for an advanced course on such topics, also may serve as an excellent introduction for any reader requiring a sophisticated one-volume survey.

Spencer Apollonio, ed., *The Last of the Cape Horners: Firsthand Accounts from the Final Days of the Commercial Tall Ships.* Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2000. xxxi + 296 pages, illustrations, glossary, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 1-57488-283-x. $26.95.

No doubt devotees of memoirs from the last age of sail have their favorite author, be he James Bisset, Basil Lubbock, Eric Newby, Felix Riesenberg, Alan Villiers, or any other of the roughly thirty authors whose accounts are sampled in this collection by Maine marine biologist Spencer Apollonio. Readers may grumble that this or that passage is or is not included, but the volume is a fine bedside read for those who vicariously would go aboard such vessels as the *Parma, Pamir, Herzogin Cecilie,* or *Moshulu* in their last, great days. A precise list of page references in the original sources would have helped, but these may still be tracked down by anyone caring to do so. Surely, this volume will be of interest to many *American Neptune* readers.

Jürgen Rohwer, *Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two: German, Italian, and Japanese Submarine Successes, 1939–1945.* Annapolis: Greenhill Books and Naval Institute Press, 1999. xvi + 366 pages, charts, indexes. Hardcover. ISBN 1-55750-029-0. $49.95.

Jürgen Rohwer first published *Die U-Booterfolge der Achsenmächte, 1939–1945* in 1968, with an English-language version appearing from the Naval Institute Press in 1983. *Axis Submarine Successes* is a revised and extended version of that work, the result of a half-century of dedicated

research. It is, very simply, a massive list, day by day, month by month of Axis submarine successes, wherever possible giving the time and map reference location of the attack; the type, nationality, name, and tonnage of the target; the weapons used; and the nationality and number or name of the submarine and its commander. Detailed indexes are provided of submarines, commanding officers, convoys, and ships attacked, together with world-wide charts using a grid system. Taken altogether, this is an indispensable reference work for any collection concerned with the submarine war and its results.

BRUCE HAMPTON FRANKLIN, *The* Buckley-*Class Destroyer Escorts.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999. 232 pages, illustrations, maps, appendices, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 1-55750-280-3. $39.95.

The *Buckley*-class was the largest of the destroyer escorts ever built. Indeed, it was the second largest class of major combatants built for the U.S. Navy in World War II. Bruce Franklin has gathered an impressive body of material for this detailed study of all 154 ships in the class. Half the book is a well-written and well-illustrated history of the class as a whole, including a discussion of the design, armament, and various conversion programs (this last issue was an important one since some served in the Korean conflict and, later, as training vessels in the 1960s). The second half is a biography of each vessel, with as detailed a history as possible and a photograph; each ship was named for an individual, and one particularly interesting detail provided is the source for each name. More than one hundred thousand American and British sailors served aboard this class of DEs, the workhorses of the convoy and antisubmarine war; it is refreshing to see them receive the serious historical treatment that they deserve.

KEITH M. MILTON, *Subs against the Rising Sun.* Las Cruces, N.M.: Yucca Tree Press, 2000. 376 pages, illustrations, appendices, bibliography, index. Hardcover. ISBN 1-88132-545-8. $30.00.

The Pacific War saw 1,584 sorties made by 249 American submarines, fifty-two of which were lost. Keith Milton's reference study gives the data for each boat, grouped by class, along with a photograph. Patrol records include dates, captains, duration, confirmed sinkings, and other relevant details. Ten appendices list the submarines by number of sinkings, tonnage destroyed, Navy Unit, and Presidential Unit Commendations. A comprehensive index aids location of cross-references to vessels, allied and enemy, and individual captains. The one map is inadequate and wrong in several respects (Tiawan for Taiwan, Kirule for Kurile Islands), but this is a valuable reference book for comprehensive submarine collections.

The Creeks, Nantucket

Running to Cowes

Wave Runners

Brant Point

Power Twenty in Two